هل جعلنا القلق بشأن هرمز ننسى البحر الأحمر؟

Has القلق بشأن هورموز جعلنا ننسى البحر الأحمر؟

Authored by Gregory Copley via The Epoch Times,

Concerns during wartime over the security of maritime energy traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — connecting the Indian Ocean/Gulf of Oman with the Persian Gulf — have overshadowed the fact that the related issue of Red Sea security is far from resolved and is, in fact, becoming more dynamic.

The Red Sea–Suez link between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean is of equal strategic importance to global trade as the Hormuz choke point and is, through geography and common players, intrinsically linked with the Persian Gulf conflict.

But it is Ethiopia’s civil war, brewing with different factions and with varying intensity since the coup against Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974, which is again moving in ways that could prove decisive.

Always, in the background, is the reality that Ethiopia could revive its historical influence over the Red Sea–Suez sea line of communication (SLOC).

Inside Ethiopia, the conflicts that have been raging since 1974 between different governments and different factions are at a new level.

The four different Fano opposition militia groups, representing different areas of the Amhara heartland, have been fighting against the central government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali for several years. In early 2026, they came together with a united manifesto of their intentions. This has revived the momentum of the threat to Abiy’s Prosperity Party government.

A statement issued by a united Fano on Jan. 17, 2026 (Tir 9, 2018, in the Ethiopian calendar) noted:

“So that the Amhara struggle may become one, the leaders of the Amhara Fano National Force and the Amhara Fano People’s Organization, through a historic decision that demanded courage, open-heartedness, decisiveness, and trust in the people, have been able to make Fano unity a reality. ... We have designated one leader, one organization.”

Significantly, the leadership of the united Fano all titled themselves as “Arbegna,” a nod to the Arbegnoch, the Patriots, who, under the banner of Emperor Haile Selassie I, fought against the Italian invaders of Ethiopia from 1935 to 1941. This led to the ouster of the Italians at the Battle of Gondar, in late November 1941, the first major Allied victory of World War II, in the ouster of an Axis power (Italy) from territory it had seized.

Today, the result of the four separate Amhara Fano groups fighting against the Abiy government over the past several years was the creation—finally—of the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) as an umbrella for all civil and military operations. AFNM, however, described itself as working on behalf of all Ethiopians desirous of the restoration of the multi-ethnic empire. (Ethiopia is home to some 80 ethnic and linguistic groups.)

Prime Minister Abiy, half-Amhara and half-Oromo, has consistently identified with Oromo causes and first fought against a Tigrean-dominated government of Ethiopia, and then against the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) militia, which was forced into a ceasefire—essentially a military surrender by the TPLF—in November 2022.

Abiy’s Prosperity Party government has increasingly been rejected by his original Oromo militant supporters, who regard him as “insufficiently Oromo” in outlook, and the government’s writ—or its area of focus—now rarely extends beyond the capital, Addis Ababa. The exception for Abiy’s travels is to some major projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region of western Ethiopia. The dam has been the subject of some hostility from Egypt, which sees its existence as infringing on Egypt’s “right” to control the waters of the Blue Nile, even though they originate in Lake Tana in the Amhara Highlands of Ethiopia, outside Egypt’s territories.

The AFNM designated its first chairman as Arbegna Zemene Kasse, and its military commander as Brigadier General Tefera Mamo.

Meanwhile, Abiy’s government has become increasingly dependent on support from the governments of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and, to an extent, Turkey and the PRC, each of which has a strong interest in dominating the Red Sea–Suez sea line of communication.

To a key extent, Abiy has focused on modernizing the capital, Addis Ababa—which now resembles a Dubai skyline—but has less control over the broader hinterland of Ethiopia.

At the same time, the government of Egypt is working to support various Ethiopian regional independence groups to destabilize Ethiopian control of the Blue Nile waters, which Egypt claims are critical to its national security and economic well-being. Egypt has maintained an on-and-off war approach to Ethiopia since the late 19th century and lost several major military confrontations with Ethiopia during the late 19th century. All the supporting nations, as far as Abiy is concerned, also have interests that are inimical to Ethiopia’s revival of Red Sea influence.

It is important to note that Abiy has consistently ensured there is very little foreign news reporting from Ethiopia, which has had the positive benefit for the government that the civil wars, and the massive loss of life, have not been widely known around the world.

On the other hand, it has also prevented international investor and tourism interest in the country.

Now, Turkey, in particular, is vying for control of the region. It now actively controls the Somalian government and uses Somalian coastal territory for its military testing of ballistic missiles, among other things. It was particularly hostile to Israel’s diplomatic recognition of independent Somaliland, on the Red Sea coastline, in late December 2025.

Internally, in Ethiopia, the AFNM has been speaking—in its initial unity document—about representing the interests of all Ethiopian ethnicities and regions, not just the Amhara people and regions. It has been gathering significant military momentum, with additions to its ranks coming from defecting government forces. It did not, however, mention the restoration of Ethiopia’s last constitution from the pre-coup era, given that this was the last democratic reference point for the country.

All subsequent “constitutions” have been designed in the divide-and-conquer mode to keep ethnic groups separate and competitive, keeping various Ethiopian peoples as second-class citizens.

But what the AFNM has failed to do is to address meaningful international support or define the future shape of Ethiopia if it were to attain power. There has been no public discussion of its proposed economic or strategic policies. Only the adoption of the name of the Patriots—the Arbegnoch—gives any indication of its reflection of traditional Ethiopian values or historical Ethiopian geopolitical aspirations, which would include a reunification with Eritrea and the reacquisition of Ethiopia’s traditional Red Sea coastline.

It is significant, however, that Eritrea has been supporting the AFNM groups with arms and other support, and some Tigrean elements from the now-split TPLF have also supported Fano groups.

The AFNM operates freely in Amhara areas close to Addis Ababa and could certainly challenge Abiy’s forces in the capital. The other factor is the reporting that Abiy himself may be closer to the end of his leadership than the start of it. Change may not be imminent, but Abiy is becoming somewhat embattled.

But no wonder the world is oblivious to the wars of the Horn of Africa: The prime minister has consistently kept foreign journalists out of the country.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.