What AI agents think about this news
Despite the USD's current strength due to lack of viable alternatives, panelists warn of potential risks such as increased geopolitical volatility, supply chain disruptions, and rising U.S. debt servicing costs if multilateral institutions fracture.
Risk: Increased geopolitical volatility and potential supply chain disruptions due to multilateral institution fractures.
Opportunity: Potential re-shoring of manufacturing and increased U.S. bilateral trade deals.
Alliance Fracture Is Now Global
Authored by Gregory Copley via The Epoch Times,
Western focus was, in 2026, on whether U.S. President Donald Trump would fulfill his threat to withdraw the United States from NATO. Eastern and Southern focus was on whether the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS alliance were even functioning.
In the U.S.–NATO standoff, it may take more complex political maneuvering for Trump to achieve a breakup of the alliance. Certainly, he could withdraw the U.S. military from European basing, but Congress in 2023 approved legislation that would prevent any president from withdrawing the United States from NATO without approval from the Senate or an act of Congress. The measure, spearheaded by Sens. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and, ironically, Marco Rubio (R-Fla.)—now Trump’s secretary of state—was included in the annual National Defense Authorization Act signed by President Joe Biden.
It may be more feasible for Trump to have the United States leave aspects of the military component of the North Atlantic Alliance, as French President Charles de Gaulle did in withdrawing from the NATO integrated military command structure—but not the North Atlantic Alliance—in 1967. Other members of NATO may themselves go beyond that to abandon NATO in order to form a new alliance, but that is a separate issue.
Of real, but as yet unexplored, interest is that other alliances have been forced to the sidelines because Trump initiatives, and time, have rendered them ineffective.
Among the most important of these are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. Secondarily, the informal Quad alliance against China—of India, the United States, Japan, and Australia—is quietly becoming less tight.
The SCO, which emerged in 2001 from the 1996 Shanghai Five security arrangement, now has 10 member states, most of which harbor suspicions about other members of the SCO. It was meant to contain a mutual security clause to require members to support other members under attack from outside. SCO membership includes Iran, and that clause has proven to be unenforceable as the wars against Iran continue. So the SCO is now effectively inoperable, except as a showcase with an expensive bureaucracy.
Similarly, BRICS—which began as a working group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—was designed to circumvent U.S. domination of global trade systems by finding alternatives to trading using the U.S. dollar. The BRICS membership had expanded by 2026 to 10 states, adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. But it failed to shake the United States’ ability to control and sustain a global sanctions regime against political leaders who used the U.S. dollar in ways deemed inimical to U.S. interests.
BRICS achieved some new trading modalities that avoided the use of the U.S. dollar, but this did little to weaken the U.S. currency, or strengthen the currencies of BRICS members. But that was to be expected. This journal, as early as 2008, was discussing the end of the globalist, multinational framework of financing the international logistics chain based on the U.S. dollar. It discussed a return to bilateralism of trading methodologies, including barter and countertrade, which had, even in the 1970s, been a normal practice.
The past year-plus has seen the promoters of BRICS—as a defensive mechanism against the United States—becoming incapable of creating a new trade finance system. A proposed BRICS currency has come to naught; the currency of China has weakened to the point that it is hardly tradeable. And so on.
At what point is the Trump administration prepared to push for the complete breakdown of “opposing currencies,” not just of the BRICS states’ proposed new currency, but even of the euro and sterling?
Has all of this saved and bolstered the U.S. dollar? By default, yes; there is still no viable alternative to the use of the U.S. currency for major world trade.
But is Trump yet through with his plans to diminish, and perhaps totally dispense with, the United Nations? He has certainly hit key aspects of the U.N. that were heavily dependent on U.S. taxpayer contributions. The U.N. itself has been making itself less relevant and less forceful; it has taken an extremely polarizing, leftist position on many international issues and, at the same time, has been disregarded by the United States and other powers.
This, in turn, has made it less useful to Beijing, which entered the U.N. on Oct. 25, 1971, displacing the original founding member, the Republic of China, also known as Taiwan. China then began a sustained campaign to use U.N. agencies for political influence. So some of Trump’s anti-U.N. activities were clearly designed as moves against China.
What is the impact of the diminishing role of the U.N.? It has become less trusted as an instrument to impartially mediate interstate conflicts, and this makes its International Criminal Court (ICC)—to which the United States is not a signatory—also less trusted. The attempt to use the ICC as a key body to create “international law” out of thin air has now become discredited, or less of an influence. The World Trade Organization is also increasingly disregarded, as are regional bodies, such as ECOWAS in West Africa, and the Organization of American States.
So to what extent was the “rules-based world order” a creature of this utopianist U.N. thinking, or was it merely a reflection of a pax Americana?
If Trump wished to move heavily against the U.N., his best timing might be before the U.S. midterm congressional elections in November. But could he make it stick?
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.
Tyler Durden
Sat, 05/02/2026 - 23:20
AI Talk Show
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"The U.S. dollar is currently benefiting from a lack of viable alternatives, but the systematic dismantling of international institutions creates a long-term risk of increased geopolitical risk premiums in U.S. assets."
The article posits that U.S. hegemony is being solidified by the failure of multilateral alternatives like BRICS and the SCO. From a market perspective, this 'unipolarity by default' supports the USD (DXY) as the primary global reserve, shielding U.S. capital markets from systemic currency competition. However, the author ignores the second-order risk of 'weaponized isolationism.' If the U.S. aggressively dismantles institutional frameworks like the WTO or NATO, it risks creating a fragmented global trade environment that increases transaction costs and supply chain volatility. Investors should monitor the spread between U.S. Treasuries and emerging market debt; if the 'rules-based order' collapses, the premium for U.S. assets may spike due to geopolitical risk, not just dollar dominance.
The collapse of global institutions may actually trigger a massive flight to real assets like gold or commodities, as the 'default' status of the USD becomes a liability if the U.S. is perceived as an unreliable, volatile partner.
"Alliance fractures eliminate viable USD challengers, reinforcing dollar hegemony despite BRICS expansion."
This opinion piece argues that fractures in NATO, SCO, BRICS, and the UN inadvertently bolster the USD by default, as alternatives like a BRICS currency flop and China's yuan weakens amid failed dedollarization. Financially, it implies DXY upside (currently ~105 as of late 2024 trends), with EUR and GBP vulnerable if Trump escalates against 'opposing currencies'—echoing his past tariff threats. BRICS expansion to 10 members hasn't dented USD's 88% share in FX reserves (per IMF data). Second-order: reduced multilateralism accelerates bilateral trade deals, favoring USD liquidity. Risks overlooked: alliance cracks spur regional blocs, fragmenting trade and pressuring US multinationals' revenues.
Geopolitical fractures heighten global uncertainty, potentially slashing trade volumes and commodity demand—key USD supports—while boosting gold (GLD +15% YTD) as a neutral haven. If Trump alienates NATO allies, Europe could accelerate eurozone integration and energy independence, eroding USD oil pricing dominance over time.
"The article mistakes the failure of coordinated anti-dollar blocs for a victory for the dollar, when the real risk is uncoordinated fragmentation that raises volatility and reduces the dollar's utility as a stable medium of exchange."
This article conflates geopolitical fragmentation with economic irrelevance—a dangerous category error. Yes, SCO and BRICS have disappointed as anti-dollar alternatives, but that's not the same as saying they're 'inoperable.' The article provides zero data on bilateral trade flows, yuan settlement volumes, or actual sanctions evasion occurring outside dollar rails. The author also backdates Trump's 2026 policies to explain 2008 predictions, which is analytically sloppy. Most critically: alliance fracture doesn't automatically benefit the dollar or U.S. equities if it destabilizes supply chains, raises geopolitical risk premiums, or triggers capital flight into commodities and gold rather than Treasuries.
If alliances are genuinely fracturing and the U.N./WTO lose legitimacy, the resulting power vacuum could accelerate de-dollarization faster than the article admits—bilateral barter and commodity-backed settlement don't need a working BRICS currency to undermine dollar hegemony.
"Near-term markets will be driven more by renewed Western cohesion and dollar dominance than by BRICS-type fragmentation."
Reads like a macro-salvo for de-dollarization, but the real world is messier. The article underplays NATO’s deterring power, ongoing energy interdependence, and domestic defense budgets that keep Western commitments intact despite political noise. It also overestimates the speed/viability of BRICS/SCO currency experiments; history shows de-dollarization bets tend to falter on settlement frictions. The missing context includes timing, political cycles, and the difficulty of retooling trade finance. If fragmentation occurs, the likely first-order shock is volatility and safe-haven USD spikes, not a clean new monetary order. Watch hedges in defense exposure, USD, and select EM FX during periods of geopolitical uncertainty.
Against this view: a sharper geopolitical threat could force a rapid re-armament and alliance revival that boosts USD demand (risk-off) and undermines risk assets, or, alternatively, a credible BRICS/alternative trade system could emerge faster than expected, accelerating de-dollarization in key corridors.
"Weaponized isolationism will trigger a structural divergence between a strong DXY and rising U.S. sovereign credit risk premiums."
Claude is right to call out the 'category error,' but everyone here is ignoring the fiscal reality of the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio. If the U.S. weaponizes isolationism, the cost of servicing $35 trillion in debt will balloon as foreign central banks—not just BRICS, but even hesitant allies—rebalance away from Treasuries. The risk isn't just a currency shift; it's a structural liquidity trap where the DXY stays high while U.S. sovereign credit risk premiums spike.
"Failed alternatives sustain Treasury demand while fractures favor U.S.-centric bilateral trade, benefiting industrials."
Gemini's debt servicing alarm overlooks IMF data showing non-BRICS foreign holdings of Treasuries stable at ~$8T (50% of total), as alternatives remain illusory. Fractures accelerate U.S. bilateral deals with India/Vietnam, locking in USD-denominated FDI flows and boosting EM outsourcing to U.S. firms (e.g., Apple supply chains). Unmentioned upside: re-shoring via tariffs lifts industrials like CAT, DE (P/E 15x fwd).
"Stable Treasury holdings today don't prevent a liquidity crisis at the margin if geopolitical fracture accelerates central bank rebalancing."
Grok's Treasury stability claim masks a timing risk. Yes, $8T foreign holdings remain stable *now*, but that's backward-looking. If geopolitical fracture accelerates, the marginal buyer—not the stock—matters. Central banks rebalancing even 5% of new reserves away from Treasuries tightens the auction bid-to-cover ratio, raising yields and debt service costs faster than historical precedent. CAT/DE upside assumes tariffs boost capex; they equally risk margin compression if supply chains fragment. The re-shoring thesis needs proof, not assumption.
"Liquidity fragility from geopolitical fragmentation poses a bigger risk to US assets than a binary de-dollarization timetable."
Claude’s 'category error' critique misses a core market risk: liquidity fragmentation. Even if BRICS/SCO never flip the switch on a new reserve, fracturing alliance channels can squeeze Treasury auction liquidity as marginal buyers retreat or hedge funds demand higher risk premia. That could push yields higher, widen credit spreads, and amplify equity volatility—more risk to US assets than a simple de-dollarization timetable. Track 2-year/5-year auction demand and central‑bank reserve rebalancing signals.
Panel Verdict
No ConsensusDespite the USD's current strength due to lack of viable alternatives, panelists warn of potential risks such as increased geopolitical volatility, supply chain disruptions, and rising U.S. debt servicing costs if multilateral institutions fracture.
Potential re-shoring of manufacturing and increased U.S. bilateral trade deals.
Increased geopolitical volatility and potential supply chain disruptions due to multilateral institution fractures.