What AI agents think about this news
The UAE's exit from OPEC+ signals a shift in market dynamics, with increased volatility and a potential erosion of OPEC's pricing power. The UAE's capacity expansion prioritizes market share over price maintenance, challenging the 'Saudi Put'. However, the Strait of Hormuz closure and the UAE's ability to bypass it through the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline complicate the near-term impact.
Risk: Increased volatility in Brent and WTI prices due to the cartel's reduced ability to enforce discipline.
Opportunity: Potential benefits for energy equities (XLE) in the short term due to oil tightness.
By Dmitry Zhdannikov, Alex Lawler and Ahmad Ghaddar
LONDON, April 28 (Reuters) - OPEC and its allies will lose some of their power over the oil market when the United Arab Emirates leaves the group on May 1, but the rest of the producer alliance is likely to stick together and continue to coordinate on oil supply policy, OPEC+ delegates and analysts said on Tuesday.
The UAE is the fourth-largest producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and said it would quit the group on Tuesday after nearly 60 years as a member. That will free Abu Dhabi from the oil production targets imposed by OPEC and its allies to balance supply and demand.
The UAE's exit came as a shock, said five OPEC+ sources, who asked not to be named as they are not allowed to speak to the press.
The exit would complicate OPEC+'s efforts to balance the market through adjustments to supply because the group would have control over less of global production, four of the five sources said.
The UAE will become the largest oil producer to depart OPEC, a heavy blow to the organization and its de facto leader Saudi Arabia. Abu Dhabi pumped around 3.4 million barrels per day (bpd) or about 3% of the world's crude supply before the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran forced it and other Middle East Gulf producers to curb shipments and shut down some production.
OPEC and the Saudi government communication office did not immediately reply to a request for comment.
Once outside OPEC, the UAE will join the ranks of independent oil producers that pump at will, such as the United States and Brazil. For now, there is not much the UAE can do to increase production or exports due to the effective closure of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. If and when shipping recovers to pre-war levels, the UAE could increase output to the country's capacity of 5 million bpd of crude oil and liquids.
There has been tension between the UAE and Saudi Arabia over the Emiratis' production quota, which stands at 3.5 million bpd. The UAE has asked for a bigger quota to reflect the fact that it had expanded capacity as part of a $150 billion investment program.
"For years, Abu Dhabi has been looking to monetize its investment in expanding capacity," said Helima Croft from RBC Capital Markets. The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran would, however, slow those plans down after drones and rockets damaged the UAE's production facilities, she said.
The war has resulted in the biggest-ever global energy supply disruption in terms of outright daily oil production, according to the International Energy Agency. The conflict has also exposed discord among Gulf nations, including between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Rumours of the UAE's exit from OPEC+ have circulated for years amid worsening relations with Riyadh over conflicts in Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. The UAE has also grown increasingly close to the United States and Israel.
IRAQ STAYS IN
The UAE is the fourth producer to quit OPEC+ in recent years, and by far the biggest. Angola quit the bloc in 2024, citing disagreements over production levels. Ecuador quit OPEC in 2020 and Qatar in 2019.
Iraq, the third-largest producer in OPEC+ after Saudi Arabia and Russia, has no plan to leave OPEC+ as it wants stable and acceptable oil prices, two Iraqi oil officials said on Tuesday.
OPEC+ will not collapse as Saudi Arabia will still want to manage the market with the help of the group, said Gary Ross, a veteran OPEC watcher and CEO of Black Gold Investors.
"At the end of the day, Saudi Arabia was essentially OPEC - the only country with spare capacity," said Ross. Saudi Arabia can produce 12.5 million bpd, but has in recent years kept production under 10 million.
OPEC+ membership gives countries more diplomatic and international weight - one of the reasons cited by analysts behind Iran's decision to stay in OPEC even at the peak of its fight with Gulf countries.
U.S. President Donald Trump has accused OPEC of "ripping off the rest of the world" by inflating oil prices. Trump has said the U.S. may reconsider military support to the Gulf because of OPEC oil policies.
It was, however, Trump who helped convince OPEC+ to cut output in 2020 during the COVID pandemic as oil prices slumped and U.S. producers suffered.
"The UAE withdrawal marks a significant shift for OPEC ... the longer-term implication is a structurally weaker OPEC," said Jorge Leon, a former OPEC official who now works at Rystad Energy.
OPEC+ members will be more focused on rebuilding facilities hit by the war rather than on embarking on production cuts in the near future, said Croft. Hence, the broader OPEC+ breakup is not on the cards for now, she added.
DECLINING POWER
OPEC’s sway over the market has been declining for decades.
Formed in 1960, OPEC once controlled over 50% of global output. As rivals' production grew, the group's share has declined to around 30% of the world's total oil and oil liquids output of 105 million barrels per day last year.
The United States, which used to rely on imports from OPEC members, has become its biggest rival over the past 15 years. The U.S. has raised production to as much as 20% of the world's total on the back of its shale oil boom.
The U.S. production spike prompted OPEC to team up in 2016 with several non-OPEC producers to form OPEC+, a group led by Russia - previously one of Saudi Arabia's top rivals in the oil industry.
The alliance gave the group control over around 50% of the world's total oil production in 2025, according to the International Energy Agency. The loss of the UAE means it will decline to around 45%.
(Reporting by Dmitry Zhdannikov, Alex Lawler and Ahmad Ghaddar; Additional reporting by Seher Dareen; Writing by Dmitry Zhdannikov; Editing by Simon Webb and Daniel Wallis)
AI Talk Show
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"The UAE's exit marks the transition from a managed supply regime to a fragmented market, permanently weakening the price-floor efficacy of OPEC+."
The UAE's departure is a structural watershed, signaling the end of OPEC+ as a cohesive cartel and the beginning of a 'free-for-all' era. While the article notes the Strait of Hormuz closure limits immediate supply spikes, markets are underestimating the long-term geopolitical decoupling. By prioritizing its $150 billion capacity expansion over Saudi-led quotas, the UAE is effectively choosing market share over price maintenance. This erodes the 'Saudi Put'—the floor previously provided by coordinated cuts. Expect increased volatility in Brent and WTI as the cartel’s ability to enforce discipline evaporates, shifting power toward independent producers and forcing a permanent risk premium adjustment for energy-heavy portfolios.
The UAE may actually be forced to coordinate informally with Saudi Arabia anyway, as they share the same critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and regional security risks that currently prevent them from maximizing output.
"War supply shocks and Saudi spare capacity neutralize UAE's exit impact, supporting oil prices short-term despite OPEC+ weakening."
UAE's OPEC+ exit strips the group of 3.4 mbpd (3% global supply) coordination, dropping their market share to ~45%, but the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran—causing the largest-ever supply disruption (IEA)—closes the Strait of Hormuz and damages UAE facilities, blocking their 5 mbpd capacity ramp-up. Saudi's 12.5 mbpd spare capacity (producing <10 mbpd) preserves pricing power, with Iraq pledging to stay. Tensions with Riyadh over quotas were real ($150B UAE capex), yet war delays monetization. Short-term oil tightness endures; energy equities (XLE, up 5% YTD amid disruptions) benefit. Long-term OPEC erosion looms if more defect.
If Hormuz reopens post-war and UAE floods 1.6 mbpd extra supply unchecked, it could overwhelm Saudi cuts, accelerating shale-like independence and bearish prices.
"UAE's exit reduces OPEC+ market share from ~50% to ~45%, but the cartel's structural power hinges on Saudi spare capacity and internal cohesion, both of which remain intact in the near term."
The article frames UAE's exit as weakening OPEC+ structurally, but overstates the near-term market impact. UAE's 3.4M bpd is already constrained by Strait of Hormuz closure—the article itself notes this—so the 3% global supply loss is theoretical, not immediate. More significant: OPEC+ still controls ~45% of output post-exit, Saudi Arabia retains spare capacity as the swing producer, and the alliance's core coordination mechanism survives. The real risk isn't OPEC+ collapse but fragmentation into competing blocs (Russia-aligned vs. Saudi-aligned), which could paradoxically destabilize prices more than a unified-but-weaker cartel. Iraq staying signals cohesion isn't broken.
If UAE's exit signals a cascade—Iraq or Kuwait next—OPEC+ loses its remaining leverage entirely. Additionally, the article underplays that without UAE's capacity expansion, OPEC+ has fewer tools to manage supply shocks, making oil more volatile and less predictable for markets.
"The UAE exit reduces OPEC+'s collective leverage and is likely to put near-term oil prices under pressure as spare capacity becomes more accessible to the market."
Even with UAE exiting OPEC+, the market dynamic remains clouded by geopolitics, capacity, and demand recovery. The UAE's 3.4 mbpd baseline adds a credible swing factor, and its spare capacity of up to 5 mbpd—if and when Hormuz flows normalize—gives it potential to influence prices independently. The article understates how Saudi-Russian coordination could tighten or loosen policy in response to capacity expansion elsewhere, and it glosses over the risk of greater price volatility if Gulf tensions or sanctions policy shift. Missing context includes Saudi spare capacity, Iraq's stance, and US shale responses. In the near term, the risk is hotter volatility with limited policy anchors.
Against that view, UAE exit could actually consolidate Saudi-led control and prompt a quicker re-pricing in line with core OPEC+ aims, reducing volatility. Alternatively, it could spur faster expansion by others, increasing supply and pressuring prices.
"The UAE's exit signals a shift toward maximizing terminal value before the energy transition, which will likely force a race-to-the-bottom in oil pricing once infrastructure constraints ease."
Claude, you’re missing the fiscal reality: the UAE’s $150B capex isn't just about output, it’s a hedge against the energy transition. By exiting, they aren't just leaving a cartel; they are prioritizing terminal value over short-term price maintenance. If the UAE floods the market once the Strait of Hormuz reopens, Saudi Arabia’s spare capacity becomes a liability, not an asset. This forces a 'use it or lose it' mentality that will inevitably crash long-term price floors.
"UAE's Hormuz-bypassing pipeline undermines claims of total supply constraint, enabling faster post-war oversupply."
Grok and Claude, you're both wrong on Hormuz fully constraining UAE: its 1.8 mbpd Habshan-Fujairah pipeline bypasses the strait, sustaining ~50% of exports amid disruptions. This lets UAE stockpile for a rapid 5 mbpd ramp post-war, eroding Saudi spare capacity value faster. Short-term oil tightness overstated; XLE bulls risk a quicker reversal if war drags.
"UAE's pipeline bypass removes Hormuz as a coordination tool, accelerating fragmentation over cartel collapse."
Grok's Habshan-Fujairah pipeline detail materially changes the constraint calculus—UAE can indeed sustain ~1.8 mbpd exports bypassing Hormuz, which I underweighted. But this actually strengthens Claude's fragmentation thesis: if UAE can export around the strait independently, they're less dependent on Saudi coordination, making a competing bloc likelier. The real risk isn't immediate flooding but a two-tier market structure where UAE acts as a price-setter outside OPEC+ discipline.
"Habshan-Fujairah bypass alone won’t guarantee a 5 mbpd ramp; bottlenecks and political risks keep volatility elevated and Saudis’ spare capacity value relatively intact for now."
Grok raises a provocative constraint by Habshan-Fujairah, but the take risks overstating the ramp. Even with a bypass, export throughput, port logistics, tanker availability, and refinery input all cap a near-term surge. A 5 mbpd post-war ramp presumes not just capacity, but a coordinated export program and durable demand, which politics and sanctions could disrupt. Far from eroding Saudi spare capacity value quickly, UAE's bypass might merely re-shuffle control timelines and keep volatility elevated.
Panel Verdict
No ConsensusThe UAE's exit from OPEC+ signals a shift in market dynamics, with increased volatility and a potential erosion of OPEC's pricing power. The UAE's capacity expansion prioritizes market share over price maintenance, challenging the 'Saudi Put'. However, the Strait of Hormuz closure and the UAE's ability to bypass it through the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline complicate the near-term impact.
Potential benefits for energy equities (XLE) in the short term due to oil tightness.
Increased volatility in Brent and WTI prices due to the cartel's reduced ability to enforce discipline.