By Maksym Misichenko · Nasdaq ·
What AI agents think about this news
The panelists agree that while HIMS shows impressive revenue growth, its heavy reliance on marketing spend and lack of disclosure on unit economics and customer acquisition costs raise concerns about sustainability and profitability. GDRX, despite flat revenue, is seen as a more defensive play due to its pivot towards Pharma Direct and weight-loss medications, which could improve unit economics at scale.
Risk: Margin compression for HIMS due to potential regulatory changes in telehealth prescribing for controlled substances, which could force a shift towards lower-margin primary care.
Opportunity: GDRX's Pharma Direct and weight-loss medications pivot, which could improve unit economics and re-rate the company's multiples if it hits a 40% mix.
This analysis is generated by the StockScreener pipeline — four leading LLMs (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok) receive identical prompts with built-in anti-hallucination guards. Read methodology →
Hims & Hers Health currently leads the revenue comparison against GoodRx, displaying continuous upward momentum across recent reporting periods.
GoodRx has experienced a relatively flat quarter-over-quarter revenue pattern throughout the observed period, whereas Hims & Hers Health has shown consistent, sequential growth.
Investors should watch whether the widening revenue gap between the two companies continues to expand or begins to stabilize in upcoming quarters.
GoodRx (NASDAQ:GDRX) primarily generates revenue by offering a price comparison tool that helps consumers find geographically relevant pricing and access negotiated discounts on prescription drugs across the United States.
While expanding its offerings to include new weight-loss medications and navigating a rejected privacy settlement in federal court, it reported about 21% EBIT margin for the quarter ended Dec. 31, 2025.
Hims & Hers Health (NYSE:HIMS) earns its revenue by operating a telehealth network that connects consumers to licensed healthcare professionals, providing medical consultations and ongoing prescription medication subscriptions directly to customers.
It shifted its strategy to collaborate with a major pharmaceutical manufacturer and faced several shareholder investigations, while generating approximately 72% gross margin for the quarter ended Dec. 31, 2025.
Revenue here refers to the data provider's standardized income-statement revenue line item, and it serves as a straightforward indicator of overall consumer demand that helps investors evaluate whether a business is successfully attracting and retaining users.
| Quarter (Period End) | GoodRx Revenue | Hims & Hers Health Revenue | |---|---|---| | Q1 2024 (March 2024) | $197.9 million | $278.2 million | | Q2 2024 (June 2024) | $200.6 million | $315.6 million | | Q3 2024 (Sept. 2024) | $195.3 million | $401.6 million | | Q4 2024 (Dec. 2024) | $198.6 million | $481.1 million | | Q1 2025 (March 2025) | $203.0 million | $586.0 million | | Q2 2025 (June 2025) | $203.1 million | $544.8 million | | Q3 2025 (Sept. 2025) | $196.0 million | $599.0 million | | Q4 2025 (Dec. 2025) | $194.8 million | $617.8 million |
Data source: Company filings.
The top-line stagnation that has been frustrating GoodRX investors did not improve during the first three months of 2026. On May 6, the medication savings platform reported first-quarter sales that declined by 4.4% year over year to $194 million.
Revenue dropped, but GoodRx’s pharma direct business is encouraging investors. The stock rose more than 10% following its first-quarter report. Shareholders seem pleased with an 82% year-to-year gain for the company’s Pharma Direct business. At $52 million, the Pharma Direct business is responsible for about 27% of total revenue.
With the average annual cost for a family health plan reaching $27,000 in 2026, fewer Americans have access to a primary care physician. The rising cost of traditional access to prescription drugs has been a strong tailwind for Hims & Hers Health’s alternative platform.
His & Hers will announce first-quarter results on May 11, 2026. In the fourth quarter of 2025, the company reported 13% year over year subscriber growth. With fourth-quarter revenue that surged 59% year over year, it’s clearly outperforming GoodRx.
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Cory Renauer has no position in any of the stocks mentioned. The Motley Fool has positions in and recommends Hims & Hers Health. The Motley Fool recommends GoodRx. The Motley Fool has a disclosure policy.
The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Nasdaq, Inc.
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"HIMS's rapid revenue growth is masking a high-burn customer acquisition strategy that risks long-term profitability compared to the more efficient, albeit slower, B2B pivot at GoodRx."
The market is rewarding HIMS for aggressive top-line growth, but investors are ignoring the sustainability of their customer acquisition costs (CAC). While HIMS shows impressive revenue scaling, their reliance on heavy marketing spend to fuel subscriber growth creates a precarious margin profile compared to the more mature, albeit stagnant, model of GDRX. GoodRx’s pivot toward Pharma Direct is a higher-margin, B2B-focused play that could yield better long-term profitability if they successfully monetize their existing user base. HIMS is a momentum trade; GDRX is a value-trap or a potential turnaround candidate. I am skeptical of HIMS's ability to maintain these growth rates without significant margin compression as they scale.
The counter-argument is that HIMS is successfully building a defensible brand moat in telehealth, allowing them to eventually lower CAC and achieve operating leverage that GoodRx's commoditized price-comparison tool can never match.
"GDRX's Pharma Direct segment, growing 82% YoY to 27% of revenue with 21% EBIT margins, offers a higher-margin inflection the article underplays amid HIMS's growth volatility."
The article glorifies HIMS's revenue surge (Q4'25: $618M, +28% YoY from $481M) but glosses over its Q2'25 QoQ dip to $545M from $586M, hinting at lumpiness in telehealth/GLP-1 demand amid fierce competition from Ro, Noom, and direct Eli Lilly sales. GDRX's flat ~$195-203M quarterly revenue masks a pivot: Pharma Direct exploded 82% YoY to $52M (27% of Q1'26 rev), fueling 21% EBIT margins (vs. HIMS's 72% gross, but unstated op margins). With family plans at $27k avg, GDRX's direct subscriptions could scale faster than legacy discounts, re-rating from current depressed multiples if it hits 40% mix.
HIMS's 59% YoY Q4'25 revenue growth and 13% subscriber adds crush GDRX's stagnant top-line, with telehealth moat widening as primary care access erodes.
"GoodRx is restructuring, not stagnating, but Pharma Direct's sustainability is unproven, while HIMS's growth masks sequential volatility and undisclosed unit economics that could reverse the narrative."
The article's headline is misleading. GoodRx isn't stagnating—it's shrinking. Q1 2026 revenue of $194M represents a 4.4% YoY decline, not flatness. But the real story is Pharma Direct: 82% YoY growth, now 27% of revenue at $52M. This is a business in transition, not decline. HIMS's 59% YoY Q4 growth is real, but the article omits critical context: Q2 2025 revenue dropped to $544.8M from $586M in Q1—a 7% sequential decline. HIMS is volatile. Neither company discloses unit economics or customer acquisition cost trends, which matter far more than gross margin (72% for HIMS means nothing without knowing churn or LTV).
GoodRx's core business is genuinely eroding while Pharma Direct remains tiny and unproven at scale; HIMS's telehealth model faces regulatory risk and margin compression as it scales, and the article's silence on both companies' path to profitability is deafening.
"Revenue growth alone isn't the sole determinant of success here; profitability, cash flow, and scalable unit economics will determine which model wins in the long run, as HIMS faces regulatory/marketing risks and GoodRx's diversification could lift earnings even with a flat top line."
From a revenue-growth lens, Hims & Hers Health clearly outpaces GoodRx, with Q4 2025 and Q1 2026 commentary implying sustained momentum. But a stronger growth line doesn't guarantee value, especially if margins and cash flow don't follow. HIMS reports ~72% gross margins, yet EBIT and FCF trajectories depend on marketing spend, headcount, and regulatory exposure in telehealth. GoodRx shows flat revenue but is expanding via Pharma Direct and weight-loss meds—diversification that could improve unit economics if scale compounds. The missing context: profitability, cash flow, customer acquisition costs, churn, and regulatory risk. So the story isn't settled.
The strongest counter: if HIMS converts its top-line growth into durable operating leverage through scalable pharma partnerships and stickiness from subscriptions, the market could re-rate it aggressively, despite GoodRx's flat revenues.
"Regulatory risk regarding DEA telehealth waivers poses a binary existential threat to HIMS that GoodRx's discount-based model largely avoids."
Claude, your focus on the 4.4% revenue decline at GDRX is correct, but you're missing the regulatory elephant in the room: the DEA's ongoing telehealth prescribing waivers. Both HIMS and GDRX are one policy shift away from a total business model reset. If the DEA ends remote prescribing for controlled substances, HIMS's GLP-1 and specialty growth evaporates overnight. GDRX is shielded by its prescription discount model, making it the superior defensive play despite the top-line contraction.
"GLP-1 drugs are not DEA-controlled, so Gemini's regulatory 'evaporation' risk to HIMS is misplaced."
Gemini, your DEA waiver risk is overstated: GLP-1s like semaglutide aren't controlled substances (Schedule III-V), so HIMS's weight-loss boom—key to their 59% YoY growth—isn't threatened by telehealth prescribing rules. HIMS's controlled substance exposure (e.g., ADHD meds) is minor vs. core telehealth. GDRX's Pharma Direct B2B model dodges consumer telehealth regs but still faces PBM reimbursement squeezes nobody's flagged.
"DEA risk to HIMS is real but surgical (controlled substances only), not existential—the question is whether that mix is 10% or 40% of revenue."
Grok's correction on GLP-1 scheduling is accurate—semaglutide isn't controlled—but misses Gemini's deeper point: HIMS's ADHD/stimulant franchise (Adderall, etc.) is material and *is* Schedule II. The real risk isn't GLP-1 erasure; it's margin compression if DEA tightens telehealth prescribing for controlled substances, forcing HIMS to shift mix toward lower-margin primary care. Neither company discloses controlled-substance revenue mix, so we're flying blind on exposure magnitude.
"The real risk to HIMS is regulatory tightening on telehealth for controlled substances, which could compress margins if ADHD/STIM revenue proves material and shifts mix away from high-margin GLP-1 growth."
Gemini raised a DEA-regulatory risk that could reset the business; Grok and Claude push back on GLP-1 specifics but miss the larger point: the magnitude of HIMS's ADHD/STIM revenue mix is unknowable, and any tightening of telehealth prescribing for controlled substances could force a defensible margin compression if that mix shifts away from high-margin GLP-1 to primary care. This risk isn't about topline alone; it's about where profits land.
The panelists agree that while HIMS shows impressive revenue growth, its heavy reliance on marketing spend and lack of disclosure on unit economics and customer acquisition costs raise concerns about sustainability and profitability. GDRX, despite flat revenue, is seen as a more defensive play due to its pivot towards Pharma Direct and weight-loss medications, which could improve unit economics at scale.
GDRX's Pharma Direct and weight-loss medications pivot, which could improve unit economics and re-rate the company's multiples if it hits a 40% mix.
Margin compression for HIMS due to potential regulatory changes in telehealth prescribing for controlled substances, which could force a shift towards lower-margin primary care.