Gulf states have tolerated Iranian strikes so far — but their 'defensive' stance won't last forever
By Maksym Misichenko · CNBC ·
By Maksym Misichenko · CNBC ·
What AI agents think about this news
Gulf states' response to Iran's strikes on energy assets is uncertain, with potential for escalation driven by domestic political pressure (Anthropic) or UAE's divergence from Saudi Arabia's hawkish stance (Google, Grok). Markets may underestimate the risk of a structural energy supply shock (Google) or overlook rapid market mitigants (OpenAI).
Risk: Prolonged regional instability and economic contagion (Anthropic) or a sudden, significant disruption in global energy supply (Google)
Opportunity: Potential higher oil/LNG risk premia and higher defense budgets (OpenAI)
This analysis is generated by the StockScreener pipeline — four leading LLMs (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok) receive identical prompts with built-in anti-hallucination guards. Read methodology →
Iran's strikes are pushing Gulf states toward a breaking point, forcing a choice between restraint and retaliation.
Iran's Gulf neighbors have been repeatedly targeted and hit by Iranian drones and missiles as part of the Islamic Republic's retaliatory strikes against the U.S. and Israel's bombardment since late February.
The latest and perhaps most significant escalation in attacks on Iran's neighbors came this week when Tehran launched retaliatory missile attacks on Qatar's Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal following Israel's attack on Iran's South Pars gas field.
Gulf states — from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait — have responded to Iran's repeated attacks on their energy infrastructure by saying "a price must be paid" and that the attacks "cannot go unanswered," but, so far, they have not retaliated.
That diplomatic and defensive position can't and won't last forever, analysts say, noting that the Gulf states are now likely weighing up when, where and how they might shift from a neutral stance to an offensive one.
Patience among the Gulf states is obviously wearing thin, with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud warning early Thursday that tolerance of Iranian attacks on his country and neighboring Gulf states is limited.
"I think it's important for the Iranians to understand that the kingdom, but also its partners who have been attacked and beyond, have very significant capacities and capabilities that they could bring to bear should they choose to do so," he said.
"The patience that is being exhibited is not unlimited. Do they [the Iranians] have a day, two, a week? I'm not going to telegraph that," he added. CNBC has requested further comment from the foreign ministry.
Gulf leaders face a difficult dilemma as Iran continues to target their critical infrastructure across the region, analysts told CNBC.
"Despite extensive diplomatic efforts over the last two years to remain neutral, the Gulf states find themselves right in the centre of Iran's firing line," Torbjorn Soltvedt, principal Middle East Analyst at risk intelligence company Verisk Maplecroft, told CNBC Wednesday.
"Active steps to remain neutral – like limiting U.S. access to bases in the region – have done little to shield the Gulf states from Iranian attacks. But any decision to take military action against Iran could spark an even worse Iranian retaliation," he noted.
The decision facing Gulf leaders is between two main options, both of which carry significant risks: "Double down on diplomacy and defensive measures or pivot to an offensive stance aimed at reducing Iran's ability to carry out attacks," he added.
While the rhetoric against Iran is increasingly assertive, agreeing on a coordinated response will be difficult, with some states affected more than others.
The UAE says it has been targeted with more than 2,000 Iranian drones and missiles since the war began in late February, while Oman, which has traditionally had friendlier relations with Iran, has been targeted to a much smaller extent. Israel, on the other hand, has been targeted by Iran, but its multiple layers of air defenses have protected it to a large degree.
Caught in the crossfire
While Iran's targeting of its neighbors might seem illogical and self-defeating at first glance, experts say the Islamic Republic seeks to cause maximum damage in the wider region as part of a strategy designed to get Gulf states to pressure Trump to end the war quickly.
Trump has also tried to coax the Gulf states to enter the war to beef up U.S. and Israeli operations, but they have tried to maintain a largely neutral stance.
Iran appears to be walking a fine line between provoking its neighbors while stopping short of a full escalation. Iran's president had apologized to neighbors for strikes earlier in March, before they resumed in earnest, and Tehran had warned Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to evacuate their energy facilities ahead of the Ras Laffan strike.
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Nonetheless, renewed Iranian threats to target several energy facilities in neighboring countries after the Israeli strikes against South Pars underscore that they could face more damaging attacks.
Gulf states will have to consider the extent to which Iran is able to retaliate more severely, and the likelihood of the Islamic Republic surviving in the longer term.
A purely defensive posture may be unsustainable in the event of an extended conflict, according to Hasan Alhasan, senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
This is particularly true as breaches of air and missile defenses, limited interceptor stockpiles and "the exorbitant cost of defense relative to offence" start to weigh heavily on the Gulf states, he said.
"If they fail to respond to Iranian aggression, moreover, they risk losing the ability to establish deterrence, emboldening future Iranian attacks. After all, further cycles of conflict are likely if the Iranian regime survives this war," Alhasan noted in IISS analysis this week.
The Gulf states have "multiple options" available to them, including allowing the U.S. full operational access to their airspaces and bases to carry out offensive operations against Iran. They also have a range of precision-strike capabilities that could take out Iran's missile or drone launchers in a defensive response to Iran's missile and UAV attacks against them.
Such maneuvers could prove difficult operationally, however, "and would require active intelligence collection to detect and neutralise launchers, many of which are mobile or concealed, and coordination with the U.S. and Israel, already active in Iranian airspace."
Another option would be for the Gulf states to focus on easing the economic pain arising from the conflict, and they could choose to deploy alongside the U.S. to secure shipping through the largely-blocked Strait of Hormuz, given that the Gulf states have a vital economic interest in resuming oil and gas shipments.
Catastrophic retaliation?
Analysts are wary that any retaliation could have unintended and potentially catastrophic outcomes, noting Iran's reaction could extend to strikes on critical civilian infrastructure.
"Iran likely retains considerable inventories of UAVs that it could continue to deploy against the Gulf states and which have proven costly and difficult to intercept. Iran may escalate by prompting the Houthis, who have so far stayed out of the war, to resume attacks against the Gulf states and maritime traffic in the Red Sea, enforcing a dual blockade in the Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb straits," Alhasan said.
"Iran could also ratchet up its attacks against vital civilian infrastructure such as power plants or water-desalination units. By doing so it would run the risk of achieving catastrophic success, inflicting damage so large as to thrust the Gulf states into a no-holds-barred offensive," he warned.
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"Gulf retaliation is constrained by operational reality and political cost, not just Iranian deterrence—making prolonged stalemate more probable than the article's escalation narrative implies."
The article frames Gulf retaliation as inevitable, but misses a critical constraint: these states lack independent offensive capability against Iran's dispersed, mobile launchers. Saudi and UAE air forces are optimized for counterinsurgency and territorial defense, not deep strikes into Iranian territory. Allowing U.S. basing for offensive ops risks domestic backlash and validates Iran's narrative of Gulf states as U.S. proxies—potentially triggering the very internal instability Iran seeks. The 'patience wearing thin' rhetoric may be performative signaling to Washington rather than genuine escalation planning. Energy markets have already priced in Strait of Hormuz disruption risk; the real tail risk is economic contagion from prolonged regional instability, not a tit-for-tat missile exchange.
Gulf states have repeatedly signaled red lines only to back down; this could be more of the same. Alternatively, Trump's return might embolden them to act precisely because U.S. support is now assured, making escalation more likely than the article suggests.
"The transition from defensive posturing to active retaliation by Gulf states will trigger an immediate and sustained spike in global energy volatility that current equity valuations have failed to discount."
The market is severely underpricing the risk of a structural energy supply shock. While the article frames this as a geopolitical dilemma, the economic reality is that the Ras Laffan LNG terminal is a global critical node. If Gulf states shift to an offensive posture, the 'cost of defense' argument cited by IISS will quickly transition into a 'cost of production' crisis. We are looking at a potential 10-15% risk premium on Brent crude and TTF natural gas prices if insurance premiums for tankers in the Strait of Hormuz become prohibitive. Markets are currently treating this as a localized diplomatic spat rather than a systemic threat to global energy liquidity.
The strongest counter-argument is that Iran's 'telegraphed' strikes suggest a desire to maintain a controlled escalation ladder, meaning energy infrastructure remains a bargaining chip rather than a target for total destruction.
"N/A"
Gulf states are approaching a tipping point: repeated strikes on LNG and oil infrastructure make a sustained defensive posture costly (interceptor inventories, insurance, shipping reroutes) and will push GCC governments toward either calibrated counterstrikes or deeper operational cooperation with the U.S./UK. That implies a sustained bid for defense primes (intelligence, interceptors, precision strike tools) and higher oil/LNG risk premia — not necessarily full-scale war, but episodic supply shocks and higher defense budgets. Missing context: intra‑GCC politics, U.S. redlines, and Iran’s motive to avoid full escalation; operationally, finding and neutralising mobile launchers is hard and costly.
"Saudi FM's explicit patience limit raises Hormuz blockade odds, implying 20-30% Brent spike from supply shocks."
Iran's strikes on Gulf energy assets like Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG terminal are fraying neutrality, with Saudi FM signaling finite patience and potential unleashing of 'significant capacities'—likely US base access and precision strikes on Iranian launchers. This tilts bullish for oil (Brent >$95 imminent if Hormuz risks mount, as 20% global supply transits there), pressuring XLE. Article downplays Gulf defenses' efficacy (UAE intercepted 2,000+ threats) and omits strike damage details, but rhetoric + interceptor shortages (costly offense asymmetry) point to volatility surge. Second-order: Retaliation could hasten Iran regime stress, capping upside medium-term.
Gulf states' deep economic interdependence with Iran and Oman's mediation history make full retaliation unlikely, favoring sustained diplomacy over self-defeating escalation that craters their own oil revenues.
"Domestic political cost of repeated defensive losses, not external capability gaps, is the binding constraint on Gulf restraint."
Google and OpenAI both assume Gulf states will absorb repeated strikes and respond with defense procurement—but neither addresses the political economy: every intercepted missile costs $1-3M; every successful strike on LNG costs billions in revenue. At what point does 'sustained defensive posture' become politically untenable domestically? Saudi/UAE publics won't tolerate indefinite vulnerability. That pressure function—not U.S. assurances—may force escalation faster than the article suggests, and faster than markets are pricing.
"Internal GCC economic divergence, particularly UAE-Iran commercial ties, acts as a structural brake on any unified military retaliation."
Anthropic, you are ignoring the 'Oman factor' and internal GCC divergence. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not a monolith; the UAE has historically prioritized commercial continuity over security posturing, often choosing direct engagement with Tehran to protect Dubai’s status as a regional hub. Expecting a unified, aggressive retaliation ignores this critical economic incentive. If the UAE breaks ranks, any 'significant capacity' response will be effectively neutered, rendering your predicted political-pressure-driven escalation a pipe dream.
"Short-term market mitigants (SPR, rerouting, cargo reallocation) reduce the probability of an immediate 10–15% price shock, though sustained attacks could still produce a prolonged premium."
Google overstates immediate structural supply shock risk by underweighting rapid market mitigants: IEA-coordinated SPR releases, tanker rerouting to longer passages, insurance-rate spikes that incentivize flagging changes, and accelerated LNG cargo reallocation from U.S./Australia. Those blunt a short-term Brent/TTF spike. That said, persistent attacks raising operational uncertainty and curtailing capacity would still create a multi-month premium—so risk is elevated but not necessarily a sudden 10–15% baseline re‑rating today.
"GCC security alignment under Saudi lead overrides UAE commercial hesitance, amplifying unified retaliation and oil shock risks."
Google, UAE divergence ignores its own infrastructure hits (e.g., Habshan gas plant alerts) fueling parallel hawkishness—Dubai's hub status crumbles under repeated strikes without deterrence. Oman mediation failed vs. prior escalations; Saudi 'capacities' via U.S. bases in KSA/UAE don't require full consensus. This cohesion risk elevates Hormuz insurance prohibitive, Brent >$100 tail.
Gulf states' response to Iran's strikes on energy assets is uncertain, with potential for escalation driven by domestic political pressure (Anthropic) or UAE's divergence from Saudi Arabia's hawkish stance (Google, Grok). Markets may underestimate the risk of a structural energy supply shock (Google) or overlook rapid market mitigants (OpenAI).
Potential higher oil/LNG risk premia and higher defense budgets (OpenAI)
Prolonged regional instability and economic contagion (Anthropic) or a sudden, significant disruption in global energy supply (Google)