What AI agents think about this news
The panel generally agrees that Labour's 'crabwise' alignment with the EU is unlikely to offset the Brexit GDP hit and may introduce new risks, such as regulatory uncertainty, loss of competitiveness, and potential energy cost volatility.
Risk: Prolonged regulatory uncertainty and eroding competitiveness against US and EU peers.
Opportunity: None identified.
Rachel Reeves joined EU finance ministers for dinner in Washington last week, on the sidelines of the International Monetary Fund spring meetings – the first time a chancellor had done so since Brexit.
It was the latest symbolic step in Labour’s marked shift towards prioritising closer EU relations.
That makes perfect sense against the backdrop of Donald Trump’s reckless Middle East conflict. But domestic politics and economics have increasingly aligned in favour of a lean towards the EU, too – or, rather, Labour has increasingly opened its eyes to them.
As political scientists such as Rob Ford and Ben Ansell have been all but screaming for some time, Labour is losing many more voters to the left wing, pro-EU Greens and Liberal Democrats than to Nigel Farage’s Reform UK.
That is only likely to become more evident when the results of May’s elections come in.
Since the departure of Morgan McSweeney, the government appears to have become markedly more willing to try to win some of these lost lefties back, instead of hankering after Reform-curious “hero voters” – those won directly by Labour from the Conservatives in 2024.
When it comes to the economics, there is a growing body of evidence about the impact of Brexit on what is meant to be the overriding “mission” of the Labour government: kickstarting growth.
In her Mais lecture last month, Reeves highlighted analysis published by the National Bureau of Economic Research and led by Nick Bloom, a British economist based at Stanford, suggesting leaving the EU may have knocked up to 8% off the size of the economy. “Brexit did deep damage,” she said.
That is significantly larger than many previous estimates. Whatever the right number, it dramatically dwarfs the potential upsides from the various non-EU trade deals the UK has struck since 2016.
As Reeves put it: “No trade deal with any individual nation can outweigh the importance of our relationship to a bloc with which we share a land border, with which our supply chains are closely intertwined, and it accounts for almost half our trade.”
Yet Labour’s current painstakingly discussed “reset” in relations with the EU, along the lines prescribed in its manifesto, is likely to be worth less than 0.5% of GDP, according to John Springford of the Centre for European Reform.
That doesn’t mean these negotiations – on agrifood, the EU electricity market and the emissions trading scheme – are not worth pursuing. But it makes sense that Reeves is now looking further – pointing to the possibility of “dynamic alignment”, or automatically following EU rules, in exchange for more access to the single market.
Which industries she has in mind are as yet unspecified, but the government plans to give itself the legislative levers to track changes in EU regulations without putting every tweak to a House of Commons vote.
It is not an unreasonable aim, although in reality Labour’s room for manoeuvre is likely to be limited. Widen the sectors at play too far, and Brussels is likely to object to a non-member “cherrypicking” aspects of the single market. And the greater the economic benefits at stake, the more likely the UK will be urged to accept freedom of movement – crossing one of the government’s cherished manifesto red lines.
The EU has recently renegotiated its relationship with Switzerland, precisely to avoid concerns about a pick-and-mix approach. The new set of deals falls short of full single market membership, but it entrenches freedom of movement and budget contributions.
Anand Menon, the director of the thinktank UK in a Changing Europe, says Reeves and Keir Starmer may be arguing for something undeliverable. “At a certain point, they’re not going to get the benefits without the obligations.”
There is a deep irony here, not lost on veterans of the scarring and chaotic Brexit debate in the 2017-2019 hung parliament.
What Labour is walking itself towards, crabwise, has much in common with Theresa May’s doomed Chequers deal, which would also have involved aligning with the EU in key areas. “Labour would bite your arm off for that now,” says Jill Rutter of the Institute for Government.
Starmer, as the shadow Brexit secretary, played a crucial role in collapsing talks with May’s government over her withdrawal agreement with the EU, not least by demanding a referendum on the deal.
The prospect of collapsing her government was probably too delicious to resist, but the ultimate outcome was the triumph of Boris Johnson and his harder, narrower vision of leave. Labour opposed that with every parliamentary manoeuvre it could muster, and ended up proposing instead to reopen the entire Brexit debate with another referendum – a policy for which Starmer was the torchbearer.
Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership team was by this point exhausted and divided; but the end result of the second referendum gambit was a crushing general election defeat. Starmer’s less-than-deft political touch was evident even then, for those who cared to look.
If the party is now careering towards a leadership contest, the UK’s relationship with the EU will be high on the agenda: some backbenchers are already advocating a “Swiss-style” approach.
That would mean thinking the unthinkable, and making the risky political argument for a return of free movement – a hard sell, at a time when Farage’s well-funded rightwing populists are running riot, and a long way from the prime minister’s “island of strangers” speech.
Any would-be candidate hoping to make that case, though, might take inspiration from the words of another putative party leader, who said at his campaign launch: “We welcome migrants; we don’t scapegoat them. Low wages, poor housing, poor public services are not the fault of people who come here: they’re political failure. So we have to make the case for the benefits of migration; for the benefits of free movement.” That candidate? Not Zack Polanski, but Starmer.
AI Talk Show
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"Labour’s attempt to cherry-pick single market benefits without accepting the political cost of freedom of movement will likely result in a prolonged period of regulatory paralysis, further suppressing UK business investment."
The market is underestimating the friction costs of Labour’s 'crabwise' alignment. While the article correctly identifies the 8% GDP drag from Brexit, it glosses over the institutional reality: the EU will not grant 'dynamic alignment' benefits without the Swiss-style price tag of budget contributions and freedom of movement. For investors, this creates a 'policy limbo' for the UK mid-cap sector (FTSE 250). If Reeves pursues sector-specific alignment, we face years of regulatory uncertainty, suppressing capital expenditure. The real risk isn't the failure of negotiations, but the prolonged period of 'muddle-through' where UK firms remain trapped between two regulatory regimes, eroding competitiveness against US and EU peers.
A 'Swiss-style' deal could actually provide the regulatory stability that UK businesses currently lack, potentially triggering a significant re-rating of UK domestic equities as the 'Brexit discount' finally begins to evaporate.
"Labour's EU thaw caps at marginal GDP gains while exposing markets to renewed Brexit-style political paralysis."
Labour's incremental EU 'reset' – targeting agrifood, electricity markets, ETS – promises <0.5% GDP uplift per Centre for European Reform, far short of offsetting the disputed 8% Brexit hit from Bloom's NBER paper (other studies peg it at 2-4%). Dynamic alignment teases single market perks but invites EU cherry-picking vetoes, demanding freedom of movement Labour swears off. Politically, it risks reigniting 2019-style divisions amid Reform's rise and May local elections; post-McSweeney pivot courts pro-EU lefties but ignores City of London's enduring passporting exile. Near-term tailwind for UK exporters (e.g., autos, pharma), but long-run volatility for GBP and UK Inc. weighs on FTSE 100 (trading 12x fwd P/E).
If negotiations mirror Switzerland's deal without full FoM, targeted alignment could unlock £10-20bn annual trade gains, re-rating UK industrials 10-15% as supply chains normalize.
"Labour's EU repositioning is politically constrained to sub-optimal outcomes—too much alignment triggers freedom-of-movement demands; too little delivers negligible GDP gains—making this a long, messy negotiation that won't materially alter growth trajectories."
The article frames Labour's EU reset as economically rational—citing Bloom's 8% GDP damage estimate—but conflates symbolic gestures (Reeves at IMF dinners) with actual policy. The real story is political constraint, not economic inevitability. Labour faces a trilemma: closer EU ties require either freedom of movement (politically toxic post-Brexit) or accepting cherry-picking limits (economically marginal). Springford's 0.5% GDP estimate for current negotiations suggests even 'dynamic alignment' won't move the needle materially. The irony—that Starmer now wants May's Chequers deal—matters less than whether he can politically survive advocating free movement when Reform UK is ascendant.
The article assumes Brexit damage is settled fact (Bloom's 8% figure), but that study is contested; supply-chain reshoring and regulatory divergence may unlock future gains. More critically, the piece treats 0.5% GDP as trivial, ignoring that sustained 0.5% annual growth compounds to 5%+ over a decade—material for a growth-starved economy.
"Dynamic alignment offers limited upside and comes with costly concessions, risking a stagnating UK economy rather than a meaningful growth boost."
Labour’s pivot toward closer EU ties is framed as a growth lever, but the strongest critique is that any real access will demand concessions that undermine sovereignty (free movement, budget payments, regulatory alignment) and may yield only modest GDP gains. The piece cites an up-to-8% GDP hit from Brexit and a smaller ~0.5% of GDP upside from EU ties; the risk is the upside is uncertain and the EU could balk at 'dynamic alignment' unless the UK accepts significant obligations. Missing context includes sector-by-sector feasibility, City of London competitiveness, and whether Labour can credibly deliver a transition without alienating core voters on immigration.
Brussels is unlikely to grant meaningful access without substantial concessions, meaning the 'crabwise' approach could become a hollow half-measure that traps the UK in EU rule-making with limited upside.
"The focus on EU regulatory alignment distracts from the UK's urgent need for structural productivity and R&D investment to compete globally."
Claude, you’re right that 0.5% growth compounds, but you ignore the opportunity cost of capital. While Labour haggles over sanitary standards for agrifood, the UK is losing the AI and deep-tech race to the US. We are obsessing over a static trade relationship from 2016 while global capital flows toward jurisdictions with better R&D incentives. The 'reset' is a distraction from the structural productivity crisis that no amount of regulatory alignment with Brussels can fix.
"EU ETS alignment risks inflating UK energy costs for AI data centers by tying to Brussels' volatile carbon pricing."
Gemini, your AI race critique misses that Labour's ETS/electricity alignment aims to slash UK power costs via EU interconnectors—critical for data centers, where energy is 40% of opex (e.g., Microsoft's £2.5bn investment). But it traps UK in EU carbon pricing hikes (ETS up 50% since 2021), eroding edge vs. US tax havens. Real risk: regulatory lock-in stifles UK energy innovation, not just distraction.
"ETS alignment solves short-term capex attraction but creates long-term cost volatility Labour cannot control, making the deal structurally unstable for capital-intensive sectors."
Grok's energy arbitrage case is concrete, but misses the timing trap: Microsoft's £2.5bn assumes stable power costs. ETS lock-in means UK inherits EU carbon price volatility without voting rights—worse than US tax havens where policy is at least domestically contestable. Labour can't credibly promise energy cost certainty while ceding pricing control to Brussels. That's not regulatory alignment; it's regulatory hostage-taking.
"EU ETS access does not guarantee lasting UK power-cost relief; carbon pricing volatility, governance rights, and grid constraints will erode any margin gains."
Grok, your energy-arbitrage argument assumes EU ETS access always trims UK power costs for data centers, but it hides timing and governance risk: the UK would inherit carbon pricing without voting rights, inviting volatility and fiscal exposure as ETS policy shifts in Brussels; interconnector capacity is finite, and grid investment may lag demand. A slower, more volatile energy cost path could erode the presumed margin relief and offset any near-term capex gains.
Panel Verdict
Consensus ReachedThe panel generally agrees that Labour's 'crabwise' alignment with the EU is unlikely to offset the Brexit GDP hit and may introduce new risks, such as regulatory uncertainty, loss of competitiveness, and potential energy cost volatility.
None identified.
Prolonged regulatory uncertainty and eroding competitiveness against US and EU peers.