Move Over, Private Equity. It’s Great to Be a Banker Again.
By Maksym Misichenko · NYT Business ·
By Maksym Misichenko · NYT Business ·
What AI agents think about this news
The panelists generally agree that while banks may currently benefit from record trading revenues and M&A fees, these gains are cyclical rather than structural and could reverse due to various risks. They also caution about banks' increasing exposure to private credit markets and potential regulatory reversals.
Risk: Increasing exposure to private credit markets and potential regulatory reversals
Opportunity: Record trading revenues and M&A fees in the short term
This analysis is generated by the StockScreener pipeline — four leading LLMs (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok) receive identical prompts with built-in anti-hallucination guards. Read methodology →
They played second fiddle to private equity and hedge funds for years, but 2026 is shaping up to be “the year of the bank,” one consultant said.
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It is a golden moment for banks.
Trading profits are at record highs, and so are employee bonuses. Mergers, acquisitions and other deals are piling up at the second-fastest pace in at least a decade, producing billions of dollars in fees. And after they operated for nearly two decades in what one banker described as a regulatory “straitjacket,” the Trump administration is making it easier for banks to expand and take more risks.
“The stars are aligning for banks in a way that hasn’t been seen in multiple decades,” Citi analysts wrote in a research note this month.
The good times for banks represent a flip of fortunes. Since the 2008 financial crisis, Wall Street’s biggest paydays have been earned by private equity and private credit firms, making often high-risk investments with the promise of high returns.
Lately, many of those private equity firms have struggled to raise money as the industry has delivered lackluster investment returns. At the recent Milken Institute Global Conference in Los Angeles, a confab popular with the private equity set, the chief executive of one giant investment firm compared the vibe, with some hyperbole, to the final days of Sodom and Gomorrah.
It’s also a tenuous time for many international businesses, with airlines going bankrupt, global ship traffic choked, inflation on the rise and artificial intelligence roiling industries.
Many banks, by contrast, have followed the trajectory of Citizens Bank, a once sleepy Providence, R.I., institution that has been expanding rapidly, and seen its share price rise by more than 50 percent over the past year.
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Four leading AI models discuss this article
"Short-term bank earnings may rise from deregulation and deal flow, but credit and macro risks could cap sustainable re-rating."
The article positions banks for outsized gains from record trading revenue, accelerating M&A fees, and Trump-era deregulation that could lift capital requirements and risk appetite. Yet it underplays how inflation spikes, airline bankruptcies, and AI-driven sector upheaval might inflate credit losses and compress net interest margins once the current cycle peaks. Citizens Financial's 50% stock run reflects optimism, but similar post-crisis expansions have reversed sharply when macro conditions deteriorated. Citi's research note assumes deal momentum persists into 2026 without testing that assumption against potential Fed policy errors or geopolitical shocks.
Even with lighter oversight, a sudden credit event in leveraged loans or commercial real estate could force rapid re-tightening of capital rules, erasing the projected bonus and fee windfall before banks fully capitalize on the regulatory shift.
"Banks are experiencing a cyclical earnings surge that the market has already partially priced in, not a regime shift that justifies further multiple expansion."
The article conflates cyclical tailwinds with structural advantage. Yes, trading revenues are elevated and M&A pipelines are full—but both are mean-reverting. The regulatory relief angle is real but overstated: banks still face capital requirements, stress tests, and political headwinds if rates spike or unemployment rises. The Citizens Bank example is cherry-picked; regional banks face deposit competition and net interest margin compression if Fed cuts rates. Private equity's fundraising drought doesn't automatically redirect capital to banks—it may just sit in money markets. The 'golden moment' framing ignores that bank stocks have already re-rated substantially; Citizens up 50% in a year prices in much of this optimism.
If Trump actually follows through on deregulation and M&A activity sustains through 2026, banks could genuinely earn higher ROEs than the pre-2008 baseline. The article may be early, not late.
"The current bank rally is driven by a regulatory honeymoon that masks an underlying increase in balance sheet risk as banks pivot toward private credit."
The narrative of a 'golden age' for banks ignores the inherent cyclicality of deregulation. While the Trump administration’s shift toward looser capital requirements and M&A oversight is a clear tailwind for firms like JPMorgan (JPM) and Goldman Sachs (GS), it creates a dangerous feedback loop. Banks are currently trading at a premium because of fee-based income surges, yet they are simultaneously increasing their exposure to private credit markets—the very 'Sodom and Gomorrah' the article mocks. If the regulatory pendulum swings back or if the current M&A pipeline stalls due to geopolitical volatility, these banks will be left holding the bag on riskier, less liquid assets.
The 'straitjacket' of post-2008 regulation actually forced banks to maintain enough capital to survive the current economic turbulence; removing these guardrails might boost short-term ROE but significantly increases systemic tail risk.
"The bank upcycle in 2026 is cyclical, not structural, and could reverse quickly if deal flow, market volatility, or policy conditions soften."
While the article paints a sunlit case for banks in 2026—record trading profits, booming advisory fees, and easier expansion—the reality looks cyclical, not structural. Fee income from M&A and trading hinges on market volatility; a pause in deal activity or a normalization of spreads could sap revenue quickly. Net interest income depends on rates maintaining upside; if the yield curve flattens or a slowdown hits credit quality, earnings drift lower. Add potential regulatory reversals or tighter capital rules, plus competition from nonbanks and AI-driven compliance costs, and the upside looks more fragile than the headlines suggest.
Counterpoint: the very volatility and deal activity propping up profits could dry up, shrinking fees and trading revenue; plus policy shifts or a worsening macro backdrop could squeeze NII and push banks to reassess valuations.
"Deregulation may extend re-rating for large banks via M&A, but regionals face faster NIM pressure from deposit competition."
Claude correctly notes Citizens' 50% run prices in optimism, but overlooks how deregulation could extend the re-rating cycle for larger banks if M&A fees compound into 2026 at 15-20% growth. The overlooked risk is regional banks facing accelerated deposit outflows to money markets, compressing NIMs faster than the article's trading revenue tailwinds can offset for the sector overall.
"Regional bank NIM compression and mega-bank fee expansion are separate dynamics; the real risk is regulatory tiering that widens the moat for JPM/GS while crushing smaller competitors."
Grok's deposit-flight thesis deserves scrutiny. Regional banks' NIM compression is real, but it's orthogonal to the article's JPM/GS narrative—large banks actually benefit from deposit migration to money markets because they can fund via wholesale markets and capital markets. The real risk Grok flags is *unequal* deregulation: if only systemically important banks get relief, smaller regionals face higher capital costs while losing deposits. That's a sector bifurcation story, not a sector headwind.
"Deregulation incentivizing banks to absorb shadow banking risks creates a systemic time bomb that fee-based revenue cannot offset."
Claude, you’re missing the liquidity trap. Large banks aren't just 'beneficiaries' of deposit migration; they are becoming conduits for systemic risk via private credit. If JPM or GS expand balance sheets using deregulated capital to backstop private credit, they aren't just diversifying—they are absorbing the shadow banking sector's duration risk. When the credit cycle turns, that 'fee-based' income vanishes, replaced by massive impairment charges on illiquid loans that were never meant to be on a commercial bank's books.
"Private credit expansion under deregulation increases systemic liquidity risk; a downturn could trigger widespread impairments and funding stress, eroding the upside."
Gemini's warning about private credit growth under deregulation is valid but incomplete. The bigger overlooked link is liquidity and funding risk: if the private credit cycle reverses, wholesale and repo markets can seize up, forcing banks to cash-allocate impaired loans and support illiquid assets. That could compress earnings vs. the current high fee/NII backdrop and amplify capital hits, muting the promised 2026 upside even if deal pipelines stay robust.
The panelists generally agree that while banks may currently benefit from record trading revenues and M&A fees, these gains are cyclical rather than structural and could reverse due to various risks. They also caution about banks' increasing exposure to private credit markets and potential regulatory reversals.
Record trading revenues and M&A fees in the short term
Increasing exposure to private credit markets and potential regulatory reversals