By Maksym Misichenko · CNBC ·
What AI agents think about this news
The panel agrees that the Strait of Hormuz poses a significant risk to global energy markets, not through an outright closure, but through a slower-burn increase in operating costs and insurance premia due to potential fees or new compliance rules imposed by Oman and Iran. The key debate lies in the likelihood and impact of such measures.
Risk: Gradual increase in operating costs and insurance premia for tankers due to potential fees or new compliance rules, potentially leading to a modal shift in logistics and higher global shipping costs.
Opportunity: Potential opportunities for tanker operators to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope, although this would increase costs and may not be feasible for all operators.
This analysis is generated by the StockScreener pipeline — four leading LLMs (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok) receive identical prompts with built-in anti-hallucination guards. Read methodology →
Oman's reputation for neutrality has earned it the nickname the "Switzerland of the Middle East."
But the country, which sits to the south of the Strait of Hormuz, is employing a deliberately opaque diplomatic strategy in discussions about tolls for the critical waterway, and markets have a "blind spot" for what could happen next, analysts tell CNBC.
Oman has served as a key intermediary in regional crises and remains one of the few countries trusted by both Tehran and Washington, which is keen to ensure the flow through the strait resumes after it was blocked during the war, triggering a global energy crunch.
Situated on the southeastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula, opposite Iran across the strait, Oman has been in joint talks with Iran on a new maritime security order, amid reports that the two countries could push to establish transit fees.
Oman has said that any agreement will comply with international law, although the prospect of a financial system on a waterway that typically handles around 20% of the world's oil has sparked alarm.
Analysts told CNBC that Oman's ability to impose service fees sits within tight legal limits, given that the strait is governed by the principle of transit passage, which does not allow states to charge vessels for passing through. Service fees, however, may be one way to circumvent this.
Markets tend to price disruption risk but pay less attention to governance risk. That creates a blind spot.Neil QuilliamAssociate fellow at Chatham House
Dania Thafer, executive director of Gulf International Forum, a Washington, D.C. think tank, said Oman's position on charging fees or a tolling system was likely intentionally unclear.
"You have a regional power, such as Iran, and then you have a global power, the U.S., putting pressure on Oman," Thafer told CNBC in a phone interview.
"So, they're trying to use a degree of strategic ambiguity to try to stay out of the conflict as much as possible and not undermine these very strong players."
If Gulf nations and important international actors greenlit Oman, Thafer said the country would probably move forward with a kind of fee service system in the Strait of Hormuz.
She added that while it would be seen as a political disappointment for fees or tolls to come into force, markets would "respond accordingly" to conditions that once again allow the safe passage of ships.
A spokesperson for Oman's Foreign Ministry was not available to comment when contacted by CNBC.
The U.S. has staunchly opposed any tolls in the Strait of Hormuz.
U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has previously threatened to "aggressively" impose sanctions against Oman if it was seen to help Iran establish a tolling system.
"All nations should reject outright any efforts by Iran to disrupt the free flow of commerce," Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a post on X on May 28.
Under the terms of the U.S. and Iran's memorandum of understanding, signed on June 17, Tehran cannot impose tolls on ships during the 60 days of negotiations to find a permanent settlement.
Iran is, however, fixated on the prospect of winning international recognition of its control over the Strait of Hormuz, Reuters reported on Wednesday, citing two senior Iranian sources. This includes the ability to levy fees on ships entering or leaving the Gulf, the report added.
Andrew Leber, a non-resident scholar in the Carnegie Middle East Program, said Oman's reputation as a mediator "has left it increasingly trapped" between Tehran's demands for some kind of toll in the strait and U.S. demands that this not happen.
"As a result, we've seen Omani diplomats tack back and forth between insisting no toll will be charged, and suggesting that ships might be asked to pay a fee which will be called something other than a toll," Leber told CNBC by email.
The challenge for Oman, Leber said, is that its geography means it has a direct stake in what happens regarding the Strait of Hormuz. The country has security reasons and a financial interest in either going along with Iran's plan or charging some kind of fees, he added, provided Oman also gets a cut.
"It is highly likely that Oman continues to co-sign some kind of Iranian service-fee plan or put a gentler spin on it until that brings it into direct conflict with its Arab neighbors or the United States," Leber said.
Neil Quilliam, an energy policy, geopolitics, and foreign affairs specialist focusing on the Middle East and North Africa at Chatham House, said the combination of geography and diplomacy gives Oman influence over the rules, procedures and future arrangements governing the Strait of Hormuz.
"Markets tend to price disruption risk but pay less attention to governance risk. That creates a blind spot," Quilliam told CNBC by email.
"Changes in how the Strait is managed, even if gradual and negotiated, could alter costs, compliance requirements, and insurance dynamics without a dramatic security event," he added.
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"Gradual fee or compliance changes in Hormuz could raise tanker costs without a supply shock, a risk markets are currently underpricing."
The article flags an underpriced governance risk in the Strait of Hormuz, where Oman and Iran may introduce service fees on 20% of global oil flows. Legal limits on transit passage, strong US sanctions threats, and Oman's need to preserve ties with Gulf states and Washington make outright tolls improbable. Still, even modest fees or new compliance rules could quietly lift insurance premia and operating costs for tankers without a visible disruption event. Markets focused on outright closures are missing this slower-burn friction. The outcome hinges on whether Oman can extract a cut while avoiding direct confrontation.
Oman's entire diplomatic value rests on not alienating the US or GCC; any fee scheme that triggers sanctions or regional isolation would be abandoned quickly, rendering the risk largely performative.
"The shift from kinetic disruption risk to institutionalized governance costs in the Strait of Hormuz represents a permanent, underpriced tax on global energy logistics."
The market is fundamentally mispricing the transition from 'security risk' to 'governance risk' in the Strait of Hormuz. While traders focus on kinetic military threats of closure, they ignore the creeping institutionalization of 'service fees' which act as a permanent tax on global energy flows. Even a nominal $0.05/bbl fee, if institutionalized, creates a structural margin headwind for Gulf producers like Saudi Aramco and ADNOC, while complicating insurance premiums for tanker operators like Frontline (FRO). Markets are treating this as a binary 'open or closed' event, failing to account for the slow-motion erosion of the transit passage principle that will likely increase OPEX for the entire energy supply chain.
Oman’s 'strategic ambiguity' is likely a stalling tactic designed to avoid the very conflict that would trigger these fees, and the U.S. Treasury’s threat of sanctions acts as a hard ceiling that makes any meaningful tolling system politically impossible to implement.
"The article conflates Oman's diplomatic neutrality with negotiating power, but explicit U.S. sanctions threats and a time-boxed Iran MOU with no toll language suggest Oman's actual room to maneuver is narrower than the 'blind spot' framing implies."
The article frames this as a governance risk blind spot, but I'd invert that: markets may be rationally discounting Oman's leverage as weaker than the piece suggests. The U.S. has explicit sanction threats (Treasury May 28); Iran is boxed into a 60-day MOU with no toll language; and Oman's Arab neighbors have zero incentive to back Iran-aligned tolls. The 'strategic ambiguity' narrative is seductive, but Oman's actual negotiating position looks constrained, not expansive. The real risk isn't Oman imposing fees—it's *failed* negotiations triggering Houthi-style disruptions instead, which markets already price. The governance-risk framing assumes Oman has more agency than it likely does.
Oman's geographic chokepoint and trusted-mediator status genuinely do give it leverage to extract concessions (fees or otherwise) that neither Iran nor the U.S. wants to publicly acknowledge, and markets have historically underpriced slow-motion geopolitical ratchets until they bite.
"Near-term tolls are unlikely to be formalized, but governance risk could gradually lift transport costs and insurance premia, potentially tightening energy markets if not priced correctly."
While the piece highlights a potential Omani 'service fee' in the Strait of Hormuz, the strongest case against a dramatic market move is that enforcement and revenue collection would require Tehran's cooperation and broad international backing, which seems unlikely in the near term. The strait operates under transit passage; tariffs would conflict with international law and provoke pushback from shippers and insurers even if labeled as fees. The real risk is a slow, governance-driven tilt in costs and compliance, not a sudden price spike. Missing context: Oman’s domestic finances, regional leverage, and how any shadow toll would be operationalized without triggering a wider conflict.
One could argue that even without a formal toll, a de facto service charge or tightened transit rules could rise costs; and if any credible path materializes, markets will reprice shipping and oil swiftly.
"Oman can use the Iran MOU window for bilateral compliance fees that evade broad sanctions while still lifting costs."
Claude's view that Oman's leverage is constrained overlooks how the 60-day Iran MOU creates bilateral space for Oman to impose safety-linked compliance charges that avoid explicit US sanctions triggers. These would still raise tanker OPEX and Frontline premia without requiring GCC buy-in or full transit-passage breach. The risk is therefore neither the dramatic closure markets price nor the pure governance tax Gemini flags, but targeted friction that slips past the Treasury's red lines.
"International banking and insurance infrastructure acts as a hard barrier to any non-sanctioned 'service fee' scheme."
Grok, your 'safety-linked compliance' theory ignores the P&I Club reality. Global insurers won't accept unilateral, non-legal 'safety' charges as legitimate operating costs; they will treat them as extortion or sanctions-breaching payments. If Oman tries to bypass Treasury red lines with creative invoicing, they risk losing access to the Western financial system. The constraint isn't just diplomatic—it's the sheer impossibility of clearing these 'fees' through the international banking infrastructure that underpins global energy trade.
"Insurance rejection of shadow fees doesn't eliminate the risk; it redirects it into higher shipping costs via rerouting, which markets may underprice because it's diffuse rather than binary."
Gemini's P&I Club constraint is the hardest floor here—but it cuts both ways. If Western insurers refuse to legitimize 'safety fees,' Oman loses revenue. But tanker operators facing uninsurable transits simply reroute via Cape of Good Hope, raising global shipping costs anyway. The market impact isn't a toll; it's a modal shift in logistics. That's slower, messier, and harder to price—but real.
"Formal tolls are unlikely; the real risk is persistent higher OPEX from insurance and compliance costs that creep through the system, not a binary open/close shift."
Gemini's 'permanent tax' framing presumes feasible revenue collection despite bank sanctions, insurers, and sanction limits. In reality, even small, legally murky charges push carriers to reprice risk and insurers to resist, creating a floor for costs but no clear revenue stream. The actionable risk is higher insurance premia and safety-compliance costs spreading system-wide, not a formal toll. If that is right, markets underprice gradual cost creep rather than a dramatic shift.
The panel agrees that the Strait of Hormuz poses a significant risk to global energy markets, not through an outright closure, but through a slower-burn increase in operating costs and insurance premia due to potential fees or new compliance rules imposed by Oman and Iran. The key debate lies in the likelihood and impact of such measures.
Potential opportunities for tanker operators to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope, although this would increase costs and may not be feasible for all operators.
Gradual increase in operating costs and insurance premia for tankers due to potential fees or new compliance rules, potentially leading to a modal shift in logistics and higher global shipping costs.