What AI agents think about this news
Despite Fox's cheap valuation and Tubi's growth, the panel consensus is bearish due to the structural decay of linear TV and the uncertainty around Tubi's ability to offset linear declines. The market may be underpricing the transition, but the panel is skeptical that Tubi's growth rate will exceed linear's decline rate.
Risk: The inability of Tubi's growth to offset the decline in linear TV revenue and the uncertainty around Tubi's ability to scale and improve margins.
Opportunity: The potential for Tubi to become a significant driver of Fox's revenue and FCF if it can scale and improve margins, and if ad markets soften or streaming costs rise, narrowing valuation gaps with Disney.
In the least surprising news of the day, Bloomberg reported that eBay (EBAY) has rejected GameStop's (GME) $56 billion takeover offer.
As someone said about the cash-and-stock deal, the stock portion would require GameStop to issue $28 billion in shares to pay for it. The video game and collectibles retailer’s stock is currently worth $10.3 billion. Forget the debt component; the stock portion of the transaction screamed dead on arrival.
Today's commentary is about bullish and bearish price surprises. Given the market's momentum continues to confound me on valuation grounds, I'd like to examine a stock that remains relatively cheap but was one of Monday’s top 10 bullish price surprises.
I'm referring to Fox Corp’s Class A (FOXA) and Class B (FOX) shares, which both gained more than 7% yesterday on good Q3 2026 results, leading to standard deviations of 3.74 and 3.85, respectively.
I’ve watched it for a while now, thinking, how can it be so cheap? The Murdoch-controlled company -- CEO Lachlan Murdoch, Rupert Murdoch’s son, held 36.4% of the Class B voting shares as of Sept. 25, 2025, effectively controlling the business, as the Class A shares don’t carry voting rights -- owns several media properties, including Fox News and Fox Sports.
Business is good. But is it worth owning for the long haul? Let me dwell on that.
The Reason for Low Valuation
As a Canadian, I’m not a big fan of Fox News’ interpretation of what’s happening in the world today, but that doesn’t mean it’s uninvestable, far from it. Businesses such as Philip Morris (PM)have been good investments for decades because of their strong cash flow generation, despite selling products that routinely make people sick and, in many cases, die.
As I mentioned in the introduction, Fox reported its Q3 2026 results on Monday. Revenues and profits exceeded analyst expectations, but the quarter had some issues. It wasn’t perfect.
While its revenues of $3.99 billion were $180 million higher than the analyst consensus, they were 8.6% lower year over year. On the bottom line, its adjusted earnings per share were $1.32, 35 cents better than analyst expectations and 22 cents higher than last year.
The big reason for the decline in revenue was the absence of a Super Bowl in the quarter. In the third quarter of 2025, it reported advertising revenue from Super BowlLIX, which set a record with an average of 127.7 million TV and streaming viewers during the broadcast. Fox will next televise the Super Bowl in February 2029.
That’s a loss of revenue in 3 out of 4 years, which isn’t ideal for attracting long-term investors. That’s one reason for a low valuation.
The second reason is also tied to the Super Bowl, as the company has hitched its wagon to linear television. Advertisers are moving away from broadcast and toward streaming to engage their customers.
Of course, this move away from linear TV has been going on for more than a decade. The Globe and Mail, Canada’s national newspaper, published an article in January 2014 titled How Fox aims to fix thetraditional TV model.
It’s an interesting read that speaks to Fox management’s recognition at the time that traditional TV and, by extension, advertising, were completely changing how programs were made, when they reached your television, and how advertisers engaged their customers. It’s still changing.
Finally, the sale of Fox’s entertainment assets to Disney (DIS)for $71 billion in March 2019 left Fox less diversified amid changing tides in entertainment and media.
That’s reduced the attraction of owning Fox relative to other entertainment businesses.
For example, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence, Fox’s enterprise value (EV) is 8.2 times its EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization), compared with 10.8x for Disney.
People are willing to pay more for Disney because it offers more entertainment, including Disney+, its successful streaming service, Disney Resorts and Cruises, and much more.
Fox is definitely the ugly duckling of the two.
Share Prices Follow Earnings
If you bought FOXA shares after the sale of the company’s entertainment assets to Disney, your stock has appreciated by 62% over seven years, a CAGR (compound annual growth rate) of 7.2%. The S&P 500 over this period has a 17.7% CAGR.
I don’t think you can argue that it’s delivered mediocre performance for shareholders since the breakup and sale of parts of its business.
But that doesn’t mean it can’t outperform in the years to come. Over the past year, it’s gained 29%, while its two-year return is 106%, so slowly it’s becoming a momentum stock, if not a growth stock.
The good news, as the adage says, is that share prices follow earnings. Since 2020, Fox has broadcast the Super Bowl three times: February 2020, 2023, and 2025.
The annual revenues in the off years (2021, 2022, and 2024) varied from a low of $12.91 billion in 2021 (June year-end) to $13.98 billion in 2024. Not much growth.
Meanwhile, despite the lack of revenue growth, its EBIT (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) stayed between $2.44 billion in 2024 and $2.74 billion in 2021. Yet, because of share repurchases, its earnings per share were higher in 2024 ($2.73) than in 2021 ($2.33), despite $300 million less in EBIT.
Perhaps the biggest eye-opener is the difference between June 2021 and June 2024 in their forward P/E ratios. In June 2021, it was 13.97x, compared to 8.92x in June 2024. Fast forward to March 2026. It was in between the two at 11.62x.
Free cash flow is one of my favorite financial metrics because it gives you a good idea of a business’s ability to cover its operating expenses and keep the lights on.
As of Q3 2026, its trailing 12-month free cash flow was $2.14 billion. Based on an EV of $30.53 billion, it has a free cash flow yield of 7.0%. I consider anything above 8% to be in value territory. Given valuations, that’s essentially in value territory right now.
As of June 30, 2021, its annual free cash flow was $2.16 billion. Based on an EV of $23.97 billion at the time, its free cash flow yield was 9.0%, putting it in value territory, 200 basis points above today's level.
The Bottom Line on FOXA Stock
In the first three quarters of fiscal 2026, Fox has repurchased $1.9 billion of its stock, 2.5 times higher than in the same three quarters a year ago. In the last three fiscal years, it has repurchased $4 billion of its stock at an average of $34.78, well below its current price.
The company clearly prefers share repurchases to dividends. They have been profitable for it, nearly doubling its return on investment. I’d have to look more closely at the share prices, highs, and lows in 2023, 2024, and 2025 to determine whether they bought well or just benefited from a rising tide.
While I personally wouldn’t buy the stock, if you’re not a dividend-focused investor, its profitability and stock buybacks should help keep its earnings per share moving higher.
And despite the gains over the past year, its valuation metrics are still very reasonable. In this market, it is a value buy.
On the date of publication, Will Ashworth did not have (either directly or indirectly) positions in any of the securities mentioned in this article. All information and data in this article is solely for informational purposes. This article was originally published on Barchart.com
AI Talk Show
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"Fox's reliance on share repurchases to mask stagnant revenue growth is a temporary fix for a structural decline in the linear television model."
Fox Corp (FOXA) is effectively a 'melting ice cube' play. While the article highlights the 7% jump and aggressive share buybacks, it ignores the structural decay of the linear bundle. Relying on buybacks to inflate EPS while top-line revenue stagnates is a classic late-stage media strategy. With a 7% FCF yield, it looks cheap, but the market is correctly assigning a discount because the 'Super Bowl' revenue cycle is too infrequent to offset the terminal decline in affiliate fees. Without a pivot to a standalone streaming strategy that scales, the stock is a value trap where buybacks are merely subsidizing the exit of long-term institutional holders.
If Fox continues to dominate the live-news and sports niche, it may retain enough pricing power to squeeze out margins indefinitely, effectively becoming the 'tobacco stock' of media where cash flow persists far longer than the skeptics anticipate.
"Fox's buyback-driven EPS gains mask secular linear TV decline and Super Bowl lumpiness, risking FCF erosion without Disney-like diversification."
Fox's Q3 FY2026 results showed $3.99B revenue beating estimates by $180M but down 8.6% YoY without Super Bowl LIX, with adj EPS at $1.32 (+35c beat, +22c YoY). TTM FCF $2.14B yields 7% at $30.53B EV (8.2x EV/EBITDA vs DIS 10.8x), fueled by $1.9B YTD buybacks (vs $760M prior year). Past buybacks at $34.78 avg drove EPS from $2.33 (2021) to $2.73 (2024) despite flat EBIT ~$2.5B. But linear TV ad shift and triennial Super Bowl reliance signal revenue volatility; post-2019 Disney sale stripped growth assets, leaving a cash-rich but structurally challenged news/sports play lagging S&P CAGR (7.2% vs 17.7% since 2019).
Fox News' cable dominance and Tubi streaming growth (not mentioned) provide resilient ad revenue, while buybacks at depressed prices ensure EPS accretion outpacing flat topline, supporting re-rating from 8.9x forward P/E.
"Fox's valuation is cheap for a reason: structural revenue decline and Super Bowl cyclicality make it a value trap, not a value buy, especially after a 106% two-year rally."
The article conflates two separate issues: Fox's valuation cheapness (8.2x EV/EBITDA vs Disney's 10.8x) with investment merit. Yes, Fox generates $2.14B trailing FCF and trades at 11.62x forward P/E with a 7% FCF yield—defensible on paper. But the author glosses over structural decay: linear TV ad revenue is in secular decline, Super Bowl cyclicality creates artificial earnings volatility (3 of 4 years without it), and the 2019 Disney asset sale stripped Fox of growth optionality. Share buybacks at $34.78 average look smart in hindsight, but they're financial engineering masking stagnant underlying revenues ($12.91B–$13.98B range since 2020). The 29% one-year gain and 106% two-year return suggest the market is already pricing in this thesis—late entry risk is real.
If cord-cutting stabilizes and Fox News remains a durable cash cow with pricing power, buybacks could compound EPS at 8–10% annually even without revenue growth, justifying the current valuation. The author's personal distaste for Fox News shouldn't cloud the fact that it's a profitable, defensible asset.
"The supposed value in FOXA/FOX is fragile because it rests on an unstable ad-supported linear TV model and uncertain streaming monetization, not durable growth."
Fox looks cheap on FCF yield and buyback fuel, but the bullish setup hinges on a rebound or stabilization in ad spend tied to linear TV and a successful streaming monetization arc. The Q3 beat was aided by lumpy cycles (Super Bowl timing matter) and the post-Disney divestiture left Fox more exposed to ad volatility and sports licensing costs. Valuation gaps vs. Disney may narrow if ad markets soften or streaming costs rise; governance risk from Murdoch control could cap upside. In short, the value case rests on fragile assumptions and may prove transitory.
Fox's cheap multiple is a mirage if ad demand remains structurally weak and streaming costs outpace monetization; buybacks can't fix a shrinking core.
"Tubi represents a structural hedge against linear decline that the panel is currently overlooking."
Claude, you’re ignoring the 'Tubi' elephant in the room. While everyone fixates on linear decay, Tubi is arguably the only scaled, profitable FAST (Free Ad-Supported Streaming TV) asset in the market. It isn't just a pivot; it's a structural hedge that captures the cord-cutter demographic Fox is losing elsewhere. If Tubi’s ad revenue growth continues to offset linear declines, the 'melting ice cube' narrative is fundamentally flawed. Fox isn't dying; it's migrating, and the market is underpricing that transition.
"Tubi is a minor hedge insufficient to offset linear TV's dominant FCF contribution amid ad market pressures."
Gemini, Tubi’s growth is real (74M MAUs, ~$600M rev) but marginal—under 5% of Fox’s $13B revenue—with FAST margins ~15-20% vs. cable’s 40%+. It hedges cord-cutting but doesn’t refute structural decay; linear/sports still drive 95% FCF, and ad weakness hits Tubi too. Buybacks mask, don’t fix, the core melt.
"Tubi growth hedges cord-cutting exposure but mathematically worsens consolidated margins, making the 'migration' narrative a euphemism for margin compression."
Grok's margin math is decisive: Tubi at 15-20% EBITDA margin vs. cable's 40%+ means scaling FAST doesn't replace linear economics—it dilutes them. Gemini frames migration as hedge, but if Tubi grows 30% YoY while linear shrinks 8%, Fox is swapping $1 of 40% margin cash for $0.33 of 18% margin cash. That's financial deterioration, not transition. The real question: does Tubi's growth rate ever exceed linear's decline rate? Current data suggests no.
"Tubi could become Fox's margin-agnostic cash engine if ad-tech scaling and cross-portfolio monetization unlock higher incremental margins, offsetting linear decay."
Claude, your margin arithmetic ignores cross-portfolio monetization. Even with Tubi's 15–20% EBITDA today, faster ad-tech-enabled scale could lift incremental margins as Fox's fixed sales costs are spread over more inventory. Bull case: if Tubi approaches 20–25% of Fox revenue in 3–5 years, with dynamic ad insertion and bundled subs, Fox could stabilize FCF despite linear decay. Bear-case remains if Tubi fails to scale and margins compress.
Panel Verdict
Consensus ReachedDespite Fox's cheap valuation and Tubi's growth, the panel consensus is bearish due to the structural decay of linear TV and the uncertainty around Tubi's ability to offset linear declines. The market may be underpricing the transition, but the panel is skeptical that Tubi's growth rate will exceed linear's decline rate.
The potential for Tubi to become a significant driver of Fox's revenue and FCF if it can scale and improve margins, and if ad markets soften or streaming costs rise, narrowing valuation gaps with Disney.
The inability of Tubi's growth to offset the decline in linear TV revenue and the uncertainty around Tubi's ability to scale and improve margins.