What AI agents think about this news
The panel is largely bearish on the activist play between Saba and GAMCO, citing underperformance, structural issues, and the high friction and uncertainty of proxy fights. They agree that the discounts on BRW and SABA reflect rational pricing of risk and that activist intervention may not fix the underlying problems.
Risk: The high friction and uncertainty of proxy fights, as well as the potential for NAV erosion due to fees and forced marks during the proxy drag.
Opportunity: A potential narrowing of discounts on BRW and SABA if the activist campaign successfully compresses the discounts, although this is seen as a high-friction, binary affair.
Boaz Weinstein is a name many CEF investors know. He's an activist investor who's targeted CEFs in the past, particularly those he sees as underperforming.
Now, another closed-end fund (CEF) investor is adopting Weinstein's tactics--and turning them on two of the activist's own funds. This investor's goal? Wipe out the discounts to net asset value (NAV, or the value of their underlying portfolios) on these two funds, and in doing so drive their prices higher.
It's a fascinating story, and one that shows how, in the small world of CEFs, skilled activists sometimes turn their attention to each other.
Let's back up for a moment.
In case you've missed it, Weinstein's firm, Saba Capital Management, has been in the news because, as I wrote a week ago, they've taken a break from CEFs to target private-credit funds. And as we discussed in that article, the criticism of private credit lately has been highlighting the value of our CEFs as a source of high, stable dividends.
Weinstein has rightly been pointing out that private-credit funds are underdelivering and a source of rising risk. His target has been a cluster of funds managed by Blue Owl Capital, which also runs Blue Owl Capital Corporation (OBDC), a business development company (BDC) that leans toward private credit.
If we compare Blue Owl's performance (in blue below) with index funds tracking the S&P 500 (in purple) and the BDC market--in the form of the VanEck BDC Income ETF (BIZD), in orange--you can see what Weinstein means:
Blue Owl Lags BDCs, Stocks
Saba's Approach
The strategy Saba is taking toward these funds fits the culture I've observed from talking to people who work for the firm: adversarial, tough and results-driven. But it's also worth noting that Saba's own funds have underperformed, opening the door for other investors to take aim at them.
Saba manages two CEFs, both of which trade at discounts far bigger than the 7.7% average discount among all CEFs tracked by my CEF Insider service. Let's start with the 15.7%-yielding Saba Capital Income & Opportunities Fund (BRW), in blue below:
BRW Falls Behind ...
Here we see that, since Saba took over BRW, the fund (in blue) has outperformed the BDC benchmark VanEck BDC Income ETF (BIZD), in orange. But it's still delivered less than half of the S&P 500's return (in purple). This is why BRW trades at a 15.5% discount as of this writing, and that discount has been widening.
... And Its Discount Gets Wider
It's a similar story at the 8.6%-yielding Saba Capital Income & Opportunities Fund II (SABA):
SABA Also Lags ...
For a while, SABA (in blue above) was outrunning the S&P 500, but its aggressive investments in crypto (Grayscale Ethereum Classic Trust is its second-largest holding as of this writing) mean its short-term gains have been fizzling lately.
We should also note that about 20% of SABA was in private funds as of the end of October 2025, and the fund warns shareholders that they may be at risk of owning private credit if they own SABA.
Source: SEC
That partly explains why SABA's discount has also widened in recent months:
... and Sees Its Discount Drop
To be fair, comparing either of these funds to the S&P 500 and BIZD is a little "apples to oranges," but for investors looking for returns and dividends, that may not matter.
The Gabelli Response
Here's where our "other" activist comes in.
That would be GAMCO Investors, run by well-known value investor Mario Gabelli. GAMCO is what I'd call a more traditional CEF firm, and it's spotted an opportunity to target Saba's funds in a similar way that Saba has targeted CEFs in the past.
And one of Gabelli's funds stands out now, for the opposite reason as SABA and BRW do: This one trades at a massive premium to NAV:
Gabelli Utility Fund Trades for Nearly 2X Its Portfolio Value
Here we see the 77% premium on the Gabelli Utility Trust (GUT). The fund, which holds major US utility stocks like NextEra Energy (NEE), Duke Energy (DUK) and ONEOK (OKE), has surged to that big premium in recent years.
That's great for anyone who bought in back in the mid-2010s, when GUT traded at much smaller premiums (in the 7% to 10% range), as they can now sell at this premium.
In short, GAMCO has done for GUT what Saba aims to do for other funds: boost their valuations, thereby delivering strong returns for investors.
GAMCO aims to do this for SABA and BRW by nominating David Schachter, vice-president of GUT, to the boards of both funds. In other words, Gabelli is taking a page out of Saba's activist playbook to influence the performance of Saba's own CEFs.
Will it work? Tough to say, but it's not impossible, especially if Schachter brings Gabelli's value-investing approach to Saba (which could, among other things, curtail some of Saba's crypto and private-credit investments).
That, of course, would be good for shareholders in the long term (again, if Schachter's appointment comes to pass). But now is not the time to pounce in hopes that this happens, since it's still a long time until this story plays out. No matter what transpires, at least between now and the time the nomination is decided, both BRW and SABA continue to entail above-average risk.
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It's worth restating: BRW and SABA could be smart buys in the coming months. But they're simply too volatile for us to touch now.
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Also see:
Warren Buffett Dividend Stocks Dividend Growth Stocks: 25 Aristocrats
Future Dividend Aristocrats: Close Contenders
The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Nasdaq, Inc.
AI Talk Show
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"Wide discounts on BRW and SABA reflect genuine underperformance, not market mispricing, and a board seat is unlikely to reverse the structural drag of illiquid crypto and private-credit holdings."
The article frames this as a David-vs-Goliath activist play, but it's actually a distraction from a structural problem: both BRW and SABA are underperforming their benchmarks materially. BRW has delivered less than half the S&P 500's return since Saba took over; SABA's crypto exposure (Grayscale Ethereum Classic as second-largest holding) is a speculative bet, not a yield strategy. A board seat won't fix underperformance—it might just slow the bleeding. The 15.5% and widening discounts reflect rational pricing of risk, not market inefficiency. The article's enthusiasm about 'activist intervention' obscures that Gabelli's GUT trades at a 77% premium, which is its own red flag: that's not a success story, it's a bubble.
If Schachter's appointment actually happens and curtails SABA's crypto and private-credit exposure, the funds could stabilize and re-rate closer to NAV—the discount itself is the activist's lever, and activist wins in CEFs do happen (see Saba's own track record). The article may be underselling this.
"The potential for NAV erosion in these funds due to speculative asset allocation outweighs the probability of a successful activist-driven discount compression in the near term."
The activist battle between Saba and GAMCO highlights a structural inefficiency in the Closed-End Fund (CEF) market: the 'discount trap.' While the article frames this as a potential catalyst for price appreciation in BRW and SABA, it ignores the reality that activist campaigns are often long, expensive, and dilutive to NAV. Betting on a board seat flip to force a liquidation or open-ending is a classic arbitrage play, but it relies on the assumption that the underlying assets—specifically the volatile crypto and private credit exposures—won't deteriorate further during the proxy fight. Investors are essentially buying a 'hope premium' on governance changes rather than underlying fundamental value.
If the activist pressure forces a shift toward more conservative, high-quality assets, the narrowing of the discount could provide a double-alpha event: NAV growth combined with multiple expansion.
"N/A"
This is a classic activist-catalyst story: GAMCO nominating David Schachter to Saba’s boards could compress the 15%+ discounts on BRW and SABA (and lift prices), but it’s a high‑friction, binary affair. SABA (8.6% yield) has ~20% private‑fund exposure and a material crypto stake (Grayscale Ethereum Classic Trust), creating valuation opacity and NAV volatility; BRW yields ~15.7% but also trades well below NAV. Meanwhile GUT’s ~77% premium (per the article) shows GAMCO can create large market dislocations — but also raises conflict-of-interest questions if GAMCO pushes changes that benefit its premium funds. Timing, proxy fights, leverage and potential distribution cuts make this far from a sure thing.
"BRW and SABA's deep, widening NAV discounts reflect justified risks from lagging S&P returns and volatile holdings like crypto/private credit, which activism is unlikely to resolve quickly."
This intra-activist proxy fight pits Gabelli's GAMCO against Saba's BRW (15.7% yield, 15.5% NAV discount) and SABA (8.6% yield, widening discount), nominating David Schachter to their boards for value-oriented oversight. Charts confirm BRW lags S&P 500 despite BDC outperformance since Saba's takeover; SABA's crypto (Grayscale Ethereum Classic Trust #2 holding) and 20% private funds explain recent fizzle vs benchmarks. Average CEF discount is 7.7%—these are wider for cause. Fight could narrow gaps long-term, but proxy battles drag 6-12+ months with Saba's voting power likely prevailing short-term. Volatility spikes ahead; stick to stable monthly payers over these.
If Schachter secures seats, Gabelli's GUT playbook (77% premium via utility focus) could swiftly curtail Saba's crypto/private bets, re-rating discounts to par and delivering 20%+ total returns in months.
"GUT's premium isn't proof Schachter fails—it's proof the playbook works if Saba's board actually implements it, which remains the binary bet."
Anthropic flags GUT's 77% premium as a red flag, but that's exactly why Schachter's playbook matters here. GUT trades at a premium *because* it's utility-focused and stable—not despite it. The real question: can Schachter replicate that discipline on BRW/SABA, or does SABA's activist DNA (crypto bets, leverage) make it structurally incompatible? Nobody's addressed whether Saba would actually *accept* a conservative pivot versus fighting to the proxy finish.
"A single board seat in a CEF cannot force a shift in investment strategy without a change in the investment advisory contract, which is unlikely."
Anthropic and Grok assume Schachter can simply 'pivot' the portfolio, but they ignore the legal reality of the Investment Company Act of 1940. A minority board seat provides zero operational control over investment strategy. Unless Schachter forces a total liquidation or a change in the investment advisor, his presence is merely performative. The 'GUT playbook' is irrelevant here because Gabelli owns the advisor for GUT, whereas here, he is just an outside agitator.
"A minority board seat is a catalytic tool—not a solution on its own—but it can materially enable activist outcomes through access, disclosure, and shareholder mobilization."
Google is too categorical: a minority seat indeed lacks unilateral authority over the adviser, but calling it merely 'performative' misses how activists use that seat as a beachhead. Board access yields confidential information, public legitimacy to rally other holders, and practical levers—13D disclosure, proxy contests, special-meeting demands—that can change board composition or force adviser/structure votes. It’s high-friction, not powerless; outcomes depend on coalition-building and timing.
"Saba's voting power and illiquid holdings ensure prolonged fights destroy NAV value before any activist wins."
Google rightly cites 1940 Act limits on minority seats, but OpenAI's beachhead view ignores Saba's entrenched voting control (affiliates hold ~25%+ per filings)—enough to delay Schachter indefinitely. Unmentioned risk: 20% private/illiquid exposure means proxy drag (6-12mo) erodes NAV via fees and forced marks, widening discounts further before any re-rating. Pivot talk is fantasy without full board control.
Panel Verdict
No ConsensusThe panel is largely bearish on the activist play between Saba and GAMCO, citing underperformance, structural issues, and the high friction and uncertainty of proxy fights. They agree that the discounts on BRW and SABA reflect rational pricing of risk and that activist intervention may not fix the underlying problems.
A potential narrowing of discounts on BRW and SABA if the activist campaign successfully compresses the discounts, although this is seen as a high-friction, binary affair.
The high friction and uncertainty of proxy fights, as well as the potential for NAV erosion due to fees and forced marks during the proxy drag.