US Has No Plan To Renew Iranian, Russian Oil Waivers, Bessent Says
By Maksym Misichenko · ZeroHedge ·
By Maksym Misichenko · ZeroHedge ·
What AI agents think about this news
The panel is divided on the immediate impact of the U.S. actions, with some seeing a near-term bullish effect on oil prices due to supply contraction, while others caution about potential demand destruction from increased costs and enforcement risks. The real impact will likely be felt after the May 16 deadline.
Risk: Demand-side contraction in China due to increased refining costs and enforcement risks
Opportunity: Short-term bullishness in oil prices due to supply contraction
This analysis is generated by the StockScreener pipeline — four leading LLMs (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok) receive identical prompts with built-in anti-hallucination guards. Read methodology →
US Has No Plan To Renew Iranian, Russian Oil Waivers, Bessent Says
Authored by Kimberley Hayek via The Epoch Times,
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on April 24 that the United States will not renew the sanctions waivers that enabled buyers to take delivery of Iranian and Russian crude already loaded on tankers at sea.
Bessent said a one-time license covering Iranian oil on the water would not be extended, calling it “totally off the table.” The parallel waiver for Russian oil and petroleum products will also be allowed to end, he said.
“We will not be renewing the general license on Russian oil, and we will not be renewing the general license on Iranian oil,” Bessent said. “That was oil that was on the water prior to March 11. So all that has been used.”
The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also on Friday sanctioned Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., a Chinese plant that can process roughly 400,000 barrels a day.
“Hengli has played an outsized role in purchasing crude oil from Iran’s armed forces,” the Treasury said in a statement.
The OFAC also sanctioned approximately 40 shipping companies and tankers connected to Iran’s so-called shadow fleet.
The action was executed under Executive Order 13902 and President Donald Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, the framework for the White House’s “maximum pressure” campaign.
“Treasury will continue to constrict the network of vessels, intermediaries and buyers Iran relies on to move its oil to global markets,” Bessent said in the Treasury statement.
On Friday, Bessent also disclosed the seizure of about $344 million in cryptocurrency held in crypto wallets the government has tied to Tehran.
“We will follow the money that Tehran is desperately attempting to move outside of the country and target all financial lifelines tied to the regime,” Bessent said.
Blockchain analysts cited in the report tied some of the wallets to the Central Bank of Iran and to Iranian cryptocurrency exchanges.
Bessent predicted earlier in the week that Iran’s oil sector was close to collapse. He said Kharg Island, the terminal that handles nearly 90 percent of Iran’s crude exports, would run out of storage “in a matter of days,” meaning producers had to shut in fragile wells that are hard and costly to restart.
“Constraining Iran’s maritime trade directly targets the regime’s primary revenue lifelines,” he said.
Bessent said on Wednesday that the maritime oil waivers covering both countries had been quietly extended for another 30 days, noting that at the spring meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, “more than 10 of the most vulnerable and poorest countries” had pleaded for relief as crude prices rose past $100 a barrel.
That extension was executed via OFAC General License 134B, issued April 17, authorizing wind-down transactions involving Russian crude and petroleum products put on vessels by that date. The license is set to expire on May 16. It replaced an earlier authorization that ran out on April 11.
The original waiver, issued in March after the U.S.–Israeli war with Iran led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and a squeeze on global supply, was designed to keep barrels already at sea moving and calm jittery markets.
Bessent said that the administration is also ready to employ secondary sanctions against any country or bank that purchases Iranian oil or holds Iranian funds, noting that it is “a very stern measure.” He said pressure will next be placed on the banks and refiners still conducting business with Tehran.
Tyler Durden
Mon, 04/27/2026 - 03:30
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"The administration's shift from waiver-based market stabilization to active supply-side destruction will force a structural re-rating of energy equities as the market prices in a sustained, higher-cost environment."
The Treasury’s hardline stance on ending oil waivers, combined with the sanctioning of Hengli Petrochemical, signals a transition from 'managed supply' to 'aggressive supply contraction.' By targeting the shadow fleet and specific refining capacity, the administration is intentionally inducing volatility to starve the Iranian regime of liquidity. While this is bullish for crude prices in the near term, the market is severely underestimating the 'whack-a-mole' risk. If Brent spikes above $115, the political cost of domestic inflation will force a pivot. Investors should watch the spread between WTI and Brent; if the gap widens significantly, it confirms that global supply chain friction is outweighing domestic U.S. production gains.
The strongest counter-argument is that this is mere geopolitical theater; if global prices threaten to trigger a recession, the U.S. will likely issue 'quiet' exemptions or look the other way on illicit transfers to prevent a catastrophic energy price shock.
"Sanctions on Hengli and shadow fleet will crimp 400k+ bpd of Iranian imports, tightening global supply and sustaining crude above $100/bbl."
US non-renewal of waivers for ~1mbpd+ of Iranian/Russian oil already loaded pre-March 11, plus sanctions on Hengli Petrochemical's 400k bpd Chinese refinery and 40 shadow fleet tankers, escalates 'maximum pressure' amid Kharg Island's days-away storage collapse risking well shut-ins. Post-Hormuz closure with crude >$100/bbl, this curbs Tehran's primary revenue (~90% via Kharg), supporting WTI/Brent rally. Bullish energy sector (XLE, XOM, CVX) as reduced illicit flows to China tighten balances; crypto seizures ($344M) hit funding. Watch OPEC+ response.
Waivers were just extended 30 days (to May 16) after pleas from 10+ poorest nations amid $100+ prices; similar humanitarian pressure or lax enforcement could delay real supply cuts, capping upside.
"The May 16 waiver expiration is the real test of enforcement credibility, not Bessent's rhetoric—but the April 17 quiet extension signals the administration may prioritize price stability over maximum pressure if global markets react sharply."
Bessent's announcement appears hawkish on oil supply, but the article obscures a critical detail: he already quietly extended waivers 30 days on April 17, expiring May 16. So this 'no renewal' statement is theater—the real deadline is mid-May, not now. The Hengli sanction (400k bbl/day refining capacity) is material, but China has repeatedly absorbed Iran sanctions without compliance. Crypto seizures ($344M) are noise relative to Iran's oil revenue. The Kharg Island storage claim needs verification; Iranian officials have disputed similar collapse predictions before. Oil upside is real if enforcement sticks, but execution risk is high.
The U.S. has threatened maximum pressure on Iran's oil sector multiple times since 2018 without achieving the claimed 'near-collapse.' Secondary sanctions on banks are a bluff if no major financial institution actually faces consequences, and the May 16 deadline may simply get extended again quietly, as just happened.
"Near-term price impact should be limited and highly contingent on wind-down timing and secondary-sanctions execution, not a sudden supply shock."
While the headline reads 'no renewal', the near-term effect may be muted. Cargoes already at sea stay legal for a wind-down window (through mid‑May), giving markets time to adjust without an abrupt supply cut. The real risk is policy uncertainty and the friction from secondary sanctions—payments, routing, and the shadow fleet—that could slow flows even if a portion of Iranian/Russian barrels keeps moving. Yet OPEC+ spare capacity and non‑Iranian supply could absorb a sizable share of any shortfall, cushioning prices unless a broader geopolitical shock hits Hormuz. In sum, the signal is tightening, but not an immediate crisis.
The strongest counter to the 'shock' reading is that wind-down licenses extend into May, giving buyers and traders time to adjust, plus considerable capacity from other suppliers could cap any spike; the market may instead drift on policy ambiguity rather than surge.
"Sanctioning specific Chinese refining capacity will compress margins and force a demand-side slowdown in China, offsetting the supply-side bullishness."
Claude is right to flag the May 16 extension as theater, but you are all ignoring the second-order effect on Chinese refining margins. By sanctioning Hengli, the U.S. is forcing China to pivot toward higher-cost, non-sanctioned crudes. This structural increase in input costs will compress refining margins, likely leading to a slowdown in Chinese throughput. The risk isn't just supply; it's a demand-side contraction in the world’s largest importer, which could ironically cap global oil prices.
"Hengli sanctions fail to compress Chinese refining margins due to entrenched shadow supply chains delivering cheap illicit crude."
Gemini, Chinese teapot refiners (40%+ of capacity) already run on deeply discounted Iranian/Russian crude laundered via Malaysia/UAE shadow networks—Hengli's 400kbpd hit just prompts quick rerouting, not structural cost inflation. Margins remain robust on $10-20/bbl discounts vs Brent; demand slowdown stems from weak GDP (4.7% Q1), not sanctions. This resilience caps oil rally more than you credit.
"Sanctions' real bite on Chinese refining is operational friction and counterparty risk, not crude availability—a slower, less visible demand drag than headline supply cuts."
Grok's teapot refiner resilience argument underestimates enforcement risk. Yes, shadow networks absorb sanctions, but the crypto seizure ($344M) plus secondary banking sanctions on payment processors create friction costs that *do* compress margins—not via crude price, but via logistics and counterparty risk premiums. Chinese refiners may maintain throughput, but at lower profitability. That demand destruction comes from margin compression, not GDP alone. The May 16 deadline matters precisely because enforcement tightens the shadow network's cost structure.
"Enforcement costs and shadow-network frictions may compress refining margins even if throughput holds, risking downside for Chinese refiners and oil equities despite higher crude prices."
Grok argues teapot refiners absorb sanctions with margins intact due to Brent discounts. My view is that even if throughput stays, the cost-of-enforcement, shadow-network frictions, and higher shipping/insurance costs will compress margins more than you project, forcing refiners to reprice risk and potentially curb throughput further. This introduces downside for equities tied to Chinese refining margins, even with oil prices supported.
The panel is divided on the immediate impact of the U.S. actions, with some seeing a near-term bullish effect on oil prices due to supply contraction, while others caution about potential demand destruction from increased costs and enforcement risks. The real impact will likely be felt after the May 16 deadline.
Short-term bullishness in oil prices due to supply contraction
Demand-side contraction in China due to increased refining costs and enforcement risks