Warren Buffett and Greg Abel Have Already Made Close to $8 Billion in Gains and $424 Million in Dividends This Year on 1 of Their Oldest, Most Boring Stocks
By Maksym Misichenko · Nasdaq ·
By Maksym Misichenko · Nasdaq ·
What AI agents think about this news
The panel agrees that Berkshire's Coca-Cola stake serves as defensive ballast but raises concerns about concentration risk and potential multiple compression, with unrealized gains acting as trapped capital.
Risk: Concentration risk: KO now equals nearly 40% of Berkshire's entire consumer-staples equity exposure, making it vulnerable to sustained multiple compression and outsized portfolio drag.
Opportunity: None explicitly stated.
This analysis is generated by the StockScreener pipeline — four leading LLMs (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok) receive identical prompts with built-in anti-hallucination guards. Read methodology →
It's hard to believe that Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRKA)(NYSE: BRKB) stock is still underperforming the broader market this year. Yes, there is a new chief overseeing the company, Greg Abel, and it's the first time in over six decades that former CEO Warren Buffett has not sat at the helm.
Still, Buffett is executive chairman of the board and remains actively involved in the company. While the large conglomerate depends on more than just its equity portfolio, some of Berkshire's largest stock holdings have generated strong gains this year.
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In fact, Berkshire has already made close to $8 billion in gains and $424 million in dividends this year from one of its oldest, most boring stocks.
Berkshire first began purchasing the iconic consumer beverage company Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO) in the late 1980s and completed its 400 million share purchase in 1994. It's one of Berkshire's oldest holdings, if not the oldest.
Today, Berkshire still owns all 400 million of its shares, and Coca-Cola is the third-largest position in Berkshire's portfolio, accounting for nearly 10% of capital.
Coca-Cola, while an iconic brand, is not a high-flying artificial intelligence stock. Rather, it is viewed as a best-in-breed consumer staples stock, which is best owned in times of economic turbulence and extreme uncertainty.
As AI-related concerns persist, investors have rotated into consumer staples, leading to strong gains for Coca-Cola, with shares up nearly 29% this year (as of July 29). Coca-Cola also recently reported strong second-quarter earnings, flexing its marketing muscles during the FIFA World Cup to draw more attention to the brand.
Not only did Coca-Cola raise its full-year guidance, but trademark Coca-Cola volume growth of 5% in the quarter is the strongest seen in 17 years, excluding the COVID-19 recovery.
Coca-Cola has also shown the ability to adapt over the years to changing consumer preferences. The company no longer just carries sugary soda drinks, but has a diversity of different beverage brands, including diet soda, water, coffee, and tea, among others.
Furthermore, the company's strong supply chain has helped it effectively manage the aluminum and steel tariffs implemented last year, which do impact the business.
Coca-Cola's 29% appreciation thus far in 2026 has resulted in over $7.9 billion in gains for Berkshire. Additionally, Coca-Cola has paid out $1.06 per share in dividends through the first six months of the year, resulting in another $424 million in passive income for Berkshire.
While Coca-Cola is undoubtedly a Buffett pick through and through, Abel, in his first letter to shareholders earlier this year, provided further commitment to the company.
Abel listed Coca-Cola as one of four core positions and "businesses we understand well, have a high regard for their leaders, and expect will compound over decades. This concentrated approach will continue, with limited activity in these holdings," Abel wrote.
Coca-Cola's performance will not make or break Berkshire Hathaway, which, again, is a large conglomerate with significant energy assets, one of the largest property and casualty insurance businesses in the U.S., a large mortgage operation, and much more.
However, it's Berkshire's decision to make long-term investments in companies like Coca-Cola that demonstrates its discipline and holistic approach to investing. Coca-Cola will not make you rich overnight, but it will make you rich over decades, which is exactly what the stock has done for Berkshire.
Berkshire buys stocks that will perform well throughout an entire business cycle and balances its portfolio so that when the broader market is underperforming, it has defensive consumer staples stocks like Coca-Cola to pick up the slack. It's one of many reasons Berkshire is such a good stock for investors to own.
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Bram Berkowitz has no position in any of the stocks mentioned. The Motley Fool has positions in and recommends Berkshire Hathaway. The Motley Fool has a disclosure policy.
The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Nasdaq, Inc.
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"Berkshire's KO position proves defensive compounding works, but current valuation already prices in most of the upside the article celebrates."
Berkshire's $7.9B unrealized gain and $424M dividend haul from its unchanged 400M-share KO stake (9% of equity portfolio) validates the decades-long 'buy boring, hold forever' discipline. KO's 29% YTD rise (as of late July) outpaced the S&P amid AI rotation into staples, backed by 5% trademark volume growth—the strongest in 17 years—and raised FY guidance. Yet the article's 2026 dates and forward-looking framing feel like recycled Motley Fool promo. Core insight: Abel's explicit 'core position' language removes any succession-risk discount on this holding.
KO trades at 24x forward earnings on only mid-single-digit organic growth; tariff resilience and World Cup tailwinds are one-off, while emerging-market FX volatility and shifting Gen-Z beverage preferences could easily compress the multiple back to 19-20x, erasing most of Berkshire's paper gains in a risk-off environment.
"Coca-Cola’s current valuation is detached from its growth reality, making it a defensive anchor that risks significant multiple compression if consumer spending shifts toward healthier alternatives."
While the article celebrates Coca-Cola’s (KO) 29% YTD gain as a triumph of Buffett’s 'buy-and-hold' discipline, it ignores the valuation trap. Trading at roughly 28x forward P/E, KO is priced for perfection, not for a mature consumer staple facing structural headwinds from GLP-1 weight-loss drugs which could dampen long-term volume growth. Berkshire’s massive unrealized gains are a tax liability time bomb; selling would trigger a massive capital gains hit, effectively locking them into an underperforming asset relative to the S&P 500's tech-driven growth. This isn't just 'defensive' investing; it's a lack of liquidity that forces Berkshire to hold through potential multiple compression.
The counter-argument is that Coca-Cola’s pricing power and global distribution network provide an inflation hedge that high-beta tech stocks lack, justifying a premium valuation during periods of macro volatility.
"KO's 29% YTD gain is a multiple re-rating on macro rotation, not fundamental strength, and reverses sharply if risk appetite returns or rates stabilize higher."
The article conflates unrealized gains with investment thesis validation. Yes, KO is up 29% YTD—but that's mostly multiple expansion (flight-to-safety into consumer staples) rather than fundamental outperformance. Berkshire's $8B gain is real on paper, but the article uses it as evidence that 'boring' stocks work, when actually KO's 5% volume growth is strong but not transformative—it's benefiting from macro rotation, not secular competitive advantage. The real risk: if rate cuts disappoint or AI enthusiasm returns, that multiple compression reverses fast. The article also omits KO's structural headwinds: sugar taxes, declining soda consumption in developed markets, and margin pressure from commodity costs despite tariff management. Berkshire holding 400M shares (10% of portfolio) is concentration, not diversification.
If KO's volume growth is the strongest in 17 years and the company is successfully pivoting to non-sugary beverages while managing supply chain risk, maybe the article is right—this IS evidence that patient, defensive positioning works, especially as recession odds rise.
"The article overstates Coca-Cola as a high-conviction crown jewel for Berkshire while underappreciating the long-run risks of a concentrated, slow-growth bet in a high-rate environment."
Strong takeaway: Berkshire's Coca-Cola stake acts as a defensive ballast, but the article treats KO as a crown jewel and glosses over key risks. The claim of roughly $8B in gains and $424M in dividends from KO this year may obscure the cost basis and realized vs. unrealized gains, and it omits how much of Berkshire’s return hinges on this single holding. More important, a long-duration bet on a single consumer staple carries concentration risk: sugar taxes, input costs, inflation, and slower growth in emerging markets could erode cash flows and dividend visibility over time. In a high-rate environment, the opportunity cost of relying on one boring brand could outpace broader market foam. The piece also lacks valuation context and Berkshire’s broader diversification across cycles.
KO's cash flows have been remarkably resilient for decades, and Berkshire's scale adds cushion; the real risk isn’t concentration so much as whether KO’s moat—and its dividend—can keep pace with evolving consumer tastes and inflation. Dismissing that resilience understates a legitimate ballast to Berkshire’s portfolio.
"KO's category mix evolution mitigates GLP-1 risk, but Berkshire's outsized single-name concentration within staples remains the overlooked portfolio-level vulnerability."
Gemini's GLP-1 volume risk is real but overstated for KO; management already shifted 30%+ of portfolio to low-/no-sugar and functional beverages, with emerging-market volume still accelerating. The true unmentioned risk is balance-sheet concentration: KO now equals nearly 40% of Berkshire's entire consumer-staples equity exposure. Any sustained multiple compression there creates outsized portfolio drag regardless of succession language.
"Berkshire's unrealized gains function as interest-free leverage rather than a tax trap, making the 'liquidity' argument against the KO holding structurally flawed."
Gemini’s 'tax liability time bomb' argument is a fundamental misunderstanding of Berkshire’s capital allocation. Buffett views unrealized gains as deferred tax liabilities that provide free leverage; he isn't 'trapped,' he's utilizing interest-free capital to compound elsewhere. Claude is closer to the mark regarding multiple expansion, but ignores that KO’s real value is its status as a permanent, inflation-linked bond proxy. The risk isn't the tax bill; it's the opportunity cost of stagnant capital allocation.
"Unrealized gains aren't leverage; they're locked capital that forces Berkshire to hold through multiple compression if macro turns."
Gemini's reframing of unrealized gains as 'interest-free leverage' is elegant but dodges the real constraint: Berkshire's $7.9B KO gain is trapped capital that can't redeploy without triggering a tax event. That's not 'free leverage'—it's optionality cost. Grok's 40% concentration within consumer staples is the sharper risk; if KO compresses 15-20% on macro headwinds, Berkshire's entire defensive positioning collapses simultaneously. The panel hasn't addressed whether that's acceptable portfolio construction or a hidden tail risk.
"Gemini's tax-time-bomb framing is a misframe; unrealized gains don't tax Berkshire until sale, so the real risks are concentration and capital-allocation tradeoffs, not deferred tax leverage."
Gemini's 'tax liability time bomb' framing is flawed: Berkshire's unrealized gains on KO do not trigger taxes until sale, so they aren't a 'free leverage' asset nor a time-locked trap—it's optionality cost rather than a literal liability. The bigger risk remains KO concentration and potential multiple compression; clarify whether Berkshire can redeploy capital efficiently if KO stays cap-weighted, and avoid conflating tax semantics with capital-allocation dynamics.
The panel agrees that Berkshire's Coca-Cola stake serves as defensive ballast but raises concerns about concentration risk and potential multiple compression, with unrealized gains acting as trapped capital.
None explicitly stated.
Concentration risk: KO now equals nearly 40% of Berkshire's entire consumer-staples equity exposure, making it vulnerable to sustained multiple compression and outsized portfolio drag.