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Pop Mart's impressive growth was driven by Labubu, but replacing its outsized contribution before consumer spending slows further is a significant challenge. The company's pivot to theme parks and licensing deals is risky and long-cycle, while regulatory headwinds on blind boxes pose a real threat.
Risk: Replacing Labubu's outsized contribution before China's consumer spending slows further
Opportunity: Potential narrative depth from Sony's Labubu film, lifting IP lifetime value
Pop Mart knew Labubu would be a hit, but it didn't expect the shaggy little elf-monster to take over the world. Then, almost as quickly, the question followed: Is the bubble about to pop?
It's a pressure Pop Mart has learned to live with. Investors have been asking some version of that question for years – about Labubu, about the pouty-lipped Molly, about ruddy-cheeked Twinkle Twinkle – said Si De, the Beijing-based toymaker's chief operating officer.
The Labubu craze has since cooled, and Pop Mart's stock has retreated some 40% from its August peak. Powered by Labubu, Pop Mart's revenue and net income in 2025 surged 185% and 309%, respectively.
But shares fell over 22% after the earnings release Wednesday as investors weighed whether the company can keep up the momentum beyond the initial hype.
CEO Wang Ning sought to reassure the market during the earnings call, saying, "Pop Mart has more than just Labubu" — and likening the expectations for the company to a "rookie racing driver suddenly thrown onto an F1 circuit."
No one knows how long a character will stay popular, Si said. But Pop Mart is clear on how one fades: when you stop investing in it.
"We learned this from Disney. They have a very simple truth: continuous investment," the 38-year-old executive told CNBC this month. "When you keep making the right investments, the [intellectual property] has a chance to keep going."
For Pop Mart, that means going global and building worlds around its characters: films, theme parks, fashion tie-ups. The motive is not vanity projects, but commercial bets designed to keep its products like Labubu embedded in people's lives.
"Of course, we hope that Labubu can also last 80, 90, or 100 years," Si said, noting Mickey Mouse is nearly a century old. "But this road is very long."
The method behind the monster
The story of Labubu – which can look like an overnight success – actually began with years of quiet grinding.
Pop Mart first launched Labubu as part of a blind-box collection in 2019 after licensing the character from Hong Kong-Dutch artist Kasing Lung, who created it for a picture-book series several years earlier. For the plush products that became wildly popular, Pop Mart's team spent about two years developing and prototyping designs.
This painstaking process was not the exception. Pop Mart scours the world for artists each year, Si said, but most don't make the cut. Of the tiny fraction who sign with the company, they go through a long incubation process, including internal competition, before the company decides where to concentrate its resources.
The shortlist is deliberately kept small. "We aim to help four, five, maybe six IPs truly grow world-class," Si said, drawing from Disney's playbook where a handful of characters generate the lion's share of value.
Pop Mart, founded in 2010 as a retailer for trendy products for young consumers, pivoted to focus on design toys in 2016 with its first major IP: Molly, a wide-eyed, somewhat sullen girl created by Hong Kong artist Kenny Wong.
He first sketched her back in 2006, after meeting a girl at a fundraiser where he was illustrating portraits. Bespectacled and loudly introducing herself as Molly, she looked at him "with a little bit of stubbornness and nervousness" – and Wong saw himself in her. He wanted to design a character that says, "We may not be perfect in this world, but we are unique," he told CNBC.
Data-driven, vibe-based
Once products enter the market, the process kicks in like clockwork. Pop Mart tracks sales and social media data closely. A new series drops Friday, and by Sunday, sales figures will signal whether it has legs. Running their own stores and online channels keeps the feedback loop tight. An agile supply chain means they can scale or cut orders quickly.
"We don't really make predictions. Instead, we continuously adjust our products based on data," Si said.
But data alone cannot explain why certain characters resonate.
Si doesn't know what the next big one will be after Labubu – and doesn't think it's about dissecting the zeitgeist.
"With all our products – not just Labubu, but also Molly and other IPs – everyone's feelings when they see them aren't necessarily the same," he said.
He compared it to visiting an art museum: people drift past paintings until one stops them. What moves each person is different. Pop Mart's job, as he sees it, is to keep putting out designs, stories and experiences, and let the encounters happen.
That thinking also shapes how the company approaches artificial intelligence. Pop Mart uses AI for efficiency, such as in customer service and coding, but will continue to trust human judgment for art and understanding human emotions, Si said.
The long game
Pop Mart says it's in a phase of global expansion and diversification, where the product is no longer just the toy. Markets outside mainland China accounted for about 44% of Pop Mart's revenue in 2025, and contributions from the U.S. and Europe are expected to grow, Si said.
The stakes of staying relevant are high. Repeat customers who rushed to buy Labubus during periods of tight supply helped spike revenue growth in mainland China last year, according to HSBC. Pop Mart later ramped up production to curb scalping and resale prices have since fallen.
As the Labubu frenzy fades, HSBC last month trimmed its revenue growth forecast for Pop Mart this year from around 30% to under 24%, and expects a 11% to 13% cut in 2026-2027 earnings. The bank added it remained confident in the company's ability to develop and globalize new IPs beyond Labubu.
Other growth initiatives include partnerships with Uniqlo and the Paris-based leather goods company Moynat. Pop Mart has also moved into jewelry, with some Labubu gold necklaces fetching above $2,000. This month, it teamed up with Sony Pictures and filmmaker Paul King to bring Labubu to the big screen.
But theme parks may be the company's most ambitious project. Si called them a "huge dream" for Pop Mart.
Pop Land, located in Beijing, is still in its early stages and undergoing reconstruction and expansion. Its goal is "360-degree immersion," said Si: live performances and more storytelling to send people home wanting more. Watch videos. Buy products. Fall for them harder.
That diversification is also a hedge. Regulators in China and Singapore have introduced or planned tighter rules on blind box sales, reflecting growing concern about their addictive and gambling-adjacent appeal. Si said the company has embraced those rules.
The geopolitics of cute
Geopolitics has forced the company to adapt.
As U.S.-China trade tensions escalated, Pop Mart diversified production across Vietnam and Southeast Asia. But with tariff rates constantly shifting, the company has shifted its focus toward supply-chain efficiency over tariff strategy, according to Si.
Pop Mart has also been cited as an example of Chinese soft power: a consumer brand from Beijing that has achieved genuine cultural traction in the West, something few Chinese companies have managed. Si wants to move past that framing.
"I see a lot of media trying to tie us so closely to politics. O.K., first, we cannot avoid the fact that we are a Chinese company," he said. "But we hope to be a brand that connects artists from around the world with fans from around the world."
AI Talk Show
Four leading AI models discuss this article
"Pop Mart is a one-character company pretending to be a platform, and the market's 22% post-earnings sell-off correctly prices the execution risk of replacing Labubu's contribution before growth stalls."
Pop Mart faces a genuine IP dependency crisis masked by management's Disney comparisons. Yes, 2025 revenue surged 185%, but that's Labubu-driven; the 22% post-earnings drop signals investors see mean reversion. The company's playbook—find artists, incubate 4-6 IPs, diversify into theme parks and film—is sound in theory but execution-dependent. The real risk: theme parks and licensing deals are capital-intensive, long-cycle bets. Pop Land reconstruction, Sony partnership, Uniqlo collabs are all speculative revenue drivers 2-3 years out. Meanwhile, regulatory headwinds on blind boxes (China, Singapore) are real and growing. The company is betting it can replace Labubu's outsized contribution before China's consumer spending slows further.
Pop Mart's 44% non-China revenue mix and proven ability to scale Molly (2016+) suggest the company has genuine IP development muscle, not just Labubu luck. If theme parks and film succeed, the stock could re-rate on a lower but more durable earnings base.
"Pop Mart is trading high-margin agility for high-CAPEX infrastructure in a risky bid to transform fleeting toy trends into permanent cultural icons."
Pop Mart is attempting the 'Disney Pivot'—transitioning from a high-churn toy manufacturer to a diversified IP powerhouse. While 2025's 309% net income surge is unsustainable, the 44% international revenue share suggests they are successfully decoupling from the cooling Chinese consumer market. However, the 22% stock drop post-earnings highlights a valuation trap: investors are pricing them as a tech-style growth engine while the business model relies on the fickle 'vibe-based' hit-driven cycle of fashion. The move into theme parks and gold jewelry ($2,000 necklaces) increases CAPEX and inventory risk, moving away from the asset-light high-margin blind-box roots that originally fueled their 185% revenue growth.
Pop Mart lacks the narrative depth of Disney; without decades of cinematic lore, their characters are merely aesthetic commodities that can be easily replaced by the next viral 'cute' trend.
"Pop Mart’s near-term valuation and investor expectations rest on a small number of hit IPs and long-horizon monetization projects, leaving the stock vulnerable if new characters don’t replicate Labubu’s scale or if regulation and capex requirements bite."
Pop Mart’s 2025 surge (revenue +185%, net income +309%) was real but concentrated: the Labubu cycle powered a rally that sent the stock up and then down (about 40% from the August peak, >22% drop after the latest results). Management’s playbook — incubate a tiny slate of IPs, scale winners globally, and layer licensing, retail, even theme parks — is sensible but long-dated and capital intensive. The model’s strengths are tight data feedback, agile supply chains, and rising non-China revenue (44% in 2025). Key risks the article downplays: IP concentration (they target only 4–6 world-class characters), regulatory clampdowns on blind boxes, and very long paybacks on theme parks and film/licensing bets.
Pop Mart already answered the sceptics by internationalizing quickly (44% revenue outside China), curbing scalping, and securing premium partnerships (Uniqlo, Moynat, Sony), which suggests recurring licensing income and brand durability that could sustain above-industry growth.
"Pop Mart's diversification ambitions carry high execution risk and capex burden, likely capping growth at mid-teens post-Labubu without regulatory relief or a viral successor."
Pop Mart (9992.HK) delivered stellar 185% revenue and 309% net income growth in 2025, fueled by Labubu mania, but shares plunged 22% post-earnings and 40% from August peaks as hype fades. Management pitches a Disney-like strategy—nurturing 4-6 world-class IPs, global expansion (44% overseas revenue), theme parks, and tie-ups (Sony film, Uniqlo)—yet this glosses over execution pitfalls: enormous capex for nascent Pop Land, tightening blind-box regs in China/Singapore curbing core sales, China consumer slowdown, and tariff/geopolitical risks stalling U.S./Europe ramps. HSBC slashed 2026-27 EPS forecasts 11-13%; without a swift Labubu heir, growth normalizes to mid-teens, pressuring 11.6x forward P/E.
Pop Mart's data-driven IP pipeline and agile supply chain have sustained multi-year hits like Molly, while partnerships and 44% overseas revenue position it for Disney-esque longevity beyond any single craze.
"Pipeline depth, not Labubu replacement odds, is the true valuation lever—and management hasn't disclosed hit-rate data."
ChatGPT flags IP concentration (4-6 targets) as risk, but nobody quantifies the actual pipeline health. Pop Mart disclosed ~15 IPs in development across 2024-25. The real question: how many hit Labubu's $500M+ annual run rate? If only 1-in-5 succeeds, the math breaks. Also, Gemini's 'vibe-based' critique is fair, but Molly sustained 8+ years—that's not fashion-cycle churn. The blind-box regulatory risk is real; Singapore's 2024 moves are precedent, not anomaly.
"The shift from asset-light retail to capital-intensive theme parks will structurally compress Pop Mart's net margins regardless of IP success."
Claude and Grok mention theme park CAPEX, but ignore the 'experience-to-merch' conversion ratio. Disney's parks drive high-margin licensing, but Pop Mart’s Pop Land is currently a cost center with unproven per-capita spending. If theme parks fail to increase the 'Lifetime Value' of an IP like Molly, the 11.6x forward P/E isn't a discount—it's a value trap. We are seeing a pivot from a 60% margin retail model to a lower-margin hospitality play.
"Pop Mart needs multiple Labubu-scale hits quickly; given typical IP hit rates and time-to-scale, that outcome is unlikely and implies downside risk."
Claude flags the pipeline risk but stops short of the math: Pop Mart disclosed ~15 IPs in development—replacing Labubu’s ~$500m+ run-rate likely requires 3–4 Labubu-scale hits within 3–5 years. Typical creative-hit rates are <<50%, and time-to-scale plus discounting means mid-tier successes won’t plug the revenue hole fast enough. If only 1-in-5 becomes a true blockbuster, revenue reversion and margin compression are the probable outcomes.
"Sony film partnership could provide narrative depth to extend IP lifetimes, countering the vibe-cycle risk."
Gemini flags Pop Land's unproven 'experience-to-merch' ratio as a margin pivot risk, but ties it too tightly to hospitality failure. Pop Mart's existing 60%+ gross margins on blind boxes persist alongside parks; the real linkage is IP stickiness. Sony's Labubu film (2026) directly counters your 'aesthetic commodity' critique, potentially adding narrative depth to lift LTV 2-3x, making 11.6x P/E look cheap if overseas hits 60% revenue share.
Panel Verdict
Consensus ReachedPop Mart's impressive growth was driven by Labubu, but replacing its outsized contribution before consumer spending slows further is a significant challenge. The company's pivot to theme parks and licensing deals is risky and long-cycle, while regulatory headwinds on blind boxes pose a real threat.
Potential narrative depth from Sony's Labubu film, lifting IP lifetime value
Replacing Labubu's outsized contribution before China's consumer spending slows further