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Despite the bypass routes' logistical success in offsetting Hormuz flows, they are fragile and at risk of disruption, with no third option. This, combined with refinery crude‑slate limits and potential loss of price discovery due to 'ghost fleet' arbitrage, suggests a precarious oil market outlook.
Risk: Disruption of bypass routes, particularly Yanbu, due to targeting by Iran or Houthis, leading to a genuine supply cliff.
Fırsat: OPEC+ spare capacity (5.3 MMb/d) can surge into Asia via Pacific routes, backstopping bypass flows and maintaining Brent stability.
Hormuz Bypasses Maxed Out: Saudi East-West Pipeline Hits Record 7 MMb/d, As UAE Fujairah Crude Loadings Reach Capacity
The ramp up in Saudi Arabia's Hormuz-bypassing East-West pipeline has been nothing short of remarkable.
Two days after we reported that flow through the pipeline which crosses Saudi Arabia east to west for oil flows (hence the name) and is also known as the Abqaiq-Yanbu pipeline for nat gas flows had doubled from roughly 1.5 million before the war, today Bloomberg updates on the latest flow numbers and it now appears that the crucial East-West pipeline is pumping oil at its full capacity of 7 million barrels a day.
Crude exports via Yanbu have now reached about 5 million barrels a day and the kingdom is also exporting 700,000 to 900,000 barrels a day of refined products, according to the Bloomberg source familiar with the Saudi oil industry. Of the 7 million barrels a day that go through the pipeline, 2 million are destined for Saudi refineries.
This remarkable achievement, which many experts predicted would take weeks longer to achieve, is the culmination of the kingdom’s longstanding contingency plan for keeping its oil flowing after the effective closure of their main export route. Meanwhile, the Red Sea next to the Saudi port terminal of Yanbu is becoming a bit of a tanker parking lot as flotillas of tankers patiently await to collect the oil, providing an important lifeline for global supply.
As reported previously, Saudi Arabia has been preparing for decades for the worst-case scenario of Hormuz closing. It put its contingency plan to work within hours of the first US and Israeli strikes on Iran, and has been ramping up east-west shipments ever since. Running the breadth of the Arabian Peninsula from the massive oil fields in the east of the country to the industrial port city of Yanbu, the pipeline is more than 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) long. It’s a by-product of a previous conflict - the 1980s Iran-Iraq war - which saw attacks on ships in the Strait, but nothing like the unprecedented near-closure the current conflict has caused.
Despite the record flow, the Yanbu route still only partly offsets the hit to supply from shutting Hormuz, through which about 15 million barrels a day of crude shipments passed before the war. But the bypass is one reason oil prices haven’t reached the crisis-level highs of previous supply shocks.
However, with Yemen’s Houthis now saying they are entering the war, the concern for oil markets will be that the Red Sea becomes a new front in the conflict. While the Houthis have not given any indication they would attack tankers going through the Red Sea and Bab El-Mandeb strait, they have previously threatened shipping in the area with drones and missiles.
UAE's Fujairah Nears Capacity
It's not just Saudi Arabia that has been ramping up its options to bypass the Strait: the United Arab Emirates has also maxed out oil exports from a vital port that lies outside the Strait of Hormuz, after some of the biggest crude loading infrastructure resumed operations following Iranian drone strikes earlier this month.
The largest crude operations by Abu Dhabi National Oil Co (ADNOC) in Fujairah are picking up after they had halted March 14. The port in the UAE’s east coast has a critical role as an outlet for oil bypassing the all-but shut Hormuz waterway, making it among the energy sites most frequently targeted by Tehran. After Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, it’s the biggest exit point for Persian Gulf crude circumventing the maritime chokepoint.
As Bloomberg reports, the return of much of Adnoc’s operations helped push up crude loading to about 1.9 million barrels a day over the March 20-24 period. That’s up 57% from the average flows of about 1.21 million barrels a day over the past year, as the UAE pushes to get more cargoes out through the route with Hormuz still mostly blocked.
The latest crude oil export figures suggest a 252-mile (406-kilometer) Adnoc-owned pipeline - linking Habshan, the collection point for Abu Dhabi’s onshore fields, to the port - is operating close to its capacity.
The uptick compares with an average of 1.48 million barrels a day for the month through March 24. More recent exports still need to be verified as electronic jamming is widely blocking the transmission of satellite signals that allow tracking in the region.
Fujairah’s proximity to Iran - it’s about 80 miles (130 kilometers) south of Hormuz, nestled in the shadow of the Al Hajar mountains - makes it more vulnerable than Yanbu. Over the past four weeks, Tehran has attacked Fujairah at least seven times, destroying storage tanks and causing fires in a petrochemicals complex.
Besides crude oil, Fujairah also has large fuel-loading operations. Part of that system is still out of commission, after a key manifold was damaged in a strike more than three weeks ago. Most fuel is currently being loaded via an older section of the port, which connects directly to the ship berths without going via the manifold, according to people with knowledge of the situation. Refineries, including one run by a unit of Vitol Group, are still halted.
Fujairah — which became a refueling port for tankers during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, before the construction of storage tanks at the turn of the century — exported its first crude in 2012.
“It took foresight to build a pipeline that bypasses the strait and was an effort to reduce dependence on a single chokepoint,” said Ben Cahill, director for energy markets and policy at the University of Texas at Austin’s center for energy. “At this point, every barrel matters.”
Still, Iranian attacks have deterred some shippers from calling at Fujairah, while loading systems and storage tanks — especially at the port’s product terminals — have been damaged. More importantly, those initial strikes damaged systems in the port, known as the Matrix Manifolds, which manage the flow of oil from each of the tank farms. Refined products are pumped through a complex web of piping arriving at a single point where the flows are then directed to any of more than a dozen ship berths.
A tank farm run by companies including Royal Vopak of the Netherlands and Dubai’s Emirates National Oil Co. halted loadings when the initial strikes crippled the manifolds, according to the people who asked not to be identified discussing operational issues. Loading from the Vopak Horizon terminal restarted late this week, according to a March 26 report from Inchchape Shipping Services.
Now Fujairah is working to restore full export capacity for refined products from a vast network of storage tanks that can store up to 70 million barrels. Fujairah has also developed into one of the top three ports for bunker fuel — the propellant used by ships — although the effective closure of Hormuz has curbed demand.
According to Bloomberg, traders took a net 404,000 barrels of fuel out of Fujairah’s tanks in the week through March 23, representing a 2.8% decline in stocks, according to data from the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone and compiled by Platts, a unit of S&P Global Inc. While some terminal operators are trying to empty their tanks to reduce fire risks, others have been reluctant to load for fear that would make them a target, according to people familiar with the operations.
Finally, taking a look at the Hormuz closure, which remains Iran's only remaining Trump card and which Tehran has now played, increasingly more ships are now crossing: in addition to China and India, traditionally the biggest export clients of gulf oil, Japan has also reportedly reached a deal with Iran to be allowed passage. This morning, Thailand Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said his country had negotiated an agreement with Iran to allow the safe passage of Thai oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz.
Anutin said the agreement would ease some concerns about Thailand’s oil supply. The Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs said this week it had successfully secured the passage through the strait of a tanker owned by the Bangchak Corporation, a Thai energy conglomerate. Earlier this month Iran said its forces fired on a Thai-flagged cargo ship, Mayuree Naree, which caught fire north of Oman after being hit by an unknown projectile. Three crew members went missing and another 20 were rescued.
Also on Saturday morning, ship tracking services reported that two LPG tankers and two bulk carriers exited the Gulf, with all four ships following a northern route that passes through a narrow gap between the two Iranian islands of Larak and Qeshm which many speculate the US will seek to take over with a marine invasion due to their critical importance in halting strait traffic.
Two LPG tankers and two bulk carriers exited the Gulf on Saturday morning. All four ships followed a northerly route that passes through a narrow gap between the two Iranian islands of Larak and Qeshm: BBG pic.twitter.com/wuNzRxLvFJ
— zerohedge (@zerohedge) March 28, 2026
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"Bypass infrastructure at capacity with no redundancy is a single-point-of-failure risk far more acute than the article acknowledges—one precision strike eliminates 40%+ of the workaround."
The article frames bypass capacity as a supply relief story, but the math doesn't hold: 7 MMb/d (Saudi) + 1.9 MMb/d (UAE) = 8.9 MMb/d against ~15 MMb/d pre-war Hormuz flow. That's a 41% shortfall. Yes, prices haven't spiked catastrophically, but that's partly because global demand has already contracted (China's growth slowdown, recession fears). The real risk: these bypass routes are now *both* at or near capacity and *both* under active Iranian targeting. Fujairah has been hit 7 times in 4 weeks. One coordinated strike on Yanbu or the East-West pipeline itself—not Hormuz, but the workaround—and the market loses another 3-5 MMb/d with no third option. That's a genuine supply cliff, not a managed shortage.
If Iran wanted to crater global oil markets and trigger Western military intervention, it would have already destroyed these bypass routes instead of selectively probing them; the fact that Yanbu and Fujairah are still operational suggests Tehran is signaling constraint, not intent to fully block supply.
"The redirection of 7 MMb/d to a single port at Yanbu creates a catastrophic vulnerability that the market has not yet priced in."
The market is underestimating the fragility of these 'bypasses.' While Saudi Arabia hitting 7 MMb/d on the East-West pipeline is a logistical feat, it creates a massive single point of failure at Yanbu. We are seeing a shift from maritime risk in the Strait of Hormuz to terrestrial and terminal risk in the Red Sea. With Houthis entering the fray and Fujairah already suffering from 'Matrix Manifold' damage, the spare capacity buffer is effectively zero. If Yanbu is targeted by drones, the 5 MMb/d export lifeline vanishes instantly. This isn't a solution; it's a temporary relocation of the chokepoint that keeps oil prices artificially suppressed.
If Iran continues to grant 'safe passage' deals to major importers like Japan and Thailand, the pressure on these bypass pipelines will ease, preventing a total infrastructure failure from over-utilization.
"The East‑West pipeline and Fujairah ramp‑up materially cap immediate oil price upside, but elevated geopolitical risk and logistical bottlenecks will keep volatility and risk premia higher than pre‑crisis levels."
Bloomberg’s numbers — Saudi East‑West at 7.0 MMb/d (with ~5.0 MMb/d exported via Yanbu and 0.7–0.9 MMb/d of refined products) and UAE Fujairah loading near 1.9 MMb/d (up 57% YoY, near Habshan-Fujairah pipeline capacity) — materially reduce immediate shortage risk from a Hormuz closure. That helps explain why oil hasn’t spiked to crisis highs: alternative pipelines are absorbing a large share of Gulf flows. But this is a logistical success, not a structural fix — tankering, berth and manifold bottlenecks, damaged fuel terminals, electronic jamming obscuring tracking, and mounting insurance/shipping costs add friction. Markets should price lower near‑term upside but higher volatility and risk premia persist until infrastructure and security stabilize.
The bypasses still only partly replace the roughly 15 MMb/d that transited Hormuz — a new Red Sea front or Houthi attacks on Yanbu/Fujairah could quickly re‑impose severe shortages and spike prices. Also, reported flow rates may be transient or overstated given electronic jamming and damaged terminal capacity.
"Bypasses maxed at ~9 MMb/d with high vulnerability to Houthi/Iranian attacks leaves no slack, amplifying supply risk despite current mitigation."
Saudi East-West pipeline at record 7 MMb/d (5 MMb/d crude exports from Yanbu + 0.7-0.9 MMb/d products, 2 MMb/d domestic refining) and UAE Fujairah loadings at 1.9 MMb/d (up 57% YoY, near Habshan-Fujairah pipeline capacity) offset ~58% of pre-war Hormuz flows (15 MMb/d), muting oil price spikes. But both routes maxed—no buffer for disruptions; Yanbu's Red Sea now Houthi-threatened (post their war entry declaration), Fujairah hit 7x by Iranian drones in 4 weeks, with damaged manifolds/refineries. Missing context: global spare capacity (OPEC+ ~5 MMb/d), Brent price reaction, Hormuz passage verification amid jamming. Second-order: tanker queues at Yanbu strain logistics.
Decades of preparation enabled rapid ramp-up beyond expert expectations, with negotiated Hormuz passages for Japan/Thailand/China signaling potential de-escalation rather than total blockade.
"Yanbu queue saturation could collapse effective export capacity faster than any single infrastructure strike."
ChatGPT flags insurance/shipping cost friction, but underweights it. Yanbu tanker queues (Grok mentions) aren't logistics theater—they're a leading indicator of terminal saturation. If queue times hit 30+ days, shippers reroute around Red Sea entirely, collapsing Yanbu throughput below reported 5 MMb/d. Nobody's modeled the feedback loop: congestion → higher demurrage → reduced utilization → supply cliff. That's the real fragility, not just drone strikes.
"Infrastructure bottlenecks at Yanbu will force volumes back into the Strait of Hormuz via 'dark' ship-to-ship transfers, eliminating market transparency."
Claude’s focus on terminal saturation at Yanbu is critical, but the panel is ignoring the 'ghost fleet' arbitrage. High demurrage and 30-day queues at Yanbu won't just collapse throughput; they will force a massive return to Hormuz via 'dark' ship-to-ship transfers. If official bypasses clog, the market won't just lose supply—it will lose transparency. This shifts the risk from a 'supply cliff' to a total loss of price discovery as Iranian-style smuggling becomes the regional norm.
"Refinery crude‑slate constraints limit the effective absorptive capacity of bypass routes, creating hidden physical tightness despite high pipeline loadings."
You're all rightly focused on chokepoints and logistics, but nobody's flagged refinery crude‑slate limits: Asian and European refineries are configured for specific grades (Arab light vs. heavy basrah grades). Even if Yanbu/Fujairah push 5–9 MMb/d, refineries can't instantly absorb different chemistry—blending, coker capacity, and product yield mismatches take months. That latent demand shortfall could keep physical tightness and price volatility even with high reported throughput.
"OPEC+ spare capacity meaningfully offsets bypass risks, explaining muted Brent prices."
ChatGPT's refinery slate mismatch is valid but overstated—most Asian crackers handle Arab Light (60%+ of Yanbu exports) with minimal blending tweaks, per Platts assays. Bigger miss: OPEC+ 5.3 MMb/d spares (Saudi 3.1 alone) can surge into Asia via Pacific routes, backstopping 30-40% of bypass flows. Brent's $72 stability reflects this, not just jamming.
Panel Kararı
Uzlaşı YokDespite the bypass routes' logistical success in offsetting Hormuz flows, they are fragile and at risk of disruption, with no third option. This, combined with refinery crude‑slate limits and potential loss of price discovery due to 'ghost fleet' arbitrage, suggests a precarious oil market outlook.
OPEC+ spare capacity (5.3 MMb/d) can surge into Asia via Pacific routes, backstopping bypass flows and maintaining Brent stability.
Disruption of bypass routes, particularly Yanbu, due to targeting by Iran or Houthis, leading to a genuine supply cliff.