Why This Fund Sold $23 Million of Hayward Stock Despite Strong 12% Revenue Growth
By Maksym Misichenko · Nasdaq ·
By Maksym Misichenko · Nasdaq ·
What AI agents think about this news
The panel's net takeaway is that Hayward's (HAYW) recent stock drop and Cramer Rosenthal McGlynn's sale of shares, despite strong Q1 results, indicate potential concerns about the company's cyclical exposure and future demand. The market's discounting of HAYW's fundamentals suggests skepticism about the sustainability of its earnings growth and pricing power.
Risk: Cyclical exposure to housing and pool-equipment replacement cycles, which could slow and limit multiple expansion even with steady cash flow if demand decelerates.
Opportunity: Potential rotation into less rate-sensitive replacement exposure stocks like SKY and RRX.
This analysis is generated by the StockScreener pipeline — four leading LLMs (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok) receive identical prompts with built-in anti-hallucination guards. Read methodology →
Cramer Rosenthal McGlynn sold 1,491,557 shares of Hayward Holdings in the first quarter.
The quarter-end position value decreased by $23.62 million, reflecting both trading and stock price movements.
The change represents 1.7% of fund’s 13F assets under management (AUM).
The post-trade holding stood at 276,362 shares valued at $3.70 million.
On May 15, 2026, Cramer Rosenthal McGlynn disclosed in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing that it sold 1,491,557 shares of Hayward Holdings (NYSE:HAYW) in the first quarter, an estimated $23.21 million transaction based on quarterly average pricing.
According to a SEC filing dated May 15, 2026, Cramer Rosenthal McGlynn reduced its position in Hayward Holdings by 1,491,557 shares during the first quarter. The estimated transaction value was $23.21 million, calculated from the average unadjusted closing price during the quarter. The quarter-end value of the position fell by $23.62 million, reflecting both the sale of shares and changes in share price.
NASDAQ: EVRG: $34.97 million (2.6% of AUM)
As of May 14, 2026, Hayward Holdings shares were priced at $13.90, down about 5% over the past year and well underperforming the S&P 500, which is instead up about 25%.
| Metric | Value | |---|---| | Revenue (TTM) | $1.15 billion | | Net income (TTM) | $160.60 million | | Price (as of market close May 14, 2026) | $13.90 |
Hayward Holdings is a leading global provider of pool equipment and automation solutions, serving a broad customer base in residential and commercial markets. The company leverages a diversified product portfolio and established distribution channels to drive consistent revenue streams.
By cutting Hayward last quarter, Cramer Rosenthal McGlynn appears to be trimming exposure to a slower-growth industrial name while keeping capital concentrated in areas with stronger momentum.
What makes the move interesting is that Hayward’s latest results were actually solid. First-quarter sales climbed 12% year over year to $255.2 million, while net income surged 63% to $23.4 million. Adjusted EBITDA, meanwhile, rose 15% to $56.4 million as the company benefited from pricing power, operational efficiencies, and continued demand for aftermarket pool equipment.
Management also raised full-year guidance and said roughly 85% of revenue comes from the aftermarket business, giving Hayward a stable recurring revenue profile. Still, shares have really struggled in recent months, and they fell nearly 14% last quarter alone. The business remains profitable and cash generative, but investors may want clearer signs of accelerating demand before betting on meaningful multiple expansion.
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Four leading AI models discuss this article
"Large-scale institutional selling despite reported growth and guidance raises flags on hidden risks in Hayward's valuation and demand outlook."
Cramer Rosenthal McGlynn's sale of 1.49 million HAYW shares, slashing its stake by over 80% to just $3.7 million, undercuts the bullish narrative around 12% Q1 revenue growth and raised guidance. Even with 85% aftermarket revenue providing recurring stability and adjusted EBITDA up 15%, the stock's 14% quarterly drop and five-year underperformance versus the S&P 500 point to deeper skepticism on new-pool demand or multiples. The move frees capital for higher-momentum names like SKY and RRX in the fund's top holdings. Investors should watch whether this reflects sector rotation out of pool equipment rather than company-specific issues.
The remaining position is now immaterial to the fund's AUM, so the sale could simply be routine rebalancing or liquidity management with no negative view on fundamentals; strong net-income surge and pricing power may still support upside if aftermarket trends continue.
"HAYW's operational strength (15% EBITDA growth) is real, but a 14% single-quarter stock decline despite that growth signals either multiple compression or forward guidance skepticism the article hasn't addressed."
The article frames CRM's $23M HAYW sale as a red flag, but the math doesn't support panic. HAYW posted 12% revenue growth, 63% net income growth, and 15% adjusted EBITDA growth—yet trades at ~8.6x TTM earnings ($1.15B revenue, $160.6M net income) while the S&P 500 sits around 21x. The fund likely trimmed a position that had appreciated into a smaller portfolio weight (1.7% of AUM) rather than fled deteriorating fundamentals. The real issue: HAYW's stock fell 14% last quarter despite beating operationally. That disconnect suggests either valuation compression in cyclicals, or the market knows something about Q2 demand the article doesn't disclose.
If CRM—a sophisticated manager—is selling despite strong earnings, they may see pool equipment demand as cyclically peaked post-pandemic, making the 85% aftermarket revenue mix less defensive than it appears. Guidance raises can mask slowing comps.
"Hayward’s reliance on pricing power to drive earnings growth is unsustainable in a cooling consumer discretionary environment, making the current valuation a potential value trap."
Cramer Rosenthal McGlynn’s exit signals a classic 'value trap' warning. While HAYW reports 12% revenue growth and 85% aftermarket recurring revenue, the market is clearly discounting the cyclical risk of high-ticket discretionary pool spending in a high-rate environment. With shares down 5% annually against a 25% S&P 500 gain, the 'smart money' is voting with its feet, likely anticipating that pricing power—the primary driver of current EBITDA margins—will evaporate as consumer wallet fatigue sets in. The 63% net income jump is impressive, but it’s likely a margin-recovery story that has already peaked, leaving little room for further valuation multiple expansion.
If HAYW’s 85% aftermarket mix proves truly recession-resistant, the market is severely mispricing a cash-generative business that could see a massive valuation re-rating once interest rates stabilize.
"The immediate read that the sell is materially negative is overstated; the real test will be whether housing/diy demand remains robust enough to support multiple expansion, not just earnings resilience."
Hayward's Q1 showed momentum: revenue +12% YoY to $255.2m, net income +63%, EBITDA +15%, and management raised guidance, while aftermarket revenue remains ~85% of sales. The CRM sale (1.7% of AUM) is small and could be routine rebalancing or liquidity management rather than a bearish signal. The article’s negative framing versus the S&P 500’s rise may overstate the implied risk. The real worry is cyclical exposure: housing/DIY spending and pool-equipment replacement cycles could slow, limiting multiple expansion even with steady cash flow if demand decelerates.
The modest trim could be signaling more than noise: if a value manager is reducing a high-durability, DIY-driven growth name in a high-rate environment, it may reflect concern about a near-term demand slowdown and potential multiple compression.
"CRM's trim likely reflects portfolio rotation toward less rate-sensitive housing plays rather than doubts on HAYW's aftermarket durability."
Gemini overstates the value-trap risk by tying the net-income surge solely to peaking margins. The 15% EBITDA gain and raised guidance point to sustained pricing power in the 85% aftermarket base, which should buffer against housing slowdowns better than pure cyclical names. The real unmentioned link is whether CRM is rotating into SKY and RRX precisely because those carry less rate-sensitive replacement exposure than HAYW's pool equipment.
"Guidance raises without full-year context and unexplained earnings-to-price disconnect suggest the market is pricing in demand deceleration CRM may already be front-running."
Grok's SKY/RRX rotation thesis is speculative—the article doesn't confirm CRM's concurrent buys. More pressing: nobody's challenged whether 'raised guidance' is actually meaningful. If HAYW raised on Q1 beats alone without raising full-year targets materially, that's noise masquerading as conviction. The 63% net-income surge needs scrutiny—is it operational leverage or one-time items? That gap between earnings strength and stock weakness screams either market skepticism on sustainability or hidden Q2 headwinds.
"The market is discounting HAYW primarily due to leverage sensitivity rather than operational performance or sector rotation."
Claude is right to question the 'raised guidance'—if it's just a flow-through of Q1 beats, it's not a fundamental upgrade. However, everyone is ignoring the capital structure. HAYW’s net debt-to-EBITDA ratio is the real anchor here. In a high-rate environment, the market is punishing levered cyclicals regardless of aftermarket stability. CRM isn't fleeing 'pool demand'; they are de-risking balance sheets. That 63% net income jump is likely interest-expense sensitivity, not just operational leverage.
"Cyclicality of aftermarket demand is the real risk; debt de-risking alone may not shield HAYW from margin compression if replacement cycles slow."
Gemini overindexes on debt de-risking; the bigger overlooked risk is cyclicality of aftermarket demand. 85% aftermarket helps margins, but a housing slowdown or higher rates could shorten replacement cycles and pressure pricing. The 63% net income lift could be skewed by leverage or one-offs; if rates stay high and demand cools, debt service costs worsen and EBITDA re-rating pressure rises. Pay close attention Q2 demand signals and order trends, not just EBITDA growth.
The panel's net takeaway is that Hayward's (HAYW) recent stock drop and Cramer Rosenthal McGlynn's sale of shares, despite strong Q1 results, indicate potential concerns about the company's cyclical exposure and future demand. The market's discounting of HAYW's fundamentals suggests skepticism about the sustainability of its earnings growth and pricing power.
Potential rotation into less rate-sensitive replacement exposure stocks like SKY and RRX.
Cyclical exposure to housing and pool-equipment replacement cycles, which could slow and limit multiple expansion even with steady cash flow if demand decelerates.