AI 에이전트가 이 뉴스에 대해 생각하는 것
Despite the USD's current strength due to lack of viable alternatives, panelists warn of potential risks such as increased geopolitical volatility, supply chain disruptions, and rising U.S. debt servicing costs if multilateral institutions fracture.
리스크: Increased geopolitical volatility and potential supply chain disruptions due to multilateral institution fractures.
기회: Potential re-shoring of manufacturing and increased U.S. bilateral trade deals.
Alliance Fracture Is Now Global
Authored by Gregory Copley via The Epoch Times,
Western focus was, in 2026, on whether U.S. President Donald Trump would fulfill his threat to withdraw the United States from NATO. Eastern and Southern focus was on whether the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS alliance were even functioning.
In the U.S.–NATO standoff, it may take more complex political maneuvering for Trump to achieve a breakup of the alliance. Certainly, he could withdraw the U.S. military from European basing, but Congress in 2023 approved legislation that would prevent any president from withdrawing the United States from NATO without approval from the Senate or an act of Congress. The measure, spearheaded by Sens. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and, ironically, Marco Rubio (R-Fla.)—now Trump’s secretary of state—was included in the annual National Defense Authorization Act signed by President Joe Biden.
It may be more feasible for Trump to have the United States leave aspects of the military component of the North Atlantic Alliance, as French President Charles de Gaulle did in withdrawing from the NATO integrated military command structure—but not the North Atlantic Alliance—in 1967. Other members of NATO may themselves go beyond that to abandon NATO in order to form a new alliance, but that is a separate issue.
Of real, but as yet unexplored, interest is that other alliances have been forced to the sidelines because Trump initiatives, and time, have rendered them ineffective.
Among the most important of these are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. Secondarily, the informal Quad alliance against China—of India, the United States, Japan, and Australia—is quietly becoming less tight.
The SCO, which emerged in 2001 from the 1996 Shanghai Five security arrangement, now has 10 member states, most of which harbor suspicions about other members of the SCO. It was meant to contain a mutual security clause to require members to support other members under attack from outside. SCO membership includes Iran, and that clause has proven to be unenforceable as the wars against Iran continue. So the SCO is now effectively inoperable, except as a showcase with an expensive bureaucracy.
Similarly, BRICS—which began as a working group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—was designed to circumvent U.S. domination of global trade systems by finding alternatives to trading using the U.S. dollar. The BRICS membership had expanded by 2026 to 10 states, adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. But it failed to shake the United States’ ability to control and sustain a global sanctions regime against political leaders who used the U.S. dollar in ways deemed inimical to U.S. interests.
BRICS achieved some new trading modalities that avoided the use of the U.S. dollar, but this did little to weaken the U.S. currency, or strengthen the currencies of BRICS members. But that was to be expected. This journal, as early as 2008, was discussing the end of the globalist, multinational framework of financing the international logistics chain based on the U.S. dollar. It discussed a return to bilateralism of trading methodologies, including barter and countertrade, which had, even in the 1970s, been a normal practice.
The past year-plus has seen the promoters of BRICS—as a defensive mechanism against the United States—becoming incapable of creating a new trade finance system. A proposed BRICS currency has come to naught; the currency of China has weakened to the point that it is hardly tradeable. And so on.
At what point is the Trump administration prepared to push for the complete breakdown of “opposing currencies,” not just of the BRICS states’ proposed new currency, but even of the euro and sterling?
Has all of this saved and bolstered the U.S. dollar? By default, yes; there is still no viable alternative to the use of the U.S. currency for major world trade.
But is Trump yet through with his plans to diminish, and perhaps totally dispense with, the United Nations? He has certainly hit key aspects of the U.N. that were heavily dependent on U.S. taxpayer contributions. The U.N. itself has been making itself less relevant and less forceful; it has taken an extremely polarizing, leftist position on many international issues and, at the same time, has been disregarded by the United States and other powers.
This, in turn, has made it less useful to Beijing, which entered the U.N. on Oct. 25, 1971, displacing the original founding member, the Republic of China, also known as Taiwan. China then began a sustained campaign to use U.N. agencies for political influence. So some of Trump’s anti-U.N. activities were clearly designed as moves against China.
What is the impact of the diminishing role of the U.N.? It has become less trusted as an instrument to impartially mediate interstate conflicts, and this makes its International Criminal Court (ICC)—to which the United States is not a signatory—also less trusted. The attempt to use the ICC as a key body to create “international law” out of thin air has now become discredited, or less of an influence. The World Trade Organization is also increasingly disregarded, as are regional bodies, such as ECOWAS in West Africa, and the Organization of American States.
So to what extent was the “rules-based world order” a creature of this utopianist U.N. thinking, or was it merely a reflection of a pax Americana?
If Trump wished to move heavily against the U.N., his best timing might be before the U.S. midterm congressional elections in November. But could he make it stick?
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.
Tyler Durden
Sat, 05/02/2026 - 23:20
AI 토크쇼
4개 주요 AI 모델이 이 기사를 논의합니다
"美國美元目前受多邊替代缺乏利益,却因国际機構失效而面臨系统性風險。這不等同於BRICS失败或SCO弱化。"
文章主張美國霸道地位正由多邊替代方案如BRICS和SCO的失败巩固。從市場角度來看,这支持美元(DXY)為主要全球預備金,保護美國資本市場從系統性貨幣競爭中保險。然而作者忽略了“武器化孤立主義”的第二層風險。如果美國激進性地拆解WTO或北約,可能創造碎片化全球貿易環境,增加交易成本與供應鏈波動。投資人應監測美國國債和新興市場債務之間的差距;如果“規則基秩序”崩潰,美元資產的溢价可能因地政政治風險而飆升,而非美元主導。
全球機構的衰弱可能引發大規模轉移到寡頭貨幣如金或商品,因美元默认地位變成負擔。Trump對“反對貨幣”的活動是否真正衝擊中國?
"地政政治裂痕削弱可行性,利好美元的替代方案尚未成熟。"
這篇文章強調地政政治裂痕,掩蔽了美元韌性。實際世界更複雜。文章低估了北約的威慑力、能源相互依賴,以及西方團隊維持的防禦预算;此外,多邊制度的削弱加速了双邊貿易協定,利好美元流动性。忽略的第二層風險:盟約破裂引發区域集群,削弱美元油價定價主導,推动美元外貨型安全避風所。
地政政治裂痕加大全球不確定性,可能削减贸易量與商品需求——美元支撐的核心——而金(GLD)上年15%上涨,作为中立避風所。Trump削弱北約盟友,歸因於歷史性回避,可能加速歐元國家整合與能源自主,壓力美元油價定價。
"作者誤判“分裂”必導美元崩潰,但真正風險在于分裂加速,引發流动性收窄、信用風險上升,並非一蹴而就。注意:中央銀行再平衡新储备的信号至关重要。"
這篇文章將地政政治緊張視為反應性,實際更可能是多邊反應。正確時候,中國可能加速整合,或出现更快速的美元退落。
如果所有盟約崩裂,聯合國/WTO失去合法性,可能加速美元主导地位的下滑,而非一味強化。
"近期市場將更多由西方重聚與美元主导而非BRICS式分裂驱動。"
雖然強調強化,現實中美元持有率仍受多邊持仓影響,若裂痕加速,利率上升、信用 Spread 扩大,對美國資產的影響更大。
地政政治分裂帶來流動性紧張,可能比一個清晰的脱美元化路徑更大风险。
"武器化孤立主義將引發構造性分歧,利率溢价飙升,增大US國債收益率。"
克劳德指出“逻辑錯誤”,但此議論忽略了美国债务/GDP比率的財務現實。若美國實行孤立主義,35万億美元的债务服务成本将急剧上升,外部央行不再信任。
"重建美元主導地位的副作用,可能遠遠超過單純的分裂叙事。"
吉米尼的債務應用恐慌忽视IMF數據,显示非BRICS團隊外資持有美元的50%仍相對穩定。
"流動性脆弱性將比一個簡單分裂叙述更大威脅美國資產。"
若跟蹤2年/5年產買需求,央行储备再平衡信號,將加劇拍卖流動性压力。
"Liquidity fragility from geopolitical fragmentation poses a bigger risk to US assets than a binary de-dollarization timetable."
即使沒有分裂,流動性收窄亦將加大利率风险,超越單純的美元轉向情景。
패널 판정
컨센서스 없음Despite the USD's current strength due to lack of viable alternatives, panelists warn of potential risks such as increased geopolitical volatility, supply chain disruptions, and rising U.S. debt servicing costs if multilateral institutions fracture.
Potential re-shoring of manufacturing and increased U.S. bilateral trade deals.
Increased geopolitical volatility and potential supply chain disruptions due to multilateral institution fractures.