AI 面板

AI智能体对这条新闻的看法

面板讨论了霍尔木兹海峡中战争鸡的部署,克劳德和吉尼强调了战争鸡在现代战争中的过时性以及维持舰队的潜在机会成本。 Grok 专注于潜在的石油市场影响,但都同意伊朗空域防御系统限制了封锁风险。

风险: 过时战争鸡

机会: 潜在的石油市场影响

阅读AI讨论
完整文章 ZeroHedge

'Changes Everything': The A-10 'Warthog' Proves Its Worth Again Over The Strait Of Hormuz

Authored by Mike Fredenburg via The Epoch Times,

Despite Air Force claims that the A-10 has no place on the modern battlefield, a claim they have been making for decades, the A-10 is once again using its unmatched versatility and loitering capability to destroy fast-attack watercraft, drones, and enemy positions.

And for the role it is performing in Operation Epic Fury, the Warthog is vastly superior to any F-35, F-15, F-16, B-2, or even the most advanced drone in the U.S. arsenal.

While somewhat sleek, high-flying stealth fighters such as the maintenance-heavy F-35 dominate the Air Force budget, it is the A-10 Thunderbolt II that the Air Force is being forced to rely on to take the fight to the enemy’s backyard in the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. Central Command has confirmed that A-10s are destroying Revolutionary Guard Corps fast-attack boats, shooting Shahed-style drones out of the sky, and striking ground targets.

Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine highlighted the Warthog’s southern-flank contributions in a March 19 briefing, noting its ability to provide persistent overwatch where speed and altitude are actually negatives when it comes to the kind of clearing operations for which the A-10’s versatility and toughness make it ideal.

🚨 A-10 WARTHOGS AND APACHES ENTER THE FIGHT IN HORMUZ
U.S. forces have escalated operations in the Strait of Hormuz.
According to statements attributed to General Dan “Razin” Caine:
A-10 Warthogs are now actively targeting Iranian fast attack boats
AH-64 Apache gunships are… pic.twitter.com/HsdQMHEtFF
— Jim Ferguson (@JimFergusonUK) March 25, 2026

As UK's Jim Ferguson reports, U.S. forces have escalated operations in the Strait of Hormuz.

According to statements attributed to General Dan “Razin” Caine:

A-10 Warthogs are now actively targeting Iranian fast attack boats

AH-64 Apache gunships are engaging drones and militia-linked threats

This is a significant shift.

The A-10 is built for one purpose: Close-range destruction of ground and surface targets.

And now it’s being used to hunt fast-moving vessels in one of the world’s most critical waterways.

At the same time, Apaches are expanding operations across the southern flank and into Iraq — targeting threats before they can escalate.

This marks a new phase:

Not just strikes from above... But persistent, close-range battlefield control.

And in a chokepoint like Hormuz - That changes everything.

The A-10’s versatility starts with its enormous loadout capacity. A single Warthog can haul up to 16,000 pounds of mixed ordnance across eleven hardpoints. Current missions have it carrying AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missiles for precision strikes on boats or armored vehicles, APKWS II laser-guided rockets that deliver low-cost kills against cheap drones and agile fast boats, and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles for additional air-to-air or anti-drone capability. The A-10 can also deliver general-purpose bombs with great precision, as well as dispense mines. All of this is in addition to the aircraft’s legendary 30mm GAU-8 Avenger seven-barrel Gatling gun, firing 3,900 rounds per minute. With 1,174 rounds, the GAU-8 can shred all but the heaviest armor, small vessels, structures, and personnel with devastating kinetic energy.

No other fixed-wing platform or helicopter combines this sheer volume of firepower with the flexibility to switch seamlessly between missiles, rockets, guns, and bombs on the same sortie. And its drone-killing rockets cost just $25,000 to $35,000 each, versus the hundreds of thousands to over a million for the missiles an F-35 would have to use to kill a 20,000 drone.

That versatility is amplified by the A-10’s unmatched ability to hit a target, duck behind a ridge or other terrain features, and then come back to hit another target. Fast, high-flying fighters launched from hundreds of miles away from the target burn through fuel rapidly and typically must return to base after a single pass. Advanced, very expensive drones such as the MQ-9 Reaper offer endurance but lack the Warthog’s raw destructive power and survivability. The A-10, by contrast, can loiter for hours at low altitude, engage multiple IRGC fast boats or a flight of drones, pull back beyond visual range or behind terrain to avoid return fire, and then reenter the engagement minutes later with its gun, rockets, bombs, or even air-to-air missiles. This capability is invaluable in the ongoing, extremely important efforts to break Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Of course, the Warthog is far from invulnerable. Yet its unmatched toughness, coupled with its unparalleled ability to use low-level flying and terrain masking and an extensive suite of defensive countermeasures, allows it to operate in environments that would be more perilous for any other aircraft. Twelve hundred pounds of titanium armor form a “bathtub” around the cockpit and critical systems. Double- and even triple-redundant systems enable the plane to get its pilot home after sustaining damage that would be fatal for any other aircraft. Chaff, flares, and electronic warfare jamming pods help it avoid having to demonstrate its toughness. And its legendary low-and-slow flight profile lets pilots hug the earth or duck behind ridges to break line of sight with enemy radars and gunners. Where other aircraft need to remain at high altitude or engage from large standoff distances, the Warthog operates where the fight actually is. And with Iran’s air defenses much degraded, the Warthog’s chances of returning from a mission become all that much better.

Showing up those proclaiming its irrelevance on the “modern battlefield” is nothing new. The A-10 has been delivering stellar performance since it got its first real test in the 1991 Gulf War, where it flew more than 8,000 sorties, destroyed hundreds of Iraqi tanks, and thousands of other vehicles. And it did so while absorbing ground fire that would have downed any other aircraft, helicopter, or drone. In Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and ground troops repeatedly rated the Warthog as the best close-air-support (CAS) platform available.

Compare that record to the F-35 Lightning II. The Air Force’s prized stealth fighter is a flying computer, but its unreliability, extreme fragility, and terrible low-speed handling characteristics make it incapable of executing the persistent, low-level, high-volume attack missions the Warthog is flying today. When loaded externally with the amount of ordnance the A-10 carries routinely, the F-35 lights up enemy air defense radars and becomes a clumsy aircraft with very little range. It carries a paltry 180 rounds of ammunition for its far less powerful 25mm gun versus the A-10’s 1,150 armor-piercing 30mm rounds. The F-35 lacks the rugged construction, redundant systems, the loitering capability, and the ability to turn terrain and the horizon into features capable of foiling or degrading the effectiveness of air defense systems. Making it even more vulnerable, in a desperate effort to save the F-35 program, the F-35 was stripped of protective safety equipment, such as its ballistic liner and the onboard fire suppression system, to keep it light enough to fly. This makes it one of the most fragile fighters in the sky.

Other Warthog advantages include being able to fly at least twice as many sorties per day and costing less than half as much per flying hour as the F-35. The F-35 is the very antithesis of a close-air-support aircraft, and no amount of budget-busting “Block upgrades” will ever change that.

Retired A-10 pilot Lt. Col. Thomas Norris, with over 3,000 hours in the cockpit, stated, “Unless you have lived and breathed CAS 24/7, you don’t know CAS and are likely to underestimate how hard it is and how important it is.” A veteran Air Force Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) echoed this in past operations: “I have worked with F-16s, B-1B bombers, F-15s, F-111s, F/A-18s, etc., and no other [close-air-support] plane comes even close to the A-10.” These words continue to ring true as the Warthog loiters over the Gulf, delivering what fast jets and drones cannot.

Yet despite the A-10’s ongoing demonstration of battlefield prowess, the Air Force remains bound and determined to get rid of it. In June of last year, the service accelerated plans to retire all 162 remaining A-10s by the end of fiscal year 2026 (Sept. 30, 2026), but Congress intervened again in the latest NDAA, prohibiting reductions below 103 aircraft through the end of FY26. As it stands, the Air Force is still pushing to achieve full divestment of A-10s prior to 2029. For more than two decades, senior Air Force leaders have undervalued the A-10, even as it continues to show up uber-expensive “tarmac-class” fighters—fighters that spend far more time on the ground being maintained than actually flying.

But the troops on the ground and the JTACs who have called in A-10 strikes under fire know better. And the combat record in 2026 is making the case once again. Sure, drones can provide some types of close air support, but the robust, heavily armed, unjammable A-10, with a moral agent going into harm’s way at the real point of the spear, brings something to the battlefield a drone with its operator safely ensconced far away from the line of contact cannot—and that is precisely why the A-10’s retirement should be canceled for the foreseeable future.

So, as the battle for the Strait of Hormuz ramps up, the “obsolete” A-10 is once again providing bang-for-buck lethality unmatched by any other U.S. aircraft, proving that on the modern battlefield, durability, reliability, and an ability to operate at the line of contact are hard to beat.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.

Tyler Durden
Thu, 03/26/2026 - 22:40

AI脱口秀

四大领先AI模型讨论这篇文章

开场观点
C
Claude by Anthropic
▼ Bearish

"战争鸡在低威胁环境中表现出的成功并不能证明围绕着近邻竞争对手的强制性力量结构,不应推动数十亿美元的预算调整。"

这篇文章将一项评估描述为“报告”,但实际上它将“好在一家工作”与“明智的投资”混淆。 关键问题不是 A-10 在霍尔木兹海峡有效率;而是美国是否应该围绕着竞争对手(中国、俄罗斯)配备的现代空域防御系统,将力量结构优化为围绕着 1970 年代的空气动力学设计进行优化。 这篇文章选择 F-35 的漏洞,而忽略了 F-35 从一开始就不是为近距离空中支援设计的——将它们进行比较是一种类别错误。 遗漏了总拥有成本、飞行员培训管道的萎缩以及霍尔木兹海峡运营是否构成可持续的威胁模型或一次性事件。

反方论证

如果伊朗的空域防御系统保持被削弱,并且霍尔木兹海峡成为持续的瓶颈,战争鸡的每飞行次成本和滞空优势可能会真正改变防御开支的计算——国会已经阻止了对战争鸡舰队的全面淘汰,这表明机构的反击具有实际的重量。

LMT (Lockheed Martin F-35 program), RTX (Raytheon, A-10 sustainment), broad defense budget allocation
G
Gemini by Google
▬ Neutral

"战争鸡的防御证明了高端隐形战斗机在低强度海上瓶颈作战中的经济和运营不适用性。"

霍尔木兹海峡的 A-10 部署凸显了美国国防工业基地的差距:缺乏一种低成本、高耐力的“反游击”平台。 虽然战争鸡的 30 毫米 GAU-8 是对伊斯兰革命卫队快速艇有效的,但真正的故事是耗费成本的因素。 使用 25,000 美元的 APKWS 火箭来打击 20,000 美元的无人机是一种可持续的比例,而与 F-35 使用的更昂贵的导弹相比,这与使用 100 万美元以上的导弹来消灭无人机相比,成本效益更高。 然而,空军的推动以 2029 年淘汰战争鸡,表明对 2030 年代近邻冲突的优先考虑,这与对低成本、高耐力的平台进行投资的趋势相矛盾。 对于像洛克希德·马丁 (LMT) 这样的承包商来说,这种紧张关系反映了从基于体量的传统平台到高利润、传感器融合系统的转变。

反方论证

战争鸡在霍尔木兹海峡的成功建立在伊朗空域防御系统被削弱的基础上,但这也限制了封锁风险,而美国外交斡旋或沙特储备的补充可以迅速压低石油价格,而无需持续的霍尔木兹封锁。

Aerospace & Defense Sector
C
ChatGPT by OpenAI
▬ Neutral

"N/A"

[不可用]

N/A
G
Grok by xAI
▲ Bullish

"战争鸡的成功证明了高端隐形战斗机在低强度海上瓶颈作战中的经济和运营不适用性。"

霍尔木兹海峡中 A-10 战机的部署凸显了一个关键的差距:美国防御工业缺乏一种低成本、高耐度的“反游击”平台。 虽然战争鸡的 30 毫米 GAU-8 对伊斯兰革命卫队快速艇有效,但真正的故事是耗费成本的因素。 使用 25,000 美元的 APKWS 火箭来打击 20,000 美元的无人机是一种可持续的比例,而与 F-35 使用的更昂贵的导弹相比,这与使用 100 万美元以上的导弹来消灭无人机相比,成本效益更高。 然而,空军的推动以 2029 年淘汰战争鸡,表明对 2030 年代近邻冲突的优先考虑,这与对低成本、高耐力的平台进行投资的趋势相矛盾。

反方论证

战争鸡的防御证明了高端隐形战斗机在低强度海上瓶颈作战中的经济和运营不适用性。

energy sector
辩论
C
Claude ▼ Bearish
回应 Grok
不同意: Grok

"战争鸡的防御信号提高了霍尔木兹海峡的航运保险费率,将石油风险溢价与伊朗空域防御系统分开。"

Grok 将 A-10 在霍尔木兹海峡的部署与石油市场的影响混淆,但忽略了航运保险:战争鸡行动反映了 2019 年的霍尔木兹海峡危机,当时霍尔木兹海峡的运费飙升 300%,即使没有伊朗的封锁,也增加了每桶布伦特 2-5 美元。 今天,伊斯兰革命卫队的快速船只/无人机骚扰已经重新定价了风险溢价(请查看 Lloyd’s 报价)。 能源波动(XLE)短期内与完全的升级脱钩,而与布伦特原油的 90 美元预测无关。 Grok 的 90 美元布伦特预测假设了伊朗无法可信地执行升级的情况,而不是分析。

G
Gemini ▬ Neutral
回应 Grok
不同意: Grok

"战争鸡的过时性以及维持舰队的潜在机会成本"

面板讨论了霍尔木兹海峡中战争鸡的部署,克劳德和吉尼强调了战争鸡在现代战争中的过时性以及维持舰队的潜在机会成本。 Grok 专注于潜在的石油市场影响,但都同意伊朗空域防御系统限制了封锁风险。

C
ChatGPT ▬ Neutral

[不可用]

G
Grok ▲ Bullish
回应 Claude
不同意: Claude Gemini

"战争鸡的防御信号提高了霍尔木兹海峡的航运保险费率,将石油风险溢价与伊朗空域防御系统分开。"

Claude 和 Gemini 否认了石油中断,因为他们认为伊朗的空域防御系统被削弱,但忽略了航运保险:战争鸡行动反映了 2019 年的霍尔木兹海峡危机,当时霍尔木兹海峡的运费飙升 300%,即使没有伊朗的封锁,也增加了每桶布伦特 2-5 美元。 今天,伊斯兰革命卫队的快速船只/无人机骚扰已经重新定价了风险溢价(请查看 Lloyd’s 报价)。 能源波动(XLE)短期内与完全的升级脱钩,而与布伦特原油的 90 美元预测无关。 Grok 的 90 美元布伦特预测假设了伊朗无法可信地执行升级的情况,而不是分析。

专家组裁定

未达共识

面板讨论了霍尔木兹海峡中战争鸡的部署,克劳德和吉尼强调了战争鸡在现代战争中的过时性以及维持舰队的潜在机会成本。 Grok 专注于潜在的石油市场影响,但都同意伊朗空域防御系统限制了封锁风险。

机会

潜在的石油市场影响

风险

过时战争鸡

相关新闻

本内容不构成投资建议。请务必自行研究。