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The panel, while acknowledging a potential inflation uptick due to energy risks, is largely bearish, warning of stagflation risks, equity multiple compression, and the potential for central banks to underestimate second-round effects. They express concern about the sensitivity of inflation to energy dynamics and geopolitics, as well as the risk of a tightening credit regime.
Risiko: Stagflation risk due to persistent energy risk premium and potential second-round wage effects, which could pressure equity multiples and trigger a liquidity contraction in emerging markets.
Chance: Energy (XLE) tactical overweight, given the elevated oil prices.
Von Hari Kishan
BENGALURU, 28. April (Reuters) - Die Inflation in den meisten Ländern wird in diesem Jahr deutlich höher ausfallen als vor drei Monaten prognostiziert, inmitten einer Pattsituation in der Energiekrise, die durch den US-israelischen Krieg mit dem Iran ausgelöst wurde, so eine Reuters-Umfrage unter rund 500 Ökonomen, die ihre positive globale Wachstumsprognose kaum veränderten.
Mit Irans Würgegriff auf ein Fünftel des globalen Ölangebots durch die Schließung der Straße von Hormus schwinden die Aussichten auf niedrigere Preise, was Ökonomen und globale Zentralbanken zwingt, eine längere Phase höherer Inflation in Betracht zu ziehen.
Aber mit wenigen bemerkenswerten Ausnahmen wie der Türkei und Argentinien, die bereits zweistellige Inflationsraten aufweisen, waren die Prognoseanhebungen bescheiden, da Rohöl am Dienstag wieder über 110 US-Dollar pro Barrel gehandelt wurde.
Die jüngste Umfrage, die vom 27. März bis 27. April durchgeführt wurde und die 50 größten globalen Volkswirtschaften abdeckt, ergab für 44 von ihnen höhere Inflationsprognosen für 2026, mit wenigen wesentlichen Änderungen der Wirtschaftswachstumserwartungen, abgesehen von der Golfregion.
"Die vollständige Schließung der Straße von Hormus ist im Grunde genommen ahistorisch, und daher haben wir in der Vergangenheit kein gutes Modell dafür", sagte Seth Carpenter, globaler Chefökonom bei Morgan Stanley.
"Die Leute müssen die Idee in Betracht ziehen, dass wir aufgrund der zusätzlichen Risikoprämie, die eingepreist ist, auf absehbare Zeit einfach höhere Ölpreise haben werden."
Die Zentralbanken werden immer noch von ihrer früheren kollektiven Fehleinschätzung geplagt, dass der Inflationsschub in den letzten Tagen der COVID-19-Pandemie vorübergehend war, und von der strafferen Politik, zu der sie gezwungen waren, als klar war, dass sie die falsche Entscheidung getroffen hatten.
Aber bisher haben sie sich entschieden, abzuwarten und zu beobachten, wie sich der Konflikt im Nahen Osten entwickelt, anstatt einer möglichen Preissteigerung zuvorzukommen.
Die Bank of Japan beließ die Zinssätze am Dienstag wie in einer Reuters-Umfrage prognostiziert unverändert, und die meisten ihrer wichtigsten Pendants wurden voraussichtlich diesem Beispiel folgen.
Der Fokus wird darauf liegen, wie die Zentralbanker die jüngste Zunahme des Preisdrucks einschätzen und ob es Zweitrundeneffekte geben wird, die eine umgehende Zinsreaktion erfordern.
Während die Ökonomen erwarteten, dass die US-Notenbank nur einmal die Zinsen senken würde – im letzten Quartal dieses Jahres –, wurden die Bank of England und die Bank of Canada voraussichtlich bis 2026 keine Änderungen vornehmen. Die Europäische Zentralbank wird voraussichtlich nur einmal die Zinsen anheben, wahrscheinlich im Juni.
Die Finanzmärkte preisen jedoch weiterhin Zinserhöhungen der meisten Zentralbanken ein, während sie erwarten, dass die Fed den Rest des Jahres die Zinsen unverändert lässt.
"Es gibt eine Tendenz an den Finanzmärkten, die wir für superrational halten, schlechte Nachrichten zu ignorieren, bis sie direkt vor der Haustür stehen", sagte Douglas Porter, Chefökonom bei BMO Capital Markets.
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"Central banks are repeating their 2021 ‘transitory’ error by underestimating the structural inflationary impact of a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz."
The Reuters poll highlights a dangerous complacency in central bank policy. While economists expect ‘modest’ inflation upgrades despite $110 oil, they are likely underestimating the stickiness of energy-driven cost-push inflation. By pricing in a single Fed cut while ignoring the potential for supply-chain shocks from the Strait of Hormuz, the market is betting on a soft landing that ignores the ‘second-round effects’ of energy costs cascading into services. If energy stays elevated, real disposable income will crater, turning a ‘wait and watch’ approach into a policy error that forces a much more aggressive, growth-killing tightening cycle later in 2025.
The global economy has significantly improved its energy efficiency and diversified its oil sourcing since the 1970s, meaning the correlation between crude prices and headline inflation is weaker than historical models suggest.
"Persistent $110+ oil from Hormuz risks second-round inflation effects, forcing central bank hikes that derail the global soft landing and compress equity valuations."
This Reuters poll reveals economists revising up 2026 inflation forecasts for 44 of top 50 economies due to Iran’s Hormuz closure choking 20% of global oil supply, with Brent back above $110/bbl—yet growth views hold firm except in Gulf states. Central banks are wisely pausing (BOJ steady, Fed one cut Q4, ECB one hike June), but markets price hikes, sensing dovish blind spots akin to post-COVID ‘transitory’ errors. Key miss: no quantified inflation jumps (e.g., US CPI to ?%), vague on second-round wage effects. Stagflation risk rises if risk premium persists, pressuring equity multiples (S&P fwd P/E compression from 20x). Energy (XLE) tactical overweight, but broad risk-off looms.
Geopolitical flares like this often fizzle without full supply loss—Hormuz alternatives exist via pipelines/Saudi spare capacity—and economists’ modest upgrades suggest contained impact, preserving the soft landing.
"Central banks’ wait-and-see posture is dangerous if oil remains $100+ through Q3 and wage growth doesn't cool—they’ll be forced into surprise hikes that markets haven't priced, compressing valuations that assume rate cuts."
The article conflates a geopolitical shock (Strait of Hormuz closure) with inevitable inflation persistence, but the math doesn't support panic yet. Oil at $110 is elevated but not 2008 ($147) or 1980 ($130+) territory. Critically, the poll shows 44 of 50 economies got *modest* forecast upgrades—not dramatic ones. The real risk isn't the headline inflation bump; it’s whether central banks stay on hold too long if second-round wage effects materialize. The Fed’s single 2026 cut versus market pricing of holds suggests asymmetric upside surprise if energy stays elevated AND labor tightens.
If the Strait closure is truly temporary (weeks, not months), oil could crash 20-30% within quarters, making current inflation forecasts look alarmist. The article assumes the shock persists; geopolitical de-escalation would invalidate the entire thesis.
"Persistently higher energy-driven inflation with delayed policy easing is likely to push longer-term real yields higher and compress equity valuations, making a broad market rally unlikely in H2 2026."
This Reuters poll suggests inflation stays higher into 2026 due to energy risk premia (Brent >$110) with growth resilient and central banks cautiously patient. The missing angle is the sensitivity of inflation to energy dynamics and geopolitics: a spillover from Hormuz could persist, but a diplomatic or supply response could also deflate the inflation impulse faster than the poll assumes. The piece understates how second-order financial conditions (credit spreads, liquidity, consumer leverage) could tighten later in the year, even if headline growth holds, potentially dragging earnings and equities. Markets may be underpricing downside risk if inflation proves stickier than models imply.
Oil could retreat as supply comes online or diplomacy eases, allowing inflation to cool and prompting earlier than expected policy easing; if that happens, equities could rally despite the article’s inflation narrative.
"The real danger of sustained energy inflation is a sovereign debt-servicing crisis, not just consumer price stickiness."
Claude, you’re underestimating the fiscal transmission mechanism. It isn't just about oil prices hitting 2008 levels; it’s about the debt-to-GDP ratios of 2024. With global sovereign debt at record highs, any persistent ‘modest’ inflation spike forces central banks to maintain higher-for-longer real rates, which triggers a debt-servicing crisis in emerging markets. This isn't just a CPI print issue—it’s a solvency risk that will force a liquidity contraction far faster than your wage-price spiral models suggest.
"Bolstered EM reserves and ample spare oil capacity prevent a debt crisis from the Hormuz shock."
Gemini, EM debt-servicing crisis ignores post-2022 FX reserve builds (e.g., India +25% to $650bn, Turkey +50%) that cover 12+ months of imports even at $120 oil. Bigger miss: OPEC+ spare capacity (5.8mm bpd) and US shale ramp (EIA: +900k bpd H2) likely cap the shock at 3-6 months, avoiding solvency contagion. Equity volatility spikes short-term, but no 2025 recession trigger.
"EM solvency risk persists if OPEC+ coordination breaks and reserve currency mismatches amplify import shocks beyond headline oil prices."
Grok’s EM reserve buffer is real, but misses the *composition* risk: many reserves are USD-denominated while import costs spike in oil-linked currencies. India’s $650bn looks solid until energy bills hit in rupees. Also, OPEC+ spare capacity assumes *willingness* to deploy—geopolitical fractures (Saudi-Iran tensions) could paralyze coordination. The 3-6 month cap assumes no escalation; Hormuz closure alone doesn't guarantee supply returns.
"The real risk is tightening non-sovereign credit and dollar funding strains that tighten financial conditions even if sovereign debt remains manageable."
Gemini’s solvency warning hinges on oil staying costly and debt-servicing burdens growing; but it overstates a forced liquidity crunch. EM buffers, FX hedges, and potential IMF backstops can blunt spillovers, especially if commodity pressures ease. The real risk lies in non-sovereign credit: tighter corporate credit spreads and dollar funding strains could tighten financial conditions even if sovereign debt remains manageable. The key risk is a tightening credit regime, not a sovereign solvency crisis.
Panel-Urteil
Konsens erreichtThe panel, while acknowledging a potential inflation uptick due to energy risks, is largely bearish, warning of stagflation risks, equity multiple compression, and the potential for central banks to underestimate second-round effects. They express concern about the sensitivity of inflation to energy dynamics and geopolitics, as well as the risk of a tightening credit regime.
Energy (XLE) tactical overweight, given the elevated oil prices.
Stagflation risk due to persistent energy risk premium and potential second-round wage effects, which could pressure equity multiples and trigger a liquidity contraction in emerging markets.