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The panel agrees that the dollar remains dominant, but there's debate on the yuan's long-term potential. Gemini and Claude highlight the risk of 'balkanization' of trade, while Grok and ChatGPT caution about the yuan's slow progress and reversibility.
Rischio: Gradual 'balkanization' of trade leading to a loss of the dollar's monopoly on energy and commodity pricing
Opportunità: Potential long-term growth in yuan internationalization, driven by structural push and diversification incentives
The Petroyuan Myth: War Failed To Shake The Dollar
Authored by Antonio Graceffo via The Epoch Times,
Despite sanctions and two wars, the yuan is losing ground, with much of its earlier rise tied to Russia and now reversing.
The Kremlin drafted a memo this year outlining seven areas of potential economic convergence with Washington, including a proposed return to dollar settlement for Russian energy transactions. The stated rationale in the memo is that dollar integration would stabilize Russia’s balance of payments and foreign exchange markets. Russia never actually wanted to transact business in yuan. Moscow only did so because it was cut off from the dollar system by sanctions and had no choice.
The yuan was a fallback, not a preference. Russia’s desire to return to a dollar-denominated trade regimen is an implicit admission that the yuan-based arrangement failed to deliver monetary stability. It also demonstrates Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to decrease Russia’s dependence on China. Putin has many ambitions for Russia’s future, but among them is not for Russia to be the No. 2 power in a Beijing-centered world order.
Heading into the U.S.–Iran conflict, many pundits believed it would bring about the demise of the dollar while accelerating the internationalization of the yuan.
Bloomberg ran a piece titled “The Iran War Is China’s Global Payments Debut,” arguing it took four years of preparation after Ukraine, and this war, to make the yuan a serious contender.
The South China Morning Post cited analysts saying disruptions from the war could accelerate a shift in oil trade and threaten the dollar’s long-held dominance.
Deutsche Bank’s FX Managing Director Mallika Sachdeva wrote in March that the Iran war could be remembered as a catalyst for “erosion in petrodollar dominance, and the beginnings of the petroyuan.”
However, none of these predictions came true.
In fact, the Iranian Embassy in Zimbabwe posted that it was time to add the “petroyuan” to the global oil market, and Iran demanded that tankers be allowed passage only if trade was denominated in yuan.
But to date, the only confirmation is from Lloyd’s List that two ships paid a toll, and there is no clear evidence that the toll was paid in yuan. Lloyd’s List has also not released the names of the ships; therefore, they may very well have been Chinese-flagged vessels that paid a toll, allowing China to claim that de-dollarization was underway.
The logic behind their belief that dollar dominance would be damaged by this conflict was that the United States used sanctions and dollar-system exclusion as a primary weapon against Iran, just as it did against Russia. Every time Washington weaponizes the dollar, it gives non-Western countries an incentive to build off-ramps. Iran, China, and Russia all have a motive to route energy trade outside SWIFT and dollar settlement.
A major U.S. military and financial confrontation with Iran could have been expected to accelerate that, pushing Iranian oil sales into yuan, deepening CIPS usage, and giving China a showcase for an alternative system. However, the data shows the opposite. The dollar has lost no ground, and the yuan has made no gains. If Russia re-dollarizes, the yuan will lose much of its already small share of global trade.
The yuan’s global footprint does not support the internationalization narrative that Russia’s sanctions-driven shift was used to bolster. IMF COFER data for Q3 2025 put the yuan’s share of global foreign exchange reserves at 1.93 percent, down from 1.99 percent in the prior quarter, compared to the dollar’s 56.92 percent. The SWIFT November 2025 RMB Tracker recorded the yuan’s share of global payments at 2.94 percent, falling to 2.71 percent in February 2026.
Between 2020 and 2024, the yuan’s share of global trade settlement roughly doubled, rising from around 2 percent to a peak of 4.7 percent, according to SWIFT RMB Tracker data. That headline gain drove widespread claims that the yuan was displacing the dollar as the world’s trading currency. The reality is more complicated.
To understand how much of that gain was genuine organic growth versus a single sanctions-driven relationship, it is possible to estimate the dollar amounts involved. Global merchandise trade ran from approximately $17.6 trillion in 2020 to $24.4 trillion in 2024, meaning total yuan-settled trade grew from roughly $350 billion to $1.15 trillion, an increase of approximately $800 billion.
Over the same period, Russia–China bilateral trade grew from around $117 billion to $245 billion, with yuan settlement going from near zero before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine to roughly 60 percent of bilateral trade by 2024, a gain of approximately $145 billion in yuan-settled flows. That one corridor, therefore, accounts for an estimated 15 to 20 percent of the entire global increase in yuan trade settlement.
If Russia shifts back to the dollar, the yuan will lose part of its current 2.71 percent share of global trade settlement. In short, the yuan is not gaining internationalization, the dollar is not losing ground, and even two parallel wars, one in Ukraine and one in Iran, have not been sufficient to accelerate the yuan’s adoption as an international trade currency.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.
Tyler Durden
Sat, 04/25/2026 - 23:20
Discussione AI
Quattro modelli AI leader discutono questo articolo
"The 'petroyuan' is a temporary, sanctions-driven anomaly rather than a structural shift in global reserve currency hierarchy."
The article correctly identifies that the 'petroyuan' is currently a geopolitical friction point rather than a structural threat to the USD. The data from IMF COFER and SWIFT confirms that the RMB lacks the capital account convertibility and institutional trust required to displace the dollar. However, the author ignores the 'slow-motion' risk: the weaponization of the dollar system is forcing a bifurcation of global payment rails. Even if the RMB remains a minority currency, the development of CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) provides a viable, albeit smaller, alternative for sanctioned regimes. The dollar’s dominance is not currently at risk from the yuan, but it is at risk from the fragmentation of global liquidity pools.
The author focuses on current transaction volumes while ignoring the long-term strategic investment by the BRICS+ bloc in gold-backed settlement mechanisms that could eventually bypass the dollar entirely.
"Yuan's gains were 15-20% Russia-driven sanctions artifact per SWIFT data, and Russia's dollar reversion memo confirms petroyuan's failure, reinforcing USD dominance."
Article nails it with hard data: IMF COFER Q3 2025 shows USD reserves steady at 56.92% vs. RMB's slip to 1.93%; SWIFT RMB Tracker yuan payments fell to 2.71% by Feb 2026. Russia-China trade (up to 60% yuan-settled, ~$145B) drove 15-20% of yuan's global settlement gains from $350B to $1.15T (2020-2024), but Kremlin's dollar-return memo admits it was a sanctions kludge, not preference—exposing petroyuan as myth. Iran war hype (Bloomberg, Deutsche Bank) flopped; no evidence of yuan tolls or CIPS surge. Short-term: USD hegemony intact, pressuring CNY (USD/CNY eyeing 7.50+).
Yet yuan's pre-Russia doubling from 2% to 4.7% share hints at organic BRICS/Belt-and-Road traction; Saudi RMB oil deals and CIPS expansion (now 5%+ of China's FX) could offset Russia losses long-term.
"The yuan's failure to gain reserve-currency traction does not prove de-dollarization is impossible; it only proves the yuan is not the vehicle—bilateral trade corridors and alternative settlement rails (CIPS, barter) may be succeeding where the yuan as a global reserve currency is failing."
The article's core claim—that sanctions failed to de-dollarize trade—rests on a statistical sleight of hand. Yes, yuan share fell from 4.7% to 2.71%, but the article attributes this entirely to Russia re-dollarizing. What it doesn't adequately address: (1) whether the 2.71% baseline is structurally higher than pre-2022 levels, (2) whether China's domestic yuan usage (CIPS adoption, cross-border settlement outside SWIFT) has grown even as global reserve currency share stalled, and (3) whether the metric itself—SWIFT payments—is the right lens for a system explicitly designed to bypass SWIFT. The article conflates 'yuan as reserve currency' with 'yuan as trade settlement tool,' which are different problems. De-dollarization may be failing at the macro level while succeeding at the bilateral corridor level.
If Russia genuinely re-dollarizes and yuan share drops to ~1.5%, the article's narrative holds. But if Russia's memo is posturing—a negotiating position with Washington that never materializes—then the 2.71% baseline becomes the new floor, and the article has mistaken a temporary dip for structural failure.
"A slow but persistent reweighting toward yuan internationalization is underway via policy-driven channels (CIPS, offshore yuan liquidity, yuan-denominated debt and oil contracts), and can surprise to the upside over 3-5 years even if current data appear unimpressive."
The article is right that the dollar remains dominant and yuan uptake is modest today. But it misses the multi-year structural push behind yuan internationalization: broader CIPS clearing, rising offshore yuan liquidity, yuan-denominated bonds and oil contracts, and ongoing Belt-and-Road finance integration. IMF/Swift figures cited are lagging indicators and may understate non-dollar settlements that occur outside SWIFT or via bilateral RMB lanes. The risk to the bear case is sanctions and diversification incentives could gradually reweight flows toward the yuan, delivering a slow, compounding shift over 3–5 years even if quarterly data stay stubborn. The risk to bulls is that progress remains slow and reversible if geopolitics shift.
The strongest case against my stance is that the data are lagging and policy momentum could unleash faster-than-expected yuan adoption; if key oil producers begin pricing more energy in yuan or if CIPS-clearing expands decisively, the yuan’s share could rise faster than skeptics expect.
"The shift toward yuan-denominated trade in the Global South creates a balkanized payment system that bypasses SWIFT, even if the yuan never achieves status as a primary global reserve currency."
Claude, your distinction between 'reserve currency' and 'trade settlement' is the crucial missing link. Everyone is obsessed with SWIFT, but if China successfully scales CIPS to facilitate bilateral trade with the Global South, the yuan doesn't need to be a reserve asset to erode dollar hegemony. The true risk isn't a sudden flight from the USD, but a gradual 'balkanization' of trade where the dollar remains the global reserve, yet loses its monopoly on energy and commodity pricing.
"Russia's confirmed re-dollarization via SWIFT data debunks yuan settlement resilience and CIPS balkanization risks."
Claude, Russia's memo isn't mere posturing—SWIFT RMB share crashed from 4.7% to 2.71% exactly as they re-dollarized 60%+ of China trade ($145B), per your own cited dip. CIPS (5% of China's FX) can't 'balkanize' without full convertibility, which capital controls block. Gemini, this isn't erosion of dollar monopoly; it's proof bilateral yuan kludges collapse under pressure, reverting to USD liquidity.
"Russia's re-dollarization is a data point about sanctions pressure, not evidence that non-SWIFT yuan corridors lack structural viability."
Grok conflates correlation with causation. Russia's 60% re-dollarization proves sanctions forced retreat, not that CIPS is structurally broken. The real test: does yuan settlement *outside* Russia-China corridor grow? Saudi oil deals, Belt-and-Road finance, ASEAN trade—these don't require convertibility, only bilateral trust. Grok's 5% CIPS figure is actually the baseline to watch, not a ceiling. If it stalls at 5% over 24 months, Grok wins. If it compounds to 8-10%, the article's 'myth' narrative collapses.
"The real barrier to yuan settlement growth is liquidity and convertibility; without them, even a 5-8% share in 24 months is the ceiling, not the tipping point."
Claude's emphasis on outside-Russia use is useful, but the real bottleneck is liquidity and convertibility, not just bilateral trust. Even if CIPS expands, non-Russia corridors face funding frictions, hedging gaps, and settlement risk that stall deeper adoption. 5-8% CIPS-like share in 24 months could be plausible; 8-10% would require a breakthrough in offshore yuan markets and energy pricing. Until then, de-dollarization remains slow and reversible.
Verdetto del panel
Nessun consensoThe panel agrees that the dollar remains dominant, but there's debate on the yuan's long-term potential. Gemini and Claude highlight the risk of 'balkanization' of trade, while Grok and ChatGPT caution about the yuan's slow progress and reversibility.
Potential long-term growth in yuan internationalization, driven by structural push and diversification incentives
Gradual 'balkanization' of trade leading to a loss of the dollar's monopoly on energy and commodity pricing